Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound web requests directed at public NPM mirrors and CDNs (unpkg, npmmirror, yarnpkg, jsdelivr) that contain strings matching known malicious package names associated with the 'Beamglea/ClickFix' campaign. This activity is typically indicative of a victim visiting a deceptive Cloudflare CAPTCHA phishing page designed to execute malicious scripts in the browser.
This rule detects email activity involving DocuSign-themed messages that contain attachments and also coincide with URL click events that redirect users to Microsoft-related login portals (e.g., login.microsoftonline.com or teams.microsoft.com) containing 'redirect' or 'redirect_uri' parameters. This behavior is indicative of a phishing attempt designed to capture credentials or perform OAuth consent phishing by mimicking legitimate document-signing workflows.
This rule monitors network connections for specific domains and URL patterns associated with the 'FlowerStorm' campaign. It flags potential phishing attempts by identifying low-prevalence connections to known malicious infrastructure from browser or PDF reader processes.
This rule detects potential phishing activity by correlating email delivery events and URL click events against a set of known malicious domains and suspicious URL paths. It identifies when a user receives an email containing a suspicious link or interacts with such a link, providing visibility into potential credential harvesting or malware delivery attempts.
Detects the RejectDirectSend bypass (null SMTP envelope sender + internal-domain spoof). Tightened to require Microsoft's composite auth verdict OR all of SPF/DKIM/DMARC failing (vs. any one), excludes known-approved Direct Send relay IPs, and excludes likely-legitimate bulk/newsletter traffic via BulkComplaintLevel.
Detects Direct Send spearphishing impersonating internal roles (IT/Finance/Procurement) with business-themed lures targeting leadership/finance titles. Rewritten: removed a non-functional sender/recipient substring check and a broken EmailPostDeliveryEvents join that made the rule rarely fire; anchored detection to the actual Direct Send signature (null envelope + domain match) and a direct IdentityInfo join; standardized auth-failure parsing to match the other rules in this set.
Detects Direct Send spearphishing impersonating internal roles (IT/Finance/Procurement) with business-themed lures targeting leadership/finance titles. Rewritten: removed a non-functional sender/recipient substring check and a broken EmailPostDeliveryEvents join that made the rule rarely fire; anchored detection to the actual Direct Send signature (null envelope + domain match) and a direct IdentityInfo join; standardized auth-failure parsing to match the other rules in this set.
Detects outbound web requests directed at public NPM mirrors and CDNs (unpkg, npmmirror, yarnpkg, jsdelivr) that contain strings matching known malicious package names associated with the 'Beamglea/ClickFix' campaign. This activity is typically indicative of a victim visiting a deceptive Cloudflare CAPTCHA phishing page designed to execute malicious scripts in the browser.
Detects incoming emails where the SMTP envelope sender (MAIL FROM) is blank, but the visible 'From' header displays an internal/accepted domain. This technique is often used to bypass email authentication filters. The rule specifically alerts on cases where SPF, DKIM, or DMARC checks failed or returned 'none', yet the message was still delivered to an inbox or folder, suggesting a configuration gap or allow-list override.
This rule monitors for a multi-stage attack pattern involving two potential indicators: first, it identifies phishing emails containing a 'Google Docs' link combined with an attachment named 'API Logic Flaw'. Second, it detects browser activity involving the paste of JavaScript code or suspicious browser clipboard activity, which may indicate an attacker attempting to execute malicious scripts directly in the user's browser context.
This rule detects sophisticated phishing lure pages impersonating DocuSign or NFe documentation. It specifically identifies pages that implement multi-layered anti-bot gating techniques, including detection of browser automation (navigator.webdriver), identification of headless browser artifacts (headless/HeadlessChrome), and the presence of interaction-wait fallback timers using addEventListener, all tied to specific malicious content indicators.
Detects malicious traffic directed towards unpkg.com associated with the 'Beamglea' campaign. The rule specifically monitors for connections to known malicious npm-mirrored packages or pages serving fake Cloudflare CAPTCHA challenges, which are common tactics for credential theft and browser-based exploitation.
Detects outbound web requests directed at public NPM mirrors and CDNs (unpkg, npmmirror, yarnpkg, jsdelivr) that contain strings matching known malicious package names associated with the 'Beamglea/ClickFix' campaign. This activity is typically indicative of a victim visiting a deceptive Cloudflare CAPTCHA phishing page designed to execute malicious scripts in the browser.
This rule detects network connections or DNS queries to known phishing domains (typosquatted Microsoft login domains), DeadDrop Resolver domains, and suspicious HTML payloads served from common CDN/package hosting sites (e.g., unpkg.com, npmmirror.com, cdn.jsdelivr.net, yarnpkg.com). These patterns are indicative of initial access attempts via phishing or the secondary stage of malware C2 communication.
This rule detects network connections or DNS queries to known phishing domains (typosquatted Microsoft login domains), DeadDrop Resolver domains, and suspicious HTML payloads served from common CDN/package hosting sites (e.g., unpkg.com, npmmirror.com, cdn.jsdelivr.net, yarnpkg.com). These patterns are indicative of initial access attempts via phishing or the secondary stage of malware C2 communication.
Detects Microsoft Teams messages sent from an onmicrosoft.com domain that impersonate an 'IT Service Desk' and contain a link to an .msi file hosted on Azure Blob Storage, a common indicator of a phishing lure distributing malicious installers.
Detects Direct Send spearphishing impersonating internal roles (IT/Finance/Procurement) with business-themed lures targeting leadership/finance titles. Rewritten: removed a non-functional sender/recipient substring check and a broken EmailPostDeliveryEvents join that made the rule rarely fire; anchored detection to the actual Direct Send signature (null envelope + domain match) and a direct IdentityInfo join; standardized auth-failure parsing to match the other rules in this set.
Detects the RejectDirectSend bypass (null SMTP envelope sender + internal-domain spoof). Tightened to require Microsoft's composite auth verdict OR all of SPF/DKIM/DMARC failing (vs. any one), excludes known-approved Direct Send relay IPs, and excludes likely-legitimate bulk/newsletter traffic via BulkComplaintLevel.
Detects inbound emails where the sender domain mimics finance-themed brands (using a regex-based pattern) and includes URLs redirecting through the ActiveCampaign platform tracking domains (activehosted.com or acemlnd.com). This rule identifies potential phishing campaigns attempting to use legitimate email marketing infrastructure to bypass reputation-based filters.
This rule identifies phishing attempts by detecting inbound emails where the sender's domain or any embedded URLs within the email content match a pre-defined list of known malicious domains. It flags emails for further investigation by correlating sender domain data and URL information found in the email communication.
This rule correlates successful Microsoft 365 sign-in events with preceding network events involving identified NovaCookies AiTM phishing infrastructure (specifically targeting .vu domains or specific URL patterns). It triggers when a user successfully authenticates using MFA shortly after accessing a known phishing link, which is a strong indicator of an active AiTM session hijacking attempt.
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