Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects anomalous patterns of Kerberos Ticket Granting Service (TGS) requests using RC4 encryption (0x17), which is a common indicator of Kerberoasting attacks. The rule identifies accounts requesting a high volume of service tickets for distinct Service Principal Names (SPNs), excluding the krbtgt account.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring for high volumes of Kerberos TGS (Ticket Granting Service) requests using the weak RC4 encryption type (0x17) from a single account within a 5-minute window. It excludes machine accounts and common system service requests to reduce noise.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 4769 for TGS service ticket requests using weak RC4 encryption (etype 0x17). It correlates these individual requests to identify a single user account requesting an abnormally high volume of service tickets within a 10-minute window, which is highly characteristic of automated SPN enumeration and cracking tools like Rubeus or Impacket.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring Kerberos TGS requests (Event ID 4769) that use RC4 encryption (0x17 or 17). It identifies accounts requesting TGS tickets for a large number of unique Service Principal Names (SPNs), excluding requests for host-based services (ending in $). High volumes of such requests from a single user are indicative of an attempt to gather service tickets for offline password cracking.
Detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring for an unusually high volume of Kerberos TGS requests (Event ID 4769) for tickets encrypted with RC4 (0x17) within a short timeframe. The rule tracks the count of requests and the diversity of Service Principal Names (SPNs) requested by a specific user account, excluding machine accounts.
This rule monitors for an abnormally high number of Kerberos Ticket Granting Service (TGS) requests using the RC4-HMAC encryption type (0x17) from a single IP address to various service accounts. This pattern is indicative of Kerberoasting, a technique where attackers attempt to obtain service tickets to crack service account passwords offline.
Detects potential Kerberoasting activity by identifying anomalous behavior where a single account requests 5 or more unique Kerberos Service Principal Name (SPN) tickets within a 5-minute window, excluding common service accounts and krbtgt ticket requests. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to enumerate and obtain tickets for multiple services for offline brute-force password cracking.
Detects the execution of Rubeus, a common security tool used for Kerberos-based attacks including Golden/Silver Ticket forgery, AS-REP roasting, Kerberoasting, and ticket harvesting. The rule monitors command-line indicators associated with known Rubeus arguments.
Detects anomalous Kerberos TGS ticket requests (Event ID 4769) using weak encryption (RC4/0x17) directed at multiple unique Service Principal Names (SPNs) from a single host or user within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of Kerberoasting, a technique used by attackers to harvest service account credentials for offline brute-force cracking.
Detects a single account requesting an abnormally high number of distinct Kerberos TGS (Ticket Granting Service) tickets for SPN-mapped accounts within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of Kerberoasting, where an attacker requests service tickets to perform offline brute-force cracking of service account passwords, often used for lateral movement.
Detects a burst of Kerberos TGS-REQ (Ticket-Granting Service Request) messages using RC4 encryption (etype 0x17) over UDP or TCP port 88. A high volume of these requests from a single source within a short timeframe is indicative of Kerberoasting, a technique where an attacker requests service tickets to perform offline password cracking of service account credentials.
Detects two suspicious Kerberos activity patterns indicative of potential credential theft or reconnaissance: 1) A single account requesting tickets for multiple services or across multiple hosts in a short duration, which may indicate automated credential harvesting such as Kerberoasting; 2) The use of RC4 encryption (0x17) for Kerberos tickets, which is an older, weaker protocol and may indicate a forced downgrade attack to facilitate offline password cracking.
Detects Kerberos TGS (Ticket Granting Service) requests where the ticket encryption type is RC4 (0x17). This behavior, commonly referred to as Kerberoasting, involves requesting service tickets for accounts with service principal names (SPNs) set, often to perform offline brute-force attacks against the service account's password hash. The rule excludes common service account patterns and machine accounts to reduce noise.
Detects a single user account performing an unusually high volume of Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) requests (Event ID 4769) within a short window, specifically using RC4 encryption (0x17). This behavior is highly characteristic of Kerberoasting, where attackers request tickets for various service principal names (SPNs) to perform offline password cracking.
Detects Kerberos service ticket requests (Event ID 4769) that utilize weak RC4 encryption (0x17). This behavior is characteristic of Kerberoasting, where attackers request service tickets for service accounts in order to perform offline brute-force attacks to recover the service account password. The rule filters out machine account requests and focuses on standard user or service account requests.
This rule detects potential Kerberoasting activity by monitoring for an unusually high volume of Kerberos Service Ticket (TGS) requests (event ID 4769) for non-machine service accounts, specifically focusing on tickets encrypted with RC4 (etype 23). A high count of ticket requests or distinct Service Principal Names (SPNs) requested by a single client in a short period is characteristic of an adversary attempting to harvest hashes for offline cracking.
Detects Kerberos TGS (Service Ticket) requests utilizing the insecure RC4 encryption type (0x17). This pattern is a hallmark of Kerberoasting, where an attacker requests service tickets for SPNs in an attempt to crack the service account credentials offline.
Detects Kerberos service ticket requests (Event ID 4769) that utilize weak RC4 encryption (0x17). This behavior is characteristic of Kerberoasting, where attackers request service tickets for service accounts in order to perform offline brute-force attacks to recover the service account password. The rule filters out machine account requests and focuses on standard user or service account requests.
Detects the execution of the Rubeus toolset with command-line arguments indicative of Kerberos ticket abuse, including Kerberoasting, AS-REP Roasting, and Pass-the-Ticket (PTT) techniques. These methods are commonly used by adversaries for credential harvesting and facilitating lateral movement within an Active Directory environment.
Detects the execution of the Rubeus tool, a C# toolkit used for interacting with the Kerberos protocol. The rule specifically monitors command-line arguments and process names associated with common Kerberos exploitation tasks such as Kerberoasting, Golden/Silver Ticket forging, and ticket manipulation.
Detects the execution of the Rubeus tool, a widely used offensive security tool for Kerberos manipulation, including ticket requests, pass-the-ticket, and credential dumping.
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