Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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In this detection,we hunt for emails with randomly named attachment names from the same sender to multiple recipients
This query visualises total emails with Malware detections summarizing the data by various Malware detection technologies/controls.
How much phish and malware emails vs good emails received the user in the given timeframe.
Identify prior activity from this campaign using IOCs shared by Microsoft's Threat Intelligence Center, or MSTIC.
Read more: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/
Read more: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/
This query visualises the total amount of admin false negative submissions by the state of the submission.
Total Submissions by Submission State
This query visualises the original detection technology of emails submitted as phish false positive by admins
In this query, we hunt for inbound emails delivered having URLs from QR codes
This query visualises bad traffic (% of emails with threats) compared to total inbound emails over time summarising the data daily.
This query helps in reviewing group Quarantine released messages by detection type. Useful to see what is leading to the largest number of messages being released.
This query visualises the amount of emails subject to an admin policy with action of block, summarizing the data daily
// Author: jan geisbauer
// @janvonkirchheim
// ------------------------
// 1. A list of all devices that have this vulnerability
// 2. A list of all users that uses those devices
// 3. If these users received .mkv files recently
// @janvonkirchheim
// ------------------------
// 1. A list of all devices that have this vulnerability
// 2. A list of all users that uses those devices
// 3. If these users received .mkv files recently
This query provides insights on users who clicked on a suspicious URL
In this query, we are looking URL click actions by URL in the last 7 days
This query visualises the daily amount of admin false negative submission by submission type.
This query helps reviewing inbound / outbound / intra-org emails by domain per day
This query provides insights on the detections done by SafeLinks protection in Defender for Office 365
This query helps reviewing count of spoof and impersonation detections done per sender IP
BazaCall is a campaign that manipulate users into calling a customer support center, where they are instructed to download an Excel file to unsubscribe from a phony service. When the user opens the Excel file, they are prompted to enable a malicious macro that infects their device with BazaLoader.
This query surfaces connections to the distinctive .xyz domains that the BazaCall campaign uses to host malicious Excel files.
This query surfaces connections to the distinctive .xyz domains that the BazaCall campaign uses to host malicious Excel files.
This query looks for a Word document attachment, from which a link was clicked, and after which there was a browser download.
This query is not noisy, but most of its results are clean.
It can also hserve as reference for other queries on email attachments, on browser downloads or for queries that join multiple events by time.
Tags: #EmailAttachment, #WordLink, #BrowserDownload, #Phishing, #DedupFileCreate.
Implementation comment #1: Matching events by time.
Matching the 3 different events (saving attachment, clicking on link, downloading file) is done purely by time difference - so could sometimes link together unrelated events.
Doing a more exact lookup would create a much more complex query due to.
Implementation comment #2: Deduping DeviceFileEvents.
Oftentimes there are multiple DeviceFileEvents for a single file - e.g. if the file keeps being appended into before being closed.
So, we query only for the last reported file state to ignore intermediate file states.
Explaining the underlying data:.
BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event:.
This query uses the BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event, that includes clicks on http:// or https:// links (clicks outside of browsers), or on .lnk files.
For this event, RemoteUrl contains the opened URL.
This query is not noisy, but most of its results are clean.
It can also hserve as reference for other queries on email attachments, on browser downloads or for queries that join multiple events by time.
Tags: #EmailAttachment, #WordLink, #BrowserDownload, #Phishing, #DedupFileCreate.
Implementation comment #1: Matching events by time.
Matching the 3 different events (saving attachment, clicking on link, downloading file) is done purely by time difference - so could sometimes link together unrelated events.
Doing a more exact lookup would create a much more complex query due to.
Implementation comment #2: Deduping DeviceFileEvents.
Oftentimes there are multiple DeviceFileEvents for a single file - e.g. if the file keeps being appended into before being closed.
So, we query only for the last reported file state to ignore intermediate file states.
Explaining the underlying data:.
BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event:.
This query uses the BrowserLaunchedToOpenUrl event, that includes clicks on http:// or https:// links (clicks outside of browsers), or on .lnk files.
For this event, RemoteUrl contains the opened URL.
This query helps reviewing authentication failure count by authentication type. Update the authentication type below as DMARC, DKIM, SPM, CompAuth
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