Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects uncommon outbound network activity via Kerberos default port indicating possible lateral movement or first stage PrivEsc via delegation.
'This query identifies Active Directory computer objects modifications that allow an adversary to abuse the Resource-based constrained delegation.
This query checks for event id 5136 that the Object Class field is "computer" and the LDAP Display Name is "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity" which is an indicator of Resource-based constrained delegation.
Ref: https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html'
This query checks for event id 5136 that the Object Class field is "computer" and the LDAP Display Name is "msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity" which is an indicator of Resource-based constrained delegation.
Ref: https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html'
Microsoft Defender for Identity raises alert on suspicious Kerberos ticket, pointing to a potential overpass-the-hash attack.
Once attackers gain credentials for a user with higher privileges, they will use the stolen credentials to sign into other devices and move laterally.
This query finds related sign-in events following overpass-the-hash attack to trace the footprint of the impersonated user.
Once attackers gain credentials for a user with higher privileges, they will use the stolen credentials to sign into other devices and move laterally.
This query finds related sign-in events following overpass-the-hash attack to trace the footprint of the impersonated user.
This query shows attempts to request Kerberos service ticket using the AS service, to monitor Kerberos AS authentications.
Detects possible Kerberos Replay Attack on the domain controllers when "KRB_AP_ERR_REPEAT" Kerberos response is sent to the client
This rule detects suspicious Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) requests, specifically looking for events where a computer account (indicated by a '$' at the end of the `TargetUserName`) requests a TGT with a certificate thumbprint present. This behavior is often observed after an attacker has obtained a computer certificate, potentially through techniques like PetitPotam, and is attempting to leverage it to request Kerberos tickets using tools like Rubeus. The rule focuses on Windows Event ID 4768, which signifies a Kerberos authentication service ticket request. It filters out requests from the local host (::1) and those without a certificate thumbprint.
Detects the execution of RemoteKrbRelay, a tool used for Kerberos relaying attacks. The rule identifies the tool based on its executable name or original filename and various command-line arguments that indicate different Kerberos relaying attack techniques such as relaying to SMB, LDAP for RBCD (Resource-Based Constrained Delegation), changing user passwords, or adding users to groups.
Detects uncommon outbound network activity via Kerberos default port (88) indicating possible lateral movement or initial privilege escalation through delegation. The rule specifically filters out common legitimate processes like LSASS, Chrome, Firefox, and Tomcat that might generate similar network activity, aiming to reduce false positives.
This analytic detects Kerberos service ticket requests that utilize RC4 encryption, specifically by monitoring Kerberos Event 4769. The presence of RC4 encryption in these requests is a strong indicator of potential Golden Ticket attacks. In such attacks, adversaries forge Kerberos Granting Tickets (TGTs) using the NTLM password hash of the Krbtgt account to gain unauthorized and unrestricted access within an Active Directory environment. RC4 encryption is considered rare in modern networks, making its appearance in Kerberos service ticket requests highly suspicious and indicative of malicious activity. If confirmed, this activity could lead to lateral movement and remote code execution, compromising the entire network. It's important to note that this detection method might be bypassed if attackers opt to use an AES key instead of the NTLM hash for ticket forging.
The following analytic detects the use of `setspn.exe` to query the domain for Service Principal Names (SPNs). This detection leverages Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) data, focusing on specific command-line arguments associated with `setspn.exe`. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it often precedes Kerberoasting or Silver Ticket attacks, which can lead to credential theft. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use the gathered SPNs to escalate privileges or persist within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
This analytic identifies a local successful authentication event on a Windows endpoint using the Kerberos package. It specifically looks for EventCode 4624 with LogonType 3 and a source address of 127.0.0.1, indicating a login to the built-in local Administrator account. This activity is significant as it may suggest a Kerberos relay attack, a method attackers use to escalate privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to sensitive systems, execute arbitrary code, or create new accounts in Active Directory, leading to potential system compromise.
This analytic detects suspicious Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket (TGT) requests that may indicate exploitation of CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287. It identifies sequences where a computer account is renamed (Event ID 4781) and immediately followed by a TGT request (Event ID 4768) for that same account. This behavior is significant as it could represent an attempt to escalate privileges by impersonating a Domain Controller, potentially leading to elevated access and control over the domain environment.
The analytic identifies a computer account creating a new computer account with a specific Service Principal Name (SPN) "RestrictedKrbHost". This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to establish unauthorized Kerberos authentication channels, potentially leading to lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to impersonate services, access sensitive information, or maintain persistence within the network.
The following analytic identifies the execution of the Windows OS tool klist.exe, often used by post-exploitation tools like winpeas. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process details. Monitoring klist.exe is significant as it can indicate attempts to list or gather cached Kerberos tickets, which are crucial for lateral movement or privilege escalation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could enable attackers to move laterally within the network or escalate privileges, posing a severe security risk.
The analytic identifies potential Kerberos ticket forging attacks, specifically the Diamond Ticket attack. This is detected when a user logs into a host and the GroupMembership field in event 4627 indicates a privileged group (e.g., Domain Admins), but the user does not actually belong to that group in the directory service. The detection leverages Windows Security Event Log 4627, which logs account logon events. The analytic cross-references the GroupMembership field from the event against a pre-populated lookup of actual group memberships. Any discrepancies between the events GroupMembership and the lookup indicate potential ticket forging. Kerberos ticket forging, especially the Diamond Ticket attack, allows attackers to impersonate any user and potentially gain unauthorized access to resources. By forging a ticket that indicates membership in a privileged group, an attacker can bypass security controls and gain elevated privileges. Detecting such discrepancies in group memberships during logon events can be a strong indicator of this attack in progress.
This rule detects the use of PowerView commandlets, specifically `Get-DomainComputer` or `Get-NetComputer`, with the `-Unconstrained` parameter. This activity indicates reconnaissance efforts to identify Windows endpoints configured with Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation, which can be exploited for privilege escalation or lateral movement.
This analytic detects a computer account requesting a Kerberos ticket, which is unusual as typically user accounts request these tickets. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs, specifically EventCode 4768, to identify instances where the TargetUserName ends with a dollar sign ($), indicating a computer account. This activity is significant because it may indicate the use of tools like KrbUpRelay or other Kerberos-based attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to impersonate computer accounts, potentially leading to unauthorized access and lateral movement within the network.
The analytic detects the addition of Service Principal Names (SPNs) HOST and RestrictedKrbHost to a computer account, indicative of KrbRelayUp behavior. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Logs, specifically EventCode 4741, to identify changes in SPNs. This activity is significant as it is commonly associated with Kerberos-based attacks, which can be used to escalate privileges or perform lateral movement within a network. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to impersonate services, potentially leading to unauthorized access to sensitive resources.
The following analytic identifies a non-lsass.exe process making an outbound connection on port 88, which is typically used by the Kerberos authentication protocol. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and network traffic logs. This activity is significant because, under normal circumstances, only the lsass.exe process should interact with the Kerberos Distribution Center. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an adversary attempting to abuse the Kerberos protocol, potentially leading to unauthorized access or lateral movement within the network.
This analytic detects executables running from public or temporary locations that are communicating over Windows domain authentication ports/protocols such as LDAP (389), LDAPS (636), and Kerberos (88). It leverages network traffic data to identify processes originating from user-controlled directories. This activity is significant because legitimate applications rarely run from these locations and attempt domain authentication, making it a potential indicator of compromise. If confirmed malicious, attackers could leverage this to access domain resources, potentially leading to further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.
Detects the use of the 'Get-ADComputer' cmdlet with specific parameters or LDAP filters to identify systems configured for unconstrained delegation. This activity is often performed by adversaries during the reconnaissance phase to find targets for Kerberos-based attacks like credential theft.
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