Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects correlated SMOKE#SCREEN activity where a victim host is served a fake Zoom/Flash update lure, an HTTP response containing a JavaScript auto-download trigger, and a Dropbox-hosted payload link, all within the same hourly window.
Detects anomalous OAuth application authorization behavior by a user, specifically monitoring for a spike in authorization events within a short timeframe. This activity is often indicative of consent phishing campaigns where an adversary tricks a user into granting excessive application permissions to a malicious OAuth app, or a compromised account performing bulk authorization grants.
Detects network and DNS traffic targeting known infrastructure used by the Forg365 adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing kit. This kit clones Microsoft login pages to intercept credentials and session cookies via reverse proxy.
This rule detects the multi-stage execution pattern characteristic of the AMOS stealer on macOS, where a terminal session is used to execute a base64-encoded payload piped into a shell interpreter. The rule specifically monitors for processes like curl, openssl, base64, and zsh being launched from a Terminal or shell parent, often involving specific command-line indicators or malicious URLs associated with the stealer's toolkit.
Detects a correlated sequence where an unsigned cscript.exe/wscript.exe process executes a .vbs script, WMI-based hidden process creation is observed, and msiexec.exe performs a silent MSI installation, consistent with the SMOKE#SCREEN VBScript dropper chain that uses WMI to silently install a ScreenConnect MSI payload.
UNC6671 AiTM passkey/SSO lookalike domain DNS query
Detects inbound emails originating from a gmail.com sender that have not previously communicated with the recipient in the last 90 days. The rule identifies emails containing e-card or greeting card-themed subjects, which are often used as social engineering lures to masquerade as automated branded notifications for malicious activity or credential theft.
This rule detects potential malicious activity associated with the 'ClickFix' technique, commonly linked to Midnight Blizzard. It identifies a sequence of events where a device attempts to resolve or fetch a 'wpad.dat' file (a common indicator of proxy configuration manipulation or man-in-the-middle attempts) followed shortly thereafter by the execution of 'powershell.exe' or 'mshta.exe' spawned from 'explorer.exe' on the same host within a 30-minute window. This pattern is indicative of a user being coerced into executing malicious scripts under the guise of fixing connectivity or security prompts.
Detects execution/creation of the fake Zoom update installer (ZoomUpdateInstaller.pkg) on macOS endpoints correlated with a network connection to the SMOKE#SCREEN campaign relay IP 207.174.0.143 on port 8080.
Detects HTTP GET requests to UNC6692 Edgecution phishing landing pages hosted on S3 buckets using the 'service-page-*-outlook.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com' naming pattern with an 'email=' parameter and '/update.html' URI, used to lure victims into downloading the Edgecution malware suite via fake Outlook/Mailbox Repair Utility pages.
This rule detects potential phishing emails that successfully pass through to the mailbox despite failing SPF, DKIM, or DMARC authentication checks. It specifically flags emails that claim to originate from high-value vendor domains (e.g., DocuSign, Zoom, Adobe, RingCentral) but contain links to external domains that do not match the alleged sender's domain, which is a common indicator of brand impersonation or credential harvesting campaigns.
KQL Query
This rule detects potential phishing emails that successfully pass through to the mailbox despite failing SPF, DKIM, or DMARC authentication checks. It specifically flags emails that claim to originate from high-value vendor domains (e.g., DocuSign, Zoom, Adobe, RingCentral) but contain links to external domains that do not match the alleged sender's domain, which is a common indicator of brand impersonation or credential harvesting campaigns.
attackers are continuously abusing Device Code phishing, convincing victims to authenticate using the legitimate Microsoft login page. The victim completes the password and MFA correctly, but the resulting tokens are delivered to the attacker.
And one point that I think is important: Device Code Flow should not be enabled if you don't really need it. The recommendation is clear: disable it where possible and only allow documented exceptions.
The KQL below takes Cmsi:Cmsi as a reference (which means a Device Code Authentication flow was used) point and looks 15 minutes backwards (the time that a Code is valid) for the same user, grouping the authentication flow together with countries, IPs, browsers and User-Agents. The aim is to identify authentication flows where we observe different Browsers, Countries, IPs or User-Agents, potentially showing the transition between the victim and attacker context.
The idea is simple: Look at the complete authentication sequence and identify what changes between the victim and attacker context.
And one point that I think is important: Device Code Flow should not be enabled if you don't really need it. The recommendation is clear: disable it where possible and only allow documented exceptions.
The KQL below takes Cmsi:Cmsi as a reference (which means a Device Code Authentication flow was used) point and looks 15 minutes backwards (the time that a Code is valid) for the same user, grouping the authentication flow together with countries, IPs, browsers and User-Agents. The aim is to identify authentication flows where we observe different Browsers, Countries, IPs or User-Agents, potentially showing the transition between the victim and attacker context.
The idea is simple: Look at the complete authentication sequence and identify what changes between the victim and attacker context.
AiTM Phishing - PHPSESSID Cookie with Preload Flag and Word-Number Route Token
UNC6692 fake Outlook Updates Management Console phishing page served from S3
Detects outbound HTTP/proxy connections to gouvvbo.top, the JadeProx AdaptixC2 C2 domain also hosting a credential-harvesting phishing portal that impersonates the Piar Municipality (Venezuela) tax administration system.
Detects outbound HTTP/proxy connections to gouvvbo.top, the JadeProx AdaptixC2 C2 domain also hosting a credential-harvesting phishing portal that impersonates the Piar Municipality (Venezuela) tax administration system.
Detects a PowerShell or command shell process spawned directly by explorer.exe, consistent with a victim using the Win+R Run dialog to paste and execute a clipboard-borne command as instructed by a fake 'Webcam Compatibility'/'SECURITY WARNING'/'Zoom SDK Update' ClickFix modal. Tightened to reduce false positives from routine admin Run-dialog usage by excluding shell invocations that reference a saved script file (-File, .ps1/.bat/.vbs) or common IT support script/deployment paths, since a genuine ClickFix paste-execute is an inline one-off command typed/pasted directly into the Run box rather than a call to a maintained script. Analysts should additionally corroborate with a short-lived explorer.exe parent session (Run dialog opened immediately before the child process spawn) where session telemetry is available.
SourTrade malvertising - TLS SNI exact match to known SourTrade infrastructure domain
This rule detects proxy requests directed to the legitimate Microsoft OAuth 2.0 device authorization endpoint (/common/oauth2/deviceauth). This activity is indicative of OAuth device code phishing, where a user is tricked into entering a malicious or attacker-provided device code into the legitimate Microsoft device login page to complete an authentication flow and grant unauthorized access to an attacker-controlled application.
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