Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects network connections to phishing pages hosted on the workers.dev domain that are attempting to interact with EvilTokens device code API endpoints. These pages are known to implement developer hotkey prevention (F12 blocked, context menu disabled) to hinder in-browser analysis, indicating malicious intent.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts by identifying emails with subject lines and attachment names related to Income Tax or official tax filings. The detection logic correlates indicators such as specific tax-related subject phrases, common tax utility attachments, suspicious URLs (govtop.one), and sender spoofing (impersonating 'Government of India' without a valid .gov.in domain).
This rule detects potentially malicious search queries within Microsoft 365 or Copilot-related URLs intercepted by email gateways, proxies, or SIEM sources. It monitors for suspicious query parameters that may indicate attempts to hide malicious content, such as HTML tags (e.g., <img>), image-related keywords, or excessively long query strings, which could be indicative of phishing attempts or browser-based exploitation techniques.
RMM: ScreenConnect
Theme: DocuSign
URL: hxxps://vy.ijnggpi[.]com/ftx/
MSI Download URL: hxxps://web-g63lkz.screenconnect[.]com/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi
SHA256: a30a9779079dc897a15fed27f27f614fab77a20e953368808ba99ac6c6a3375b
Theme: DocuSign
URL: hxxps://vy.ijnggpi[.]com/ftx/
MSI Download URL: hxxps://web-g63lkz.screenconnect[.]com/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi
SHA256: a30a9779079dc897a15fed27f27f614fab77a20e953368808ba99ac6c6a3375b
Detects social engineering lures (like ClickFix, FileFix, and CrashFix) where a user is tricked into manually executing a malicious payload. This rule specifically looks for script interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe) or Living Off The Land Binaries (LOLBins) (rundll32.exe, msiexec.exe, regsvr32.exe, curl.exe, certutil.exe, bitsadmin.exe) being spawned as child processes of web browsers (chrome.exe, msedge.exe, firefox.exe, iexplore.exe, brave.exe, opera.exe) or explorer.exe (indicating execution from a Run dialog). Exclusions are in place for common benign browser update processes.
Detects potential phishing activity involving a two-hop open-redirect chain. The rule monitors for an initial navigation to known SaaS platforms (HolaBrief or LoopedIn), followed within one minute by an outbound request to an external destination where the SaaS domain is present in the HTTP referrer header, indicating a redirect-based phishing mechanism.
Detects high-risk activity where a user session, characterized by specific suspicious browser user agents and non-interactive authentication (indicative of token replay/session hijacking), is followed by changes to Workday payroll information (direct deposit, banking details) or unauthorized access to HR-related email content.
Detects potential Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing activity by identifying successful user sign-ins from a new, historically unseen IP address occurring within 30 minutes of a legitimate sign-in from a known IP, indicating the potential replay of a stolen session or refresh token.
This rule detects network connections and email URLs that match known typosquatted patterns of Microsoft domains. It aims to identify potential phishing attempts or traffic directed to infrastructure used by the 'Bulletproof Redirect Engine' masquerading as legitimate Microsoft services. The logic filters out legitimate Microsoft-related URLs to minimize false positives.
Detects phishing emails sent from personal Gmail accounts that use URL shorteners, include urgency-based legal lures in the subject line, and pass SPF/DKIM/DMARC authentication checks. The rule looks for indicators of spearphishing attempts leveraging social engineering and common evasion techniques like BCC delivery to bypass standard security filters.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for connections to domains that match naming patterns and TLDs frequently associated with the Ghostwriter/UNC1151 threat group. The rule specifically looks for URLs containing common credential-harvesting keywords (e.g., login, verify, account) combined with specific TLDs (e.g., .digital, .icu, .cc.cd). Connections to known common public DNS providers are excluded.
Detects DNS queries and network connection attempts to a set of known malicious domains associated with the threat actor UNC1151 (Ghostwriter). This rule monitors both DNS resolutions and direct network connection attempts to these indicators of compromise (IOCs), which are commonly used in spearphishing campaigns.
This rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for connections to domains that match naming patterns and TLDs frequently associated with the Ghostwriter/UNC1151 threat group. The rule specifically looks for URLs containing common credential-harvesting keywords (e.g., login, verify, account) combined with specific TLDs (e.g., .digital, .icu, .cc.cd). Connections to known common public DNS providers are excluded.
Detects malicious URLs sent via Microsoft Teams direct messages that contain known phishing TLDs, indicating potential phishing attempts or the use of Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) infrastructure. The rule specifically targets one-on-one chats and filters for a broad list of suspicious top-level domains.
Detects Microsoft 365 OAuth access tokens issued via device_code grant — the mechanism abused by the EvilTokens phishing kit — followed within 1 hour by mailbox forwarding rule creation for the same account, indicating persistent BEC access post-compromise.
This rule detects network connections or URL click events to a list of domains known to be associated with phishing or malware distribution. The rule specifically looks for connections to these domains that also contain certain path segments like '/wlc/', '/load/', or '/success/', which are often indicative of malicious activity or payload delivery. It also broadly checks for any URL click events containing these suspicious domains.
Correlates phishing email delivery with subsequent communication to attacker-controlled domains.
Detects malicious URLs sent via Microsoft Teams direct messages that contain known phishing TLDs, indicating potential phishing attempts or the use of Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) infrastructure. The rule specifically targets one-on-one chats and filters for a broad list of suspicious top-level domains.
Detects potential CastleLoader delivery by monitoring for suspicious child process executions (e.g., PowerShell, cmd, mshta, wscript, cscript) spawned directly by common browser or email client parent processes. This behavior is indicative of a user interacting with a malicious phishing link or attachment as part of a malware delivery chain.
Detects phishing emails associated with the TONResolver campaign that impersonate Booking.com guest complaints. The rule identifies suspicious emails containing .ics calendar file attachments or links to domains matching the pattern 'photo-[0-9]+.cfd', primarily targeting hospitality staff with subject lines related to hotel inquiries or issues.
Detects phishing emails impersonating Booking.com, specifically targeting Japanese users with malicious .cfd domains, suspicious subject lines, or attachments like 'invite.ics'. The rule assigns risk scores based on specific indicators such as URL patterns, body text, and sender domains.
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