Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects phishing lures delivered through social media messaging services
Detects users clicking links from emails containing Canadian payroll lures leading to fake Workday/ADP domains. The rule specifically looks for navigation to URLs matching a regex pattern for Workday, ADP, or payroll-related terms combined with login/auth/secure keywords, and correlates this with browser process events (Chrome or Edge).
Detects an account granting offline access, mail, files, directory, or user impersonation permissions shortly after anomalous authentication. This rule is designed to identify potential persistence mechanisms established by adversaries leveraging OAuth applications, as seen in campaigns like Tycoon 2FA AITM.
Detects when a user grants consent to a third-party application via the OAuth consent framework, specifically looking for grants that include highly privileged permissions such as Mail.ReadWrite, Contacts.Read, or offline_access. This can indicate a compromised user account being used to establish persistence or gain further access through a malicious application.
Detects MFA authentication success from one IP address followed immediately by a session access attempt from a different IP address. This pattern is characteristic of Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attacks, such as those using EvilProxy, Evilginx2, or similar phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) platforms, where an adversary proxies the authentication flow to capture session tokens.
Detects web traffic containing specific randomized CSS filter properties on top-level elements, frequently seen in Bluekit PhaaS toolkits. These properties are used to alter the visual hash of the rendered page, complicating automated screenshot or pixel-based analysis by security vendors. This technique is often combined with suspicious URL patterns indicative of credential harvesting sites.
Detects network communication associated with the Bluekit phishing framework and the use of the rrweb library to capture web sessions, including WebSocket upgrade attempts which may indicate unauthorized user activity monitoring or credential harvesting.
Detects potential Browser-in-the-Middle (AiTM) credential relay attacks where a user clicks a malicious phishing URL, followed shortly by a successful interactive sign-in from a different IP address and a previously unseen device.
Detects a specific behavioral pattern associated with Bluekit Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) involving WebRTC IP address leak fingerprinting. The rule identifies UDP STUN traffic (port 3478) originating from common web browsers followed within 30 seconds by an HTTPS connection to non-reputable domains, indicating a potential client-side phishing reconnaissance or identification attempt.
This rule detects potential lateral phishing attempts originating from a compromised Microsoft 365 account. It flags outbound internal emails containing payroll-related keywords, such as direct deposit or salary redirection, which are sent to HR or finance departments. This activity is correlated with recent mailbox rule modifications (like transport or inbox rules) by the same user, a technique often used by threat actors to hide communications or exfiltrate data, consistent with identified campaigns like Payroll Pirate.
This rule detects a multi-stage attack sequence where a user is subjected to a 'spam bomb' (large volume of inbound emails in a short time), followed by an external Microsoft Teams contact, and concluding with the execution of legitimate remote support tools (Quick Assist or MSRA) on the victim's endpoint, which is a common pattern for social engineering and technical support fraud.
Detects the execution of VBScript files via wscript.exe or cscript.exe from user-writable directories (Temp, Downloads, AppData, etc.) when the process is spawned by common application vectors like web browsers, email clients, or document viewers. This behavior is indicative of the Grandoreiro banking trojan's dropper mechanism, which uses obfuscated VBS scripts for geofencing and locale checks prior to downloading secondary payloads.
This rule monitors DNS traffic for queries to the domain 'chongdaotang.net', which is associated with a phishing campaign leveraging legal threat lures to harvest credentials. Detecting these queries indicates that a host in the network is attempting to resolve a domain used in a known credential harvesting attack.
Detects instances where explorer.exe launches a PowerShell process originating from an LNK file, which then performs a remote download of a Node.js runtime and JavaScript implant (TonRAT) to standard Windows temporary or application data directories. This activity is indicative of the TonRAT campaign targeting hospitality front-desk systems.
Detects network connections to known malicious domains or IP addresses associated with Fortinet or Ivanti VPN phishing campaigns or command and control infrastructure. This rule identifies attempts to connect to fake VPN portals or communicate with adversary-controlled servers.
Correlates a user passing a CAPTCHA gate (Cloudflare Turnstile, reCAPTCHA) with an immediate subsequent connection to an unknown, low-prevalence domain hosting the actual phishing landing page.
This rule detects a specific typosquatting pattern used by the EvilTokens phishing kit. It looks for HTTP traffic where the host contains 'workers.dev' and matches a regular expression for 'viewdoc[a-z0-9\-]+\.workers\.dev'. This indicates an attempt to mimic legitimate Cloudflare Workers domains for phishing purposes, specifically targeting the 'viewdoc' pattern often seen in document-sharing lures.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the 'EvilTokens' phishing kit, specifically targeting Microsoft OAuth Device Code flow. It looks for HTTP POST requests to the '/api/device/start' URI on domains hosted on Cloudflare Workers ('.workers.dev'). This pattern suggests an attempt to initiate a device code phishing attack, where adversaries trick users into entering credentials or codes to grant access to malicious applications.
Detects a browser session that contacts an EvilTokens Device Code phishing endpoint (/api/device/status/) and then immediately navigates to onedrive.live.com, indicating the attacker backend returned status:completed and the kit executed window.location.replace to redirect the victim to OneDrive after token capture. This sequence suggests a successful device code phishing attack where the victim's credentials or tokens have been captured, and they are then redirected to a legitimate service to avoid suspicion.
Detects a browser session that contacts an EvilTokens Device Code phishing endpoint (/api/device/status/) and then immediately navigates to onedrive.live.com, indicating the attacker backend returned status:completed and the kit executed window.location.replace to redirect the victim to OneDrive after token capture. This sequence suggests a successful device code phishing attack where the victim's credentials or tokens have been captured, and they are then redirected to a legitimate service to avoid suspicion.
Identifies network connections to algorithmically generated Cloudflare Workers domains used by Kali365, specifically targeting the `-s-account.workers.dev` format. This pattern is indicative of phishing campaigns, potentially for credential harvesting or token replay.
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