Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
1,243 detections
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This rule detects attempts to disable or interfere with endpoint security products, including Windows Defender and various third-party antivirus agents. It identifies suspicious process executions involving command-line tools like sc.exe, net.exe, or taskkill.exe targeting security services, or the direct modification of Windows registry keys associated with security policy disabling. The detection is further scoped to processes originating from or associated with common suspicious paths (e.g., AppData) or known malicious naming patterns.
Detects malicious activities associated with The Gentlemen RaaS group, specifically targeting GPO modifications to distribute ransomware, disable Windows Defender Real-time Monitoring, and deploy persistence mechanisms via scheduled tasks in SYSVOL or NETLOGON paths.
Detects suspicious modifications to Group Policy Objects (GPOs) using PowerShell cmdlets, including references to sensitive paths like SYSVOL/NETLOGON or suspicious script files, as well as the execution of 'gpupdate /force' from non-standard shell processes. These behaviors are often indicative of GPO abuse for persistence, lateral movement, or defense evasion.
Detects the execution of the Snowlight dropper (wusvc.exe) masquerading as a Windows Update service. The rule identifies instances where wusvc.exe is spawned by services.exe from an unconventional path, signaling a potential malicious service installation associated with the UNC5221 VSHELL RAT campaign. The payload is known to utilize Hell's Gate/Halo's Gate direct syscall techniques to evade security API hooks.
Detects the modification of the 'NoFind' registry value within the 'Policies\Explorer' key, which is used to disable the Windows Search functionality for users. Adversaries or unauthorized users may modify this setting to impair system search capabilities or as part of a broader system hardening or lockdown policy.
Detects the removal of Sysmon, which could be a potential attempt at defense evasion
Detects the creation of specific file artifacts associated with the VILE ransomware. The VILE ransomware Go-based binary is known for employing ETW tracing suppression and direct NT system calls to bypass EDR user-mode hooking. Identifying these unique filenames on the host acts as a high-fidelity indicator that the VILE binary is actively present and executing.
Detects behavioral indicators associated with VILE ransomware, specifically focused on defense evasion through Windows event log clearing, termination of security-related processes, and the presence of specific ransomware-related configuration or identity files in common staging directories.
This rule detects the presence of known malicious drivers (hlpdrv.sys, rwdrv.sys) by their SHA256 hash or file path. It also identifies attempts to install these drivers via service creation commands and monitors for modifications to Windows Defender registry keys that could disable its functionality, indicating defense evasion.
Detects in-process memory manipulation of amsi.dll (AmsiScanBuffer/AmsiScanString) within PowerShell script block logs (Event ID 4104). This activity often involves using VirtualProtect or Marshal.Copy to apply an in-memory patch (e.g., return-early 0xC3) to neutralize AMSI scanning capabilities, which is a common technique for bypassing defensive security controls.
This rule monitors PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) for command patterns indicative of Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) or Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) bypass techniques. These include reflective manipulation of AMSI internals (e.g., AmsiUtils, amsiInitFailed), DynamicMethod IL code generation for malicious hooks, and attempts to suppress ETW logging via the PSEtwLog provider.
This rule monitors PowerShell Script Block Logging (Event ID 4104) for command patterns indicative of Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) or Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) bypass techniques. These include reflective manipulation of AMSI internals (e.g., AmsiUtils, amsiInitFailed), DynamicMethod IL code generation for malicious hooks, and attempts to suppress ETW logging via the PSEtwLog provider.
Detects the use of System.Reflection.Emit.DynamicMethod and ILGenerator in PowerShell 7 scripts to perform an AMSI bypass. The attack works by emitting IL opcodes to directly modify the internal 's_amsiInitFailed' field within the AmsiUtils class, bypassing the initonly constraint to disable AMSI scanning.
Detects attempts to disable or impair Microsoft Defender Antivirus using legitimate system administration tools such as PowerShell (Set-MpPreference, Add-MpPreference), WMIC, sc.exe, or net.exe. Adversaries may use these tools to bypass security controls by disabling real-time monitoring or adding unauthorized exclusion paths.
Detects multiple methods commonly used for defense evasion and credential theft on Windows systems, including: enabling WDigest credential caching via Registry modification, execution of forensic tools (FTK Imager) sometimes repurposed for security tool tampering, disabling Microsoft Defender real-time monitoring or removing exclusions via PowerShell/CMD, and loading known vulnerable kernel drivers associated with BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver) attacks.
This rule detects the presence of known malicious drivers (hlpdrv.sys, rwdrv.sys) by their SHA256 hash or file path. It also identifies attempts to install these drivers via service creation commands and monitors for modifications to Windows Defender registry keys that could disable its functionality, indicating defense evasion.
This rule detects a high frequency (3 or more within an hour) of command-line executions containing keywords like 'antivirus', 'defense', or 'endpoint' on a Windows system. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to interact with, disable, or tamper with security software to evade detection.
Detects the use of package management or file integrity monitoring tools (rpm, dpkg, debsums, aide, inotifywait) to verify or interact with critical SSH/PAM configuration files, or the use of inotifywait to monitor SSH configuration access. This behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to verify compromised configurations, check for the presence of backdoors, or monitor security modifications.
Detects the use of fltMC.exe to spawn service control commands (sc.exe) or command processor (cmd.exe) with arguments for starting, stopping, creating, deleting, or configuring Windows services. This activity may indicate an attempt to manipulate drivers or services to impair system defenses or achieve persistence.
This rule monitors for unauthorized deletion or modification of Microsoft Sentinel alert rules and automation rules. Such actions are indicative of an attacker attempting to impair security monitoring, silence alerts, or disable automated responses to maintain persistence and evade detection.
Detects instances where wscript.exe or cscript.exe executing a VBScript file subsequently spawns taskkill.exe with arguments intended to terminate PowerShell processes. This is a common pattern used by malicious scripts to disrupt security monitoring or automated management tasks.
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