Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

128 detections

KQL Query from file: Hunting Rogue Endpoints via SMB Detection
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
9067
KQL Query
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
3066
KQL Query from file: NTLMv2 Hash Leak via COM Detection
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
4064
KQL Query from file: KQLWiz PDF NTLM Leak Detector
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
2051
KQL Query
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
3051
KQL Query
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
4049
KQL Query from file: CVE-2025-24054 NTLM Exploit in the Wild Detection
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
4039
KQL Query from file: CVE-2024-38200 NTLM Exposure Detection
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Steven Lim@KQLWizard
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SlimKQL
1 year ago
2034
Detects different hacktools used for relay attacks on Windows for privilege escalation
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0021
Detects different hacktools used for relay attacks on Windows for privilege escalation
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0018
Detects the execution of different compiled Windows binaries of the impacket toolset (based on names or part of their names - could lead to false positives)
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
0011
Detects logon events that have characteristics of events generated during an attack with RottenPotato and the like
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
009
Detects the load of the Windiver driver, a powerful user-mode capture/sniffing/modification/blocking/re-injection package for Windows
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
007
This query identifies files that are copied to a device over SMB, then executed within a
specified threshold. Default is 5 seconds, but is configurable by tweaking the value for
ToleranceInSeconds.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
1035
Detects command line parameters used by ADCSPwn, a tool to escalate privileges in an active directory network by coercing authenticate from machine accounts and relaying to the certificate service
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
005
Detects command line parameters used by ADCSPwn, a tool to escalate privileges in an active directory network by coercing authenticate from machine accounts and relaying to the certificate service
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
005
Detects the execution of different compiled Windows binaries of the impacket toolset (based on names or part of their names - could lead to false positives)
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
Detects the invocation of TabTip via CLSID as seen when JuicyPotatoNG is used on a system in brute force mode
Yamato Security Hayabusa@YamatoSecurityHayabusa
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Yamato Security Hayabusa Rules
1 year ago
004
First query digs in print spooler drivers folder for any file creations,
MANY OF THE FILES THAT SHOULD COME UP HERE MAY BE LEGIT. Unsigned files
or ones that don't have any relations to printers that you are using are
suspicious.
Second query that can be used for finding client machines that
could be operating print servers or file servers is also included here.
As additional mitigation for the exploit you might want to block the
incoming traffic to the SMB or EPMAP Ports (445) if you need to keep the
spooler service running to print from clients.
Azure Sentinel@AzureSentinel
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AzureSentinel
1 year ago
0022
This rule detects authentication attempts (both successful and failed) originating from a host with a 16-character alphanumeric workstation name, specifically looking for NTLM authentication. This pattern is characteristic of Metasploit's SMB modules, which often generate random 16-character workstation names during authentication attempts. The rule aims to identify potential lateral movement or reconnaissance activities using Metasploit against Windows systems.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
10089
Detects the use of the 'spoolss' named pipe over SMB, which can be leveraged to trigger NTLM authentication from a target machine with the print spooler service enabled. This technique is often used in NTLM relay attacks or other forms of printer spooler abuse to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0037
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