Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,243 detections
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Detects unauthorized usage of the Android AccessibilityService 'performGlobalAction' to trigger a 'BACK' operation specifically when the Android Settings application is active. This behavior is indicative of malicious applications attempting to obstruct user attempts to reach the Settings menu to uninstall a malicious package.
Detects attempts to tamper with Windows Defender configuration using PowerShell cmdlets 'Add-MpPreference' to add exclusions or 'Set-MpPreference' to disable real-time monitoring. This behavior is consistent with ClickFix attack techniques intended to evade endpoint security defenses.
Detects the execution of specific suspicious processes (Mixed Reality.exe, COU_ITR-1_to_4_AY2026-27.exe) or svchost.exe processes spawned from Windows Media Player paths, followed by suspicious loading of amsi.dll. This behavior is associated with the DragonReturn DLL sideloading and evasion chain.
This rule detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by monitoring processes such as PowerShell, cscript, wscript, and mshta for command-line arguments that attempt to modify AMSI memory structures. It specifically looks for patterns involving AmsiInitialize, memory nullification, and the loading of amsi.dll using techniques like DllImport or Add-Type.
Detects unauthorized processes (non-browser related) attempting to modify Chrome/Chromium user profile preference files or sensitive browser registry keys related to search providers and security MACs. This activity is often associated with browser hijacking, malware persistence, or unauthorized manipulation of browser settings.
This rule detects attempts by the PowerShell process to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) by patching the amsi.dll in memory. Specifically, it looks for 'WriteProcessMemoryApiCall' events targeting 'powershell.exe' where 'amsi.dll' has been loaded into the process's memory space. This technique is often used by malware, such as Potemkin Loader, to evade detection.
This rule detects command-line executions that attempt to disable Windows Defender or the Windows Firewall. It specifically looks for process creation events (EventID 4688) where the command line contains keywords like 'disable' along with 'defender' or 'firewall', executed via PowerShell or cmd. This activity is indicative of an adversary attempting to impair defenses.
Detects two distinct malicious PowerShell behaviors: memory-resident script execution using Base64 and XOR obfuscation, and unauthorized modification of Windows Defender preferences to add exclusions.
This rule detects attempts to impair defensive mechanisms by creating or modifying Quality of Service (QoS) policies that specifically target Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) or Antivirus (AV) processes. Adversaries may use QoS policies to throttle network traffic for security products, hindering their ability to communicate with central management or cloud services, thus impairing their effectiveness. The rule looks for command-line arguments used to create or set QoS policies (`New-NetQosPolicy`, `Set-NetQosPolicy`) that include throttling parameters (`ThrottleRateActionBitsPerSecond`, `AppPathNameMatchCondition`) and target common EDR/AV process names. It also detects direct registry modifications to QoS policies (`\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\QOS`) that include EDR/AV process names.
Detects evidence of AsyncRAT infection involving process hollowing into RegAsm.exe. The rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell activity involving specific artifacts ('cap.ps1', 'ConsoleApp1') used to perform reflective assembly loading, attempts to add Windows Defender exclusions for RegAsm.exe, and subsequent suspicious outbound network connections from RegAsm.exe to known C2 infrastructure.
Detects suspicious PowerShell activity characteristic of the ScreenConnect AsyncRAT campaign, specifically the use of Add-MpPreference to add Windows Defender exclusions for RegAsm.exe and drive roots, and the modification of ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin to suppress UAC prompts. These actions facilitate process hollowing and malware execution with elevated privileges.
This rule detects attempts to modify Windows Defender exclusions using PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference) or direct Registry manipulation. Adversaries often modify these exclusions to hide malicious files or directories from antivirus scanning, a technique used to impair defensive security tools.
Detects the use of the Microsoft IIS administrative tool, appcmd.exe, to uninstall ModSecurity WAF modules. This activity is a known technique used by adversaries to impair security defenses during post-exploitation, specifically observed in campaigns targeting ColdFusion servers.
Detects the use of PowerShell .NET reflection to access non-public static fields within the System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils class. Attackers often target fields such as 'amsiInitFailed' or 's_amsiContext' to programmatically disable or bypass Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) inspection during script execution.
Detects the execution of batch scripts or direct command-line operations (taskkill, sc, net, powershell, wmic) specifically targeting the termination, deletion, or disabling of common endpoint security software such as Microsoft Defender, Sysmon, Filebeat, and other agent-based security tools.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with Microsoft Defender Antivirus settings, including real-time monitoring, behavior monitoring, and antispyware features, or attempts to stop/disable the WinDefend service.
Detects the execution of 'i.bat' script accompanied by subsequent commands intended to exhaustively impair security defenses on a Windows host. The rule identifies the combination of the script execution and targeted commands to disable Microsoft Defender, stop Sysmon/Filebeat services, and uninstall or misconfigure ModSecurity modules.
Detects a sequence of actions where a process first enumerates security software (e.g., via WMIC, Registry, or PowerShell) followed by an attempt to stop or terminate security-related services or processes within a short timeframe (5 minutes). This pattern is indicative of an adversary attempting to identify and disable endpoint protection before executing further malicious activity.
Detects the execution of known Millenium RAT masqueraded binaries (svchost.exe or MsEdgeUpdate.exe) from AppData directories, followed immediately by a PowerShell command to add the root drive C:\ to Windows Defender exclusions. This sequence indicates a malware stage where a RAT attempts to persist and avoid detection by modifying security tool configurations.
Detects the use of PowerShell to modify Microsoft Defender preferences by adding an exclusion path. This activity is commonly used by adversaries to prevent security software from scanning specific directories where malicious tools or payloads are staged.
Detects the successful deletion of diagnostic settings in Azure, which may be an attempt by an adversary to impair logging and hide malicious activity.
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