Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
238 detections
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This rule detects potentially malicious activity involving the WinRAR utility. It monitors for WinRAR creating files in Windows Startup folders, dropping files in specific ProgramData subdirectories often associated with staging malicious payloads, and spawning suspicious child processes such as command shells, scripting engines, or HTML applications.
Detects the use of 7-Zip (7z.exe or 7zip.exe) to archive files within common user directories (Desktop, Documents, Users, AppData). This activity is often associated with staging sensitive data prior to exfiltration.
Detects the AMOS infostealer staging collected system data by using the macOS ditto utility to compress information into a hidden .hipr directory. The rule identifies the execution of ditto with .hipr in the command line in conjunction with the creation of User_Name.txt and System_Information.txt within that same directory.
This rule detects the execution of self-extracting archives (SFX) that are commonly used by malware to launch a visible decoy and a hidden executable from a temporary directory. It specifically looks for process launch events where the command line contains keywords associated with SFX archives (e.g., '7-zip', 'sfx', '-y', '-o') and the principal process's file path contains terms like '7z', 'sfx', 'setup', or 'installer'. The rule aims to identify the initial stage of an attack where an SFX archive is used to drop and execute malicious payloads.
This rule correlates the credential scraping phase with the invocation of zip, tar, or ditto to compress stolen artifacts into a single file in the /tmp directory. Specifically, it looks for these archiving utilities being executed with a command line that targets a .zip or .tar.gz file within /tmp, and joins this activity with the prior access of a file named 'Login Data' by the same initiating process.
Detects IDE processes creating ZIP archives in temporary directories, which can indicate exfiltration of cryptocurrency wallets. The rule specifically looks for 'Code.exe' (VS Code) or 'cursor.exe' creating '.zip' files in common temporary paths like 'AppData\Local\Temp' or '/tmp/'.
Detects the use of WinRAR (rar.exe) to archive files using command-line arguments indicative of data staging or exfiltration (such as continuous archiving or specific extraction flags). The rule focuses on executions originating from suspicious parent processes like web servers (w3wp.exe) or command shells, or occurring within sensitive directories such as backup locations or VMware application folders.
Detects the execution of 'rar.exe' with specific command-line arguments indicative of file archiving or extraction (using switches like '-k', '-r', '-s', '-t', '-o-p'). The rule monitors for instances where this activity originates from a web server process (w3wp.exe) or command interpreter (cmd.exe), or involves specific sensitive paths like backups or VMware configuration directories, which may suggest unauthorized data staging or exfiltration preparation.
Identifies the use of the macOS ditto utility to compress stolen datasets into a single archive, specifically preserving resources, as observed in AMOS malware activity.
Detects the use of the PowerShell 'Compress-Archive' cmdlet to archive files within user-writable temporary or application directories. This behavior is often indicative of an attacker staging data prior to exfiltration.
Detects the use of archive utilities (tar, zip, 7z, gzip, zstd) to bundle sensitive PeopleSoft configuration and application directories (e.g., ps_config_homes, psoft/psft). This behavior is consistent with data staging for exfiltration, frequently associated with the ShinyHunters threat group activity targeting exposed PeopleSoft environments.
Detects the use of the zstd compression utility on PeopleSoft application servers by privileged service accounts such as psoft, oracle, or linuxadm. This behavior is indicative of data staging or archiving activity consistent with ShinyHunters pre-exfiltration tactics.
Detects the execution of the macOS 'ditto' command used to compress and stage files into the /tmp directory, specifically looking for the creation of zip archives. This behavior is associated with Amos Stealer prior to data exfiltration.
Detects attempts to copy sensitive configuration or credential files (e.g., .ssh, .zshrc, .bash_history, .gitconfig, .kube, .aws) to a suspicious temporary directory '/tmp/sync' on macOS systems using common shell commands like 'cp', 'bash', 'zsh', or 'sh'. This activity could indicate an adversary staging data for exfiltration or further malicious use.
Detects PowerShell expanding a downloaded archive (winPatch.zip) to %TEMP%\winPatch and subsequently launching the update.vbs bootstrapper via wscript.exe, as observed in the abdrizak PostCSS typosquatting campaign distributing a Windows RAT.
Detects the AMOS Stealer archiving collected data using the 'ditto' command with specific flags and output file names. This rule identifies the use of '-c', '-k', and '--sequesterRsrc' flags, along with '/tmp/osalogging.zip' or '/tmp/out.zip' as target archive names, which are characteristic of AMOS Stealer's data staging and archiving behavior.
Detects the creation of archive files (ZIP, 7z, RAR, TAR, GZ) within common user staging directories such as Downloads, AppData Roaming, Desktop, or Temp folders. The detection specifically targets archives created by command-line shells (cmd, PowerShell), dedicated archiving utilities (7z, WinRAR, tar), or remote access tools (AnyDesk, Bomgar, ScreenConnect, Splashtop, Atera). This activity is indicative of data staging prior to exfiltration.
Hunts for the malware compressing the collected host and browser data into a temporary .zip file prior to network exfiltration. Specifically looks for file creation events of .zip files with a specific naming convention (8-15 alphanumeric characters) in common temporary directories, initiated by 'AutoIt3.exe'.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events indicative of ransomware activity, specifically the Prinz Eugen ransomware. It looks for the execution of common file compression utilities (7z.exe, rar.exe, WinRAR.exe, winzip.exe) followed by the execution of known ransomware encryption executables (servertool.exe, encrypt.exe) on the same device within a 30-minute window. This pattern suggests that an attacker is compressing files before encrypting them, a common tactic to reduce the size of data for faster encryption or exfiltration.
Detects PowerShell compressing stolen data prior to POST exfiltration. This rule specifically looks for the execution of 'powershell.exe' or 'pwsh.exe' with command-line arguments that include 'Compress-Archive', 'Invoke-WebRequest', and '-Method POST'. This combination indicates an attempt to compress data and then exfiltrate it via an HTTP POST request.
Detects the creation or modification of large Zstandard (.zst or .tar.zst) archive files (100MB or larger) within common temporary, data exfiltration, staging, or PeopleSoft-related directories. This activity can indicate an attacker archiving collected data for exfiltration or staging it for further actions.
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