Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
19 detections
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Detects the use of appcmd.exe to disable HTTP logging for an IIS site by setting 'dontLog' to True. Adversaries may perform this action to evade detection and prevent security logging of their activities on a compromised web server.
This rule detects attempts to disable PowerShell command history logging by using 'Set-PSReadlineOption' with 'HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing'. Adversaries often disable command history to evade detection and hinder forensic analysis.
This rule detects attempts to disable PowerShell history logging via an SSH connection. It specifically looks for the strings "Set-PSReadlineOption" and "HistorySaveStyle" within TCP traffic destined for port 22 (SSH). This activity is indicative of an attacker trying to cover their tracks by preventing their PowerShell commands from being recorded.
Detects launching shells with history disabled via environment variables (separate from deleting history files),
consistent with impairing command history logging (Defense Evasion).
consistent with impairing command history logging (Defense Evasion).
This rule detects attempts to stop services or tamper with security tools (Windows Defender, EventLog) using 'sc stop', 'net stop', 'wevtutil cl', 'Add-MpPreference', or 'Set-MpPreference' commands, specifically when initiated by 'explorer.exe'. This could indicate an adversary attempting to impair defenses or achieve persistence.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with PowerShell logging mechanisms (Script Block Logging, Module Logging, Transcription) by modifying or deleting specific registry keys or setting their values to disable logging. This activity is often performed by adversaries to evade detection.
Detects attempts to disable or tamper with PowerShell logging mechanisms (Script Block Logging, Module Logging, Transcription) by modifying or deleting specific registry keys or setting their values to disable logging. This activity is often performed by adversaries to evade detection.
This rule detects attempts to stop services or tamper with security tools (Windows Defender, EventLog) using 'sc stop', 'net stop', 'wevtutil cl', 'Add-MpPreference', or 'Set-MpPreference' commands, specifically when initiated by 'explorer.exe'. This could indicate an adversary attempting to impair defenses or achieve persistence.
This rule detects attempts to delete S3 bucket logging configurations originating from IP addresses not associated with AWS infrastructure. This could indicate an attacker attempting to cover their tracks by disabling logging for an S3 bucket after gaining unauthorized access.
KQL Query from file: Powershell History Logging Disabled KQL
Detects attempts to disable PowerShell command history logging using 'Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing'. This is a defense evasion technique used by attackers to hide their activities, as seen in the PhantomCaptcha campaign.
This detection identifies the use of the `esxcli system auditrecords` commands, which can be used to tamper with logging on an ESXi host. This action may indicate an attempt to evade detection or hinder forensic analysis by preventing the recording of system-level audit events. The rule specifically looks for the use of these commands with 'remote' or 'local' arguments, excluding commands executed within a shell.
This detection identifies changes to the syslog loghost configuration on an ESXi host, which may indicate an attempt to disrupt log forwarding and evade detection.
This detection identifies changes to the syslog configuration on an ESXi host using `esxcli`, which may indicate an attempt to disrupt log collection and evade detection. Adversaries may modify logging configurations to hinder forensic analysis and remain undetected.
To evade security software and analyst tools, Nobelium malware enumerates the target system looking for certain running processes, loaded drivers, and registry keys, with the goal of disabling them.
The Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor is one of the processes the malware attempts to disable.
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint has built-in protections against many techniques attackers use to disable endpoint sensors ranging from hardened OS protection, anti-tampering policies, and detections for a variety of tampering attempts, including "Attempt to stop Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor", "Tampering with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor settings", or "Possible sensor tampering in memory".
Successfully disabling Microsoft Defender for Endpoint can prevent the system from reporting observed activities.
However, the multitude of signals reported into Microsoft Defender XDR provides a unique opportunity to hunt for systems where the tampering technique used might have been successful.
The following advanced hunting query can be used to locate devices that should be reporting but aren't:
The Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor is one of the processes the malware attempts to disable.
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint has built-in protections against many techniques attackers use to disable endpoint sensors ranging from hardened OS protection, anti-tampering policies, and detections for a variety of tampering attempts, including "Attempt to stop Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor", "Tampering with Microsoft Defender for Endpoint sensor settings", or "Possible sensor tampering in memory".
Successfully disabling Microsoft Defender for Endpoint can prevent the system from reporting observed activities.
However, the multitude of signals reported into Microsoft Defender XDR provides a unique opportunity to hunt for systems where the tampering technique used might have been successful.
The following advanced hunting query can be used to locate devices that should be reporting but aren't:
Detects commands that attempt to clear or tamper with the Linux command history. This technique is often used by threat actors to evade detection and execute commands without leaving a record in files like "bash_history" or "zsh_history". The rule specifically looks for various commands and patterns used to delete, truncate, or otherwise manipulate history files, as well as the specific log message "empty_bash_history" which can be generated by a provided monitoring script.
Detects PowerShell commands or scripts that attempt to disable the command history by removing the 'psreadline' module. This action is often performed by adversaries to evade detection and hinder forensic analysis by preventing their commands from being logged.
Detects keywords within PowerShell module logs that indicate an attempt to clear PowerShell history. This includes commands like 'Remove-Item' or 'del' targeting the history file path, or 'Set-PSReadlineOption' to disable history saving.
This rule detects attempts to clear PowerShell command history, which adversaries might do to remove traces of their activities. It looks for specific PowerShell commands and keywords related to deleting history files or configuring PowerShell to not save history. This includes commands like 'del', 'Remove-Item', 'rm' in conjunction with the PowerShell history path, or setting 'Set-PSReadlineOption -HistorySaveStyle SaveNothing'.