Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Identifies emails spoofing NIPR, NAIC, or Stripe domains with invoice-related lures that fail authentication. This rule specifically looks for emails where the sender's domain (SenderFromDomain or SenderMailFromDomain) is one of the targeted domains (nipr.com, naic.org, stripe.com), the subject contains keywords like 'invoice' or 'past due', and the email authentication details do not indicate a 'pass'. This combination suggests a phishing attempt leveraging brand impersonation and financial urgency.
This hunting query detect detects network traffic and browser events communicating with TDS nodes and landing pages associated with an IRSF SMS scam campaign leveraging fake CAPTCHAs.
This rule detects suspicious activity where a user clicks on a URL from an email and subsequently accesses a '.workers.dev' domain that contains keywords commonly associated with credential harvesting or malicious activity (e.g., 'docusign', 'onedrive', 'password_reset'). This pattern often indicates a phishing attempt where an attacker uses a Cloudflare Workers domain to host a malicious landing page.
Detects the execution of common browser executables in headless mode with command-line arguments indicative of data exfiltration, malicious rendering (dump-dom), or external requests (http/data:text/html;base64,). This activity, especially when initiated by non-standard parent processes, can be a sign of automated web scraping, vulnerability scanning, or other malicious automated browser activity.
I don't know how many time I suffered malicious actors sharing links via Microsoft services such as SharePoint or other sites manipulating them for phishing, malware, or other malicious purposes.
I have seen multiple detections to detect phishing campaigns based on subjects, such as detecting when an email subject ends with “with you” or contains “shared.” However, if the original mailbox is configured in another language, these rules become useless.
This change specifying the InternetMessageID value odspnotify and, in addition, specifying the first part of the InternetMessageId, which tells us the action requested or performed by the email—in this case, share.
For this detection, I recommend adding your trusted domains, but it is incredibly useful to detect when links from Microsoft systems are shared with your users from unexpected domains.
I have seen multiple detections to detect phishing campaigns based on subjects, such as detecting when an email subject ends with “with you” or contains “shared.” However, if the original mailbox is configured in another language, these rules become useless.
This change specifying the InternetMessageID value odspnotify and, in addition, specifying the first part of the InternetMessageId, which tells us the action requested or performed by the email—in this case, share.
For this detection, I recommend adding your trusted domains, but it is incredibly useful to detect when links from Microsoft systems are shared with your users from unexpected domains.
Detects potential SMS phishing (smishing) vectors involving a specific shortened URL used to deliver mobile surveillance and exfiltration malware, specifically the fake RedAlert application.
This rule detects a suspicious attack chain, potentially related to 'ClickFix' or similar social engineering campaigns. It correlates multiple events within a 5-minute window: a browser being launched from an email client, a file download from a browser into the Downloads directory, and a command prompt being launched from explorer.exe executing a command that references the Downloads directory. Additionally, it looks for network connections initiated by common document types, which could indicate malicious document activity.
Detects a suspicious child process of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
Detects when Okta FastPass prevents a known phishing site.
Detects when the macOS Script Editor utility spawns an unusual child process.
Detects attempts to create a DLL file to a known desktop application dependencies folder such as Slack, Teams or OneDrive and by an unusual process. This may indicate an attempt to load a malicious module via DLL search order hijacking.
Detects a suspicious execution of a Microsoft HTML Help (HH.exe)
This rule detects two related scenarios: 1. Device Code Phishing: Correlates successful device code authentications with subsequent device registrations for the same user within a short time frame. This can indicate an attacker using a phished device code to register a new device. 2. Primary Refresh Token (PRT) Device Registration: Identifies device registrations that occur after an authentication to the Device Registration Service using a Primary Refresh Token. This pattern is indicative of an attacker minting a PRT and then using it to register or join a device, potentially bypassing conditional access policies.
This rule detects DNS requests for domain names that combine Middle Eastern-themed keywords (dubai, emirates, iran, saudi, etisalat) with suspicious or cheap Top-Level Domains (TLDs) such as .top, .cyou, .click, .life, .mom, .sbs, or .xyz. This pattern can indicate potential phishing attempts, malicious infrastructure, or C2 communication attempting to blend in with legitimate traffic by using seemingly relevant but low-cost domains.
Purpose:
The query is designed to detect and alert on emails received from typosquatted domains, which are domains that closely mimic legitimate domains by having slight variations, often used in phishing attacks.
The query is designed to detect and alert on emails received from typosquatted domains, which are domains that closely mimic legitimate domains by having slight variations, often used in phishing attacks.
This rule detects multiple failed sign-in attempts using the 'Device Code' authentication flow from various IP addresses or locations for a single user. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) or gain unauthorized access through device code phishing or brute-force attacks against the device code flow. The rule specifically looks for more than 3 attempts from more than 2 distinct IP addresses or locations, targeting common Microsoft applications like Office, Teams, Azure Portal, or Graph.
This detection helps you spot activity linked to Pawn Storm PRISMEX (CVE-2026-21509 / CVE-2026-21513) using the specific indicators in the linked source. It is written to be high confidence by focusing on exact versions, domains, paths, or file fingerprints that were observed in the reporting. A match does not prove a system is compromised by itself, but it is a strong reason to investigate. Confirm the affected host and user, check whether the access was expected, and review nearby activity for follow-on steps like additional downloads, new persistence, or repeated connections. Use the source link to support incident notes and.
This rule detects inbound emails from 'azure-noreply@microsoft.com' that are delivered to the inbox, are the first contact from this sender, and contain specific keywords in the subject line such as 'severity', 'activated', 'deactivated', 'alert', 'invoice', 'payment', 'order', or 'fund'. This could indicate phishing attempts or social engineering using a spoofed Microsoft sender to deliver urgent or financially-themed messages.
This rule detects network communication indicators associated with the Torg Grabber infostealer. It specifically looks for connections to known command and control (C2) domains or specific URL paths used by the malware for authentication and data exfiltration. The detection logic combines a regular expression for a list of suspicious domains and a check for specific API paths within URLs. A match indicates potential Torg Grabber activity, warranting further investigation into the affected host and user, and review of surrounding network and system activity.
Detects phishing emails abusing legitimate Trello invitation notifications. This rule specifically looks for emails sent from 'invitation-do-not-reply@trello.com' with a subject line matching the pattern '<name> @ <org> invited you to their board <board>'. This pattern is recently observed being abused in phishing campaigns to trick users into clicking malicious links embedded within Trello boards.
This rule detects potential social engineering attempts in external direct messages (DMs) by identifying messages that impersonate IT helpdesk or support personnel, or discuss 'working from home' scenarios. It specifically looks for keywords like 'helpdesk', 'help desk', 'IT support', and 'working from home' in the recipient details or sender display name of external messages within the last 5 days. The goal is to surface lures that aim to trick users into revealing sensitive information or performing actions under false pretenses.
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