Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
238 detections
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Detects zip archives matching the .zx_ filename prefix convention used by CrashStealer to stage encrypted exfiltration data in /tmp prior to transmission to its C2 server.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities characteristic of information-stealing malware (e.g., Vidar/SnappyClient). The rule correlates browser credential access (Login Data/Cookies), screen capturing (GDI API calls), and keylogging (SetWindowsHookEx) with subsequent archive staging activities (compression of sensitive data in temp folders) within a one-hour window.
Detects TeamPCP-associated behavior in CI/CD environments, specifically the encryption and staging of sensitive secrets using tools like OpenSSL, tar, and curl. The rule monitors for the execution of at least three distinct tools from a specified list within a short time window that interact with files in a /tmp/tmp. staging directory, indicative of preparation for data exfiltration.
Detects execution of WinRAR utilities (rar.exe, winrar.exe) where the command line contains the '-a' (add to archive) flag or involves paths typically associated with data staging (Temp, AppData, Users, or Public directories), which may indicate an attempt to archive collected data prior to exfiltration.
This rule detects the execution of rclone.exe with command-line arguments indicative of data exfiltration to cloud storage providers (mega.nz, Dropbox, OneDrive) or via SFTP. This behavior is commonly associated with ransomware threat actors, such as those observed in the STAC4713 and STAC3725 campaigns (GOLD ENCOUNTER), who utilize rclone to stage and exfiltrate sensitive data prior to deploying ransomware.
Detects the creation of large archive files (.zip, .7z, .rar, .tar) exceeding 100MB within sensitive or high-risk directory paths such as Desktop, Temp, or AppData, or on non-system drives. This behavior is often associated with the staging of sensitive data for exfiltration.
Detects the use of common archive utilities (7-Zip, WinRAR) to perform file archiving operations within sensitive user-profile directories (Desktop, Documents, Downloads, etc.). This pattern is often used by adversaries to stage or bundle sensitive data prior to exfiltration.
Detects the creation of multiple archive files (ZIP, 7Z, RAR, TAR) by common utilities (7z, WinRAR, tar) in sensitive temporary directories (Temp, tmp). The rule aggregates activity over a 10-minute window to identify suspicious staging behaviors often associated with ransomware data preparation.
Detects DNS queries to Gofile infrastructure originating from processes executing from typically transient directories (AppData or Temp). This behavior is characteristic of VILE ransomware, which stages compressed user files in these directories before exfiltrating them via Gofile as part of a double-extortion strategy.
Detects instances where the WinRAR archive utility spawns a PowerShell process with command-line arguments typically associated with obfuscated or fileless execution. The detection specifically flags PowerShell commands that employ techniques such as base64 encoding, execution policy bypass, hidden window styles, or commands containing indicators of in-memory process manipulation such as NtAllocateVirtualMemory or memory allocation constants.
Detects suspicious file activity associated with the GIFTEDCROOK (UAC-0226) threat actor. The rule identifies the creation of randomized staging directories under the user profile, the creation of ZIP archives in the user root, and the creation of extensionless files within the Windows TEMP directory.
Detects the use of 7-Zip (7z.exe) executed via the command-line interpreter (cmd.exe) to interact with a specific data file named 'data.dat' associated with the 'Traiolx Custom Utils' project, which may indicate data staging or archival activities performed by an adversary.
Detects the execution of 7z.exe with specific command line arguments that include references to 'data.dat' and 'Traiolx Custom Utils', which may indicate the use of 7-Zip for staging or archiving collected data for exfiltration.
Detects unauthorized processes, such as TaskWeaver implants or scripts (node.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe) running from non-standard directories (e.g., %TEMP%, %APPDATA%), attempting to access web browser credential databases. This behavior is indicative of post-exploitation credential harvesting, specifically linked to Djinn Stealer activity following CVE-2026-48558 exploits.
Detects the creation of a 'BackupFiles' directory and the subsequent copying of sensitive browser artifacts (e.g., Login Data, Web Data, Local Storage) within Chrome or Edge user data paths. This activity is indicative of credential and session theft staging, specifically associated with the ToddyCat group's Umbrij malware preparation for browser exploitation.
Detects usage of the WinRAR utility (rar.exe) with command-line arguments indicative of file archival, specifically using flags commonly associated with automated data collection or suspicious staging patterns such as password-protected archives (-hp) or specific file paths like 'web.rar' or those within VMware directories.
Detects the use of common archive utilities (7zip, WinRAR, zip) to interact with files located in suspicious directories commonly used for data staging (AppData, Temp, Users Public). The rule tracks multiple occurrences of these commands by the same user on a host to identify potentially malicious collection and staging activities before exfiltration.
This rule detects the execution of common archival utilities (7-Zip, WinRAR, RAR, ZIP) with parameters indicative of password-protected archive creation. It specifically flags instances where a user account, with no recorded prior history of running these utilities in the last 30 days, creates a large archive (exceeding 1GB) spanning multiple directories. This pattern is commonly used for data staging and preparation prior to exfiltration.
Detects suspicious bulk archiving activity or file drops of archive formats in staging directories. The rule monitors for common archival utilities (7zip, WinRAR) or PowerShell's Compress-Archive command being used, or the creation of archive files in suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, AppData, Public). It alerts when high volumes of archives are created, password-protected archives are used, or rapid archival operations are performed.
Detects the execution of known archive utilities (e.g., 7-Zip, WinRAR) when interacting with sensitive user or system directories. This behavior is often indicative of data staging prior to potential exfiltration, especially when the originating process is not a recognized installer or backup application.
Detects the use of WinRAR or rar.exe to create password-protected archives or archive files within temporary, user-writable, or public directories. This behavior is indicative of data staging by an adversary to prepare information for exfiltration.
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