Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This query helps reviewing malicious clicks where user was allowed to proceed through malicious URL page.
This query helps reviewing the list of top 10% of most attacked users
Advanced Hunting has default timezone as UTC time. Filters in Advanced Hunting also work in UTC by default whereas query results are shown in local time if user has selected local time zone in security center settings.
This query helps getting GeoIP information of emails SenderIPv4 addresses.
This query helps reviewing Phish detections done by some of the most frequent detection technologies in the last 7 days
This query helps reviewing malware detections by detection methods
This query helps reviewing top submitters of user submissions
This query helps reviewing admin reported email submissions
This query helps reviewing top submitters of admin submissions
One of the tricks used in phishing is obfuscating the domain name in a URL by
using the @ symbol. This technique goes all the way back to the original RFC
for URLs, RFC 1738. When you specify an @ in the DNS portion of a URL it denotes
that the left side of the DNS name holds a username and password for
authentication to the server on the right side of the @ sign. Unfortunately,
an attacker can use this technique to trick a user by formatting the URL as
http://www.trusteddomain.com@www.realdomain.com/. When a user sees the link
may they think they're going to www.trusteddomain.com when in fact they are
going to www.realdomain.com. For a working example, try this:
http://www.google.com@www.bing.com/.
This query finds this technique in URLs embedded within e-mails and highlights
the fake and real domains.
using the @ symbol. This technique goes all the way back to the original RFC
for URLs, RFC 1738. When you specify an @ in the DNS portion of a URL it denotes
that the left side of the DNS name holds a username and password for
authentication to the server on the right side of the @ sign. Unfortunately,
an attacker can use this technique to trick a user by formatting the URL as
http://www.trusteddomain.com@www.realdomain.com/. When a user sees the link
may they think they're going to www.trusteddomain.com when in fact they are
going to www.realdomain.com. For a working example, try this:
http://www.google.com@www.bing.com/.
This query finds this technique in URLs embedded within e-mails and highlights
the fake and real domains.
URLs clicked in Email
Identify emails that were send from an address external to your company and where email was send to more then 50 distinct corporate users.
Update corporatedomain.com to your corporate domain to have it excluded.
Update 50 if you want to adjust the distinct user count.
Update corporatedomain.com to your corporate domain to have it excluded.
Update 50 if you want to adjust the distinct user count.
Count of recipient's email addresses by subject
Count of recipient's email addresses by subject
Count of sender's email addresses by subject
This rule detects attempts to execute files from external WebDAV shares. It specifically looks for HTTP GET requests where the User-Agent header starts with 'Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/' and the requested URI ends with common executable or script file extensions. This behavior is often observed in initial access campaigns where adversaries leverage WebDAV to deliver and execute malicious payloads.
Detects strong indicators of a successful device code phishing attack. This rule correlates email events containing Microsoft device login URLs with subsequent Microsoft Entra ID authentication attempts that result in a specific error code (50199 or 0), indicating the user was prompted to confirm the application. The time window for correlation is set to 16 minutes, accounting for the typical 15-minute expiration of device codes.
Detects executables launched from external WebDAV shares using the WebDAV Explorer integration, commonly seen in initial access campaigns.
Detects access attempts to a newly created domain via WHOIS enrichment.
Detects strong indicators of a successful device code phishing attack.
This rule detects a significant increase in undeliverable emails for a specific user within a short timeframe. This pattern can indicate that a user's account has been compromised and is being used to send out a large volume of phishing or spam emails, leading to many bounce-back messages. It could also suggest a targeted phishing campaign where the sender's email address is being spoofed, and the legitimate user is receiving the undeliverable notifications.
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