Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects AiTM compromise where user click phishing URL, completed MFA, and signed in from a different IP within 10 minutes
Detects potential NTLM credential leakage caused by SnippingTool.exe making outbound network connections (SMB / Web) that result in NTLM authentication, consistent with CVE‑2026‑33829 exploitation.
Detects potential suspicious behaviour using secedit.exe. Such as exporting or modifying the security policy
Detects BGP failures which may be indicative of brute force attacks to manipulate routing
Detects LDP failures which may be indicative of brute force attacks to manipulate MPLS labels
Detects BGP failures which may be indicative of brute force attacks to manipulate routing.
Detects juniper BGP missing MD5 digest. Which may be indicative of brute force attacks to manipulate routing.
Detects when the Notepad++ updater (gup.exe) makes DNS queries to domains that are not part of the known legitimate update infrastructure.
This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater mechanism or suspicious network activity that warrants further investigation.
This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater mechanism or suspicious network activity that warrants further investigation.
Detects when the Notepad++ updater (gup.exe) creates files in suspicious or uncommon locations.
This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater component to deliver unwanted malware or unwarranted files.
This could indicate potential exploitation of the updater component to deliver unwanted malware or unwarranted files.
Detects when a single user account successfully signs in from two or more distinct IP addresses within a short timeframe. This can be an indicator of an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attack where both the legitimate user and the attacker have active, authenticated sessions from different locations.
Detects potential adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) session hijacking by identifying a single session ID being used in successful sign-ins from multiple distinct IP addresses and with different User-Agent strings within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an attacker stealing a session cookie and replaying it from their own machine, a technique commonly used by phishing kits like Tycoon2FA.
Detects potential adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) session hijacking by identifying a single session ID being used in successful sign-ins from multiple distinct IP addresses and with different User-Agent strings within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of an attacker stealing a session cookie and replaying it from their own machine, a technique commonly used by phishing kits like Tycoon2FA.
This rule correlates an email URL click with a subsequent risky sign-in from the same user within a short timeframe (1 hour). This is a strong indicator of a successful Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack, such as those conducted with the Tycoon2FA kit, where a user is tricked into authenticating through a malicious site, allowing the attacker to capture their session.
Correlates an email URL click with a subsequent risky sign-in from the same user within a short timeframe. This pattern is a strong indicator of a successful Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack, such as those conducted with the Tycoon2FA kit, where a user is tricked into authenticating through a malicious site, allowing the attacker to capture their session.
Detects when a single user account successfully signs in from two or more distinct IP addresses within a short timeframe. This can be an indicator of an adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attack where both the legitimate user and the attacker have active, authenticated sessions from different locations.
Detects successful Entra ID sign-ins that exhibit characteristics of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) session cookie hijack.
This activity is often associated with AiTM phishing kits like Tycoon2FA, where attackers replay stolen session cookies from unmanaged devices to bypass MFA.
This activity is often associated with AiTM phishing kits like Tycoon2FA, where attackers replay stolen session cookies from unmanaged devices to bypass MFA.
This rule detects potentially risky browser sign-ins from unmanaged devices, which aligns with account access patterns observed in AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing campaigns like those discussed in the Tycoon2FA report. It identifies sign-ins where the risk level is elevated (50 or 100), the client application used is a browser, and device trust type and device name information are empty, suggesting an unknown or untrusted device. This serves as a lead to investigate suspicious browser-based sign-ins that might indicate an AiTM compromise.
This rule detects activity related to the DKnife gateway AitM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) threat, as detailed in Talos Intelligence reporting. It identifies specific binary names (dknife.bin, sslmm.bin, postapi.bin, rules.bin, sshapi.bin, inotify.bin, curlapi.bin) associated with the threat, either as process names or file names. Additionally, it looks for configuration artifacts (rules.conf, sslmm.cfg, url.cfg) used by the proxy/redirect logic, either as file names or within process command lines. Finally, the rule identifies exfiltration or tagging markers (dkimsi=, 460110672021628, PASSWORD) observed in logs or artifacts, which are indicative of DKnife's reporting mechanisms.
Detects suspected DKnife gateway AitM activity by matching Linux process/file artifacts (component names and config files) described in the Talos DKnife disclosure.
Detects the DKnife gateway-monitoring framework, a toolset used by China-nexus actors for adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attacks, based on specific file, network, and persistence artifacts.
This query detects network traffic patterns associated with the DKnife Adversary-in-the-Middle (AitM) framework. Specifically, it looks for triggers used by the DarkNimbus backdoor to request C2 information from a compromised gateway. This includes HTTP requests to a specific Baidu URL used by the Android variant and UDP traffic to port 8005 used by the Windows variant.
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