Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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AI-powered phishing-as-a-service abusing device-code authentication
Generates a macro-level alert identifying a rapid influx of emails containing links routing through known AiTM reverse proxy architectures, specifically targeting domains like onrender.com, web.app, and workers.dev. The rule triggers if more than 100 such threats are observed within a one-hour window for a given URL domain.
Detects an inbound policy-themed PDF attachment whose extracted URLs lead to a sign-in, authentication, review, or acknowledgement workflow outside the organisation. This rule specifically looks for PDF attachments in emails where the subject contains terms like 'code of conduct', 'policy', 'compliance', or 'handbook', and the extracted URLs within the PDF contain keywords such as 'login', 'signin', 'auth', 'review', or 'acknowledge'.
Detects mshta.exe launched from Windows Explorer to retrieve remote HTA content over HTTP, a technique frequently observed in phishing campaigns and initial access attacks.
This rule detects potential mass emailing or spam activity by identifying instances where a single email account sends more than 100 emails within a one-minute window. This behavior is often characteristic of compromised accounts performing phishing campaigns or bulk unauthorized communication.
Detects application consent by a user shortly after the same account clicked a code-of-conduct or compliance-themed message. This behavior can indicate a multi-stage phishing campaign where a user is lured into clicking a malicious link (e.g., a fake policy document) and subsequently grants OAuth permissions to a malicious application.
Detects a multi-stage infection chain associated with HijackLoader delivered via ErrTraffic ClickFix lures. The rule identifies a sequence where a web browser spawns a PowerShell process that subsequently creates a large archive file (binary bloating), followed by the execution of suspicious processes (often associated with process injection/hollowing) from the extracted context.
Correlates JS payload execution with immediate network requests to high-reputation but compromised shadowed domains used for traffic proxying. Specifically, this rule detects network connections initiated by 'wscript.exe' to known SocGholish domain shadowing infrastructure.
Detects network connections to Bunny CDN infrastructure that contain common URL path indicators associated with phishing, a technique observed in activity attributed to UNC1151 (Ghostwriter).
This rule detects network connections from internal hosts to identified C2 or phishing infrastructure associated with the threat actor group UNC1151 (also known as Ghostwriter). It monitors both host-based network events (via DeviceNetworkEvents) and centralized network security logs (via CommonSecurityLog) for traffic targeting a curated list of known malicious IP addresses.
Detects network connections to Bunny CDN infrastructure that contain common URL path indicators associated with phishing, a technique observed in activity attributed to UNC1151 (Ghostwriter).
Detects phishing attempts leveraging legitimate service redirectors such as Calendly and Google share URLs to deliver malicious photo-themed ZIP archives. The rule identifies suspicious redirect chains to Cloudflare-hosted (.cfd) domains and monitors for specific ZIP filename patterns commonly used in these campaigns to target the hospitality sector.
This rule detects potentially malicious emails that leverage Calendly as a lure. It looks for emails that pass standard authentication (SPF/DKIM/DMARC) but contain suspicious elements such as URLs redirecting to Calendly or Google, subject lines related to common social engineering themes (complaints, health inspections, etc.), or the presence of ZIP attachments that match common photo/image naming patterns.
This rule detects suspicious emails exhibiting patterns associated with 'authentication laundering' by identifying the combination of legitimate scheduling or redirection links (e.g., Calendly, Google Redirect) with potentially malicious indicators such as zip file links, suspicious .cfd domains, or impersonation of booking management services. It calculates a laundering score based on these features and the health of email authentication signals (SPF/DKIM).
Detects spear-phishing emails associated with Operation DragonReturn, which impersonates the Indian Income Tax Department. The rule identifies specific malicious attachment filenames, suspicious URLs, subject lines, and sender domains commonly used in these campaigns to deliver malicious content.
These domains are actively used in phishing campaigns impersonating legitimate software platforms like Homebrew, LogMeIn, and TradingView to distribute Odyssey Stealer and AMOS malware. Blocking these domains can prevent access to malicious download sites.
This rule detects POST requests to the URI '/api/device/start' which is indicative of the EvilTokens phishing kit attempting to initiate a Microsoft OAuth Device Code flow. This technique is often used in phishing campaigns to gain unauthorized access to user accounts by tricking them into authenticating through a device code.
This rule detects network traffic indicative of the 'EvilTokens' phishing kit, specifically targeting Microsoft OAuth Device Code flow. It looks for HTTP POST requests to the '/api/device/start' URI on domains hosted on Cloudflare Workers ('.workers.dev'). This pattern suggests an attempt to initiate a device code phishing attack, where adversaries trick users into entering credentials or codes to grant access to malicious applications.
This rule detects successful sign-ins using the OAuth 2.0 Device Code Flow. This flow is often abused in phishing attacks (device code phishing) where an attacker tricks a user into authenticating a malicious application. A successful sign-in using this method could indicate a compromised account or a successful phishing attempt.
Detects DNS resolution of known Bluekit PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) operator domains. These domains are associated with phishing lures that leverage LLMs for localized content and voice cloning, and this detection identifies when a host attempts to resolve these specific malicious domains, indicating a likely interaction with a phishing lure.
Detects emails containing Microsoft Customer Voice URLs that redirect to known cloud-hosting platforms (vercel.app, amplifyapp.com, workers.dev) frequently used for phishing campaigns. This indicates an attempt to leverage legitimate Microsoft services to host or redirect to malicious content.
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