Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects phishing emails with malicious HTML attachments designed to harvest credentials and exfiltrate them via the Telegram Bot API. The detection looks for specific attachment filenames (e.g., RFQ, INQUIRY) or content patterns indicative of this threat.
Detects download of certain file types from hosts in suspicious TLDs
Detects executable downloads from suspicious remote systems
Detects strong indicators of a successful device code phishing attack.
Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in RunMRU registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing lures using clickfix techniques to hide malicious commands in the Windows Run dialog box from naked eyes.
Detects a spike in undeliverable emails, this can be an early indication of a targeted phishing campaign or a compromised user account.
Detects the occurrence of numerous space characters in TypedPaths registry paths, which may indicate execution via phishing lures using file-fix techniques to hide malicious commands. This technique is often used to bypass security controls that might inspect the command line for malicious strings.
Detects users who accessed Microsoft Copilot Studio and correlates that activity with OAuth consent events for third-party applications in Azure Active Directory. Optionally, it verifies whether the consented application was used to access data via Microsoft Graph API, indicating potential account compromise.
Detect the patten execution of the the brazilian malware Zapgrande
This rule detects when Okta FastPass successfully identifies and prevents an authentication attempt originating from a known phishing site. It specifically looks for Okta System Log events where the outcome reason is 'FastPass declined phishing attempt', the outcome result is 'FAILURE', and the event type is 'user.authentication.auth_via_mfa'. This indicates that a user attempted to authenticate via MFA, but Okta FastPass intervened due to a detected phishing attempt.
This rule detects a highly suspicious sequence of events: a user clicking on a URL (potentially a phishing link) followed by a risky sign-in attempt to Azure AD from an IP address outside the organization's defined range. The rule specifically looks for sign-ins with a high-risk level (>= 50) that occur after a URL click event, suggesting a potential compromise initiated by a phishing attack.
Detects a single Gmail sender address using multiple distinct display names within a short timeframe (1 hour). This behavior can indicate an attempt at impersonation, phishing, or spam campaigns where an attacker tries to appear as different entities from the same compromised or controlled email account.
Detected endpoints that processed an SVG file and subsequently connected to a known malicious domain.
Detects internal phishing emails with subject lines mimicking IT service notifications, such as from ServiceNow. This is a tactic used by the Jingle Thief group (also tracked as Atlas Lion and STORM-0539) for lateral movement within a compromised organization.
This rule detects the creation of temporary files within the WebDAV TfsStore directory that have suspicious file extensions. Attackers can leverage WebDAV to force authentication or to drop malicious files onto a system. The presence of executable or archive file extensions in this specific temporary directory is highly indicative of malicious activity, potentially related to initial access or resource development.
Detects DNS queries for domains associated with the Tykit phishing kit infrastructure. These domains are used for hosting phishing pages and for C2 exfiltration.
This rule detects suspicious sign-in activities that occur shortly after a network connection to an IP address associated with 'Lab539 Clickfix'. It correlates risky sign-in events from Azure Active Directory (AAD) with network connection logs from devices. Specifically, it looks for AAD sign-ins with a risk level of 30 or higher, from non-guest, non-compliant, and non-managed devices, where the IP address has not been seen for that user in the last 30 days. This is then joined with network connection events to IP addresses found in the 'Lab539 Clickfix' external data, ensuring the sign-in occurs after the network connection within a short timeframe. The 'Lab539 Clickfix' reference suggests a connection to a known threat or campaign, possibly related to phishing or credential compromise.
Detects network connections to the InterPlanetary File System (IPFS) where the URI contains a pattern indicative of an email address. This behavior is associated with recent phishing campaigns that leverage IPFS to host credential harvesting webpages, attempting to collect user credentials.
Detects a phishing attack which expands a ZIP file containing a malicious shortcut. If the victim expands the ZIP file via the explorer process, then the explorer process expands the malicious ZIP file and drops a malicious shortcut redirected to a backdoor into the Startup folder. Additionally, the file name of the malicious shortcut in Startup folder contains {0AFACED1-E828-11D1-9187-B532F1E9575D} meaning the folder shortcut operation.
The following analytic identifies potential phishing attempts blocked by Zscaler within a network. It leverages web proxy logs to detect actions tagged as HTML.Phish. The detection method involves analyzing critical data points such as user, threat name, URL, and hostname. This activity is significant for a SOC as it serves as an early warning system for phishing threats, enabling prompt investigation and mitigation. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an attempt to deceive users into divulging sensitive information, potentially leading to data breaches or credential theft.
Detects a non-browser process launching a browser with automation flags, which subsequently connects to WhatsApp Web. This behavior is consistent with the Maverick banking trojan's use of Selenium and WPPConnect to hijack WhatsApp sessions for self-propagation.
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