Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous WebSocket connections on web pages that utilize the 'rrweb' session replay library, often used by phishing infrastructure such as the Bluekit Browser-in-the-Middle (AiTM) kit to capture and relay real-time victim input (keystrokes and mouse movements) to attacker-controlled consoles.
Detects potential Browser-in-the-Middle (AiTM) credential relay attacks where a user clicks a malicious phishing URL, followed shortly by a successful interactive sign-in from a different IP address and a previously unseen device.
Detects consecutive successful AWS ConsoleLogin events for the same user originating from distinct IP addresses within a 10-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a session-based attack such as Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) where session cookies are intercepted and replayed, allowing an attacker to bypass traditional authentication or multi-factor authentication controls.
This rule detects potential adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) activity targeting FortiGate firewalls, specifically looking for internal authentication traffic (LDAP, Kerberos, LDAPS, MS-SQL) originating from a firewall management IP. The rule triggers if there are 5 such connections within 60 seconds, indicating a possible listening post or attempt to intercept credentials.
Detects a single host serving materially different status codes, body sizes, or redirects to automated user agents (bots, crawlers, scanners, curl, wget, headless browsers, python, go-http) compared to normal browsers. This behavior can indicate an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack where the adversary is attempting to serve different content to different user agents to evade detection or deliver malicious payloads.
Detects anomalous web session traffic that proxies enterprise authorization endpoints (e.g., oauth, saml, login) while simultaneously interacting with session-related cookies. This behavior is indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) proxy setup used to capture session tokens and bypass authentication.
Detects the execution of known adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing frameworks, such as Evilginx or Modlishka, by identifying process names, paths, or specific command-line arguments (e.g., --phishlets, --proxy, --lure) used to initiate these proxy-based phishing sessions.
Detects session hijacking consistent with Browser-in-the-Middle (BitM) attacks like Bluekit PhaaS, where an attacker captures an authenticated session token. The rule identifies instances where a successful MFA-protected login event is immediately followed by a session reuse event from a different IP address or network location, which is indicative of the attacker utilizing the intercepted session.
Detects network activity associated with Bluekit phishing infrastructure, which utilizes WebSocket connections for real-time browser session exfiltration. The rule monitors for characteristic HTTP upgrade requests to WebSockets containing 'rrweb' or 'session' query parameters, or connections to known Bluekit phishing domains, which allow attackers to stream DOM, keystrokes, and mouse movements from a victim's browser to an attacker-controlled dashboard.
Detects a web session that proxies an enterprise authorisation endpoint while also handling session-cookie names associated with authenticated access. This rule identifies suspicious activity indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) attack where an attacker proxies authentication requests and steals session cookies.
Detects manipulation of data in transit via man-in-the-middle position
AI-powered phishing-as-a-service abusing device-code authentication
Flags traffic targeting known rogue DNS infrastructure IPs associated with recent SOHO router hijacking campaigns. This rule specifically looks for outbound network connections to IP addresses starting with '5.' or '185.' on destination port 53 (DNS).
This rule detects POST requests to the URI '/api/device/start' which is indicative of the EvilTokens phishing kit attempting to initiate a Microsoft OAuth Device Code flow. This technique is often used in phishing campaigns to gain unauthorized access to user accounts by tricking them into authenticating through a device code.
Detects suspected Browser-in-the-Middle (AiTM) activity by identifying successful multi-factor authentication followed by session activity from a different source IP address or with a different user-agent string within a 10-minute window, suggesting token theft or session hijacking.
Detects potential unauthorized or rogue peer connections within a Cisco SD-WAN infrastructure. The rule monitors certificate-based authentication events for indicators of rogue peers (e.g., certificate mismatches, invalid common names) or connections originating from known malicious IP addresses associated with rogue SD-WAN activity.
Detects when a single session identifier is used to access multiple cloud applications, where at least three distinct applications are accessed within an hour, and these applications were not part of the original interactive sign-in. This behavior can indicate a token replay attack, specifically as described in the Elastic Security Labs research on Tycoon 2FA AiTM detection engineering.
Detects OpenVPN Connect applying a server-controlled PAC AutoConfigURL to HKCU Internet Settings, potentially enabling proxy interception of user traffic. This is achieved when a malicious VPN server pushes a dhcp-option PROXY_AUTO_CONFIG_URL, causing the OpenVPN system-level agent to write the attacker-controlled URL to the user's registry hive.
Detects behavior indicative of Bluekit Browser-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing, where a client system fetches the rrweb DOM-serialization library followed by the establishment of a WebSocket connection within a 5-minute window. This sequence is consistent with live session recording or interactive DOM streaming from an attacker-controlled infrastructure.
Detects Browser-in-the-Middle (BitM) phishing attacks, such as Bluekit, that utilize the rrweb library for real-time DOM serialization and WebSocket streaming to capture user sessions. The rule correlates the presence of the rrweb library in HTTP traffic with WebSocket communication patterns containing session handshakes and serialized DOM payloads.
Detects Browser-in-the-Middle (BitM) phishing infrastructure associated with PhaaS kits (e.g., Bluekit). The detection monitors proxy access logs for patterns where page assets (images, fonts, CSS) are fetched through a proxy API endpoint on behalf of the victim, combined with WebSocket connections used for real-time relay of victim inputs to the attacker.
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