Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects HTTP 3xx redirect chains where a browser is redirected to a cloud-native staging domain (such as azurewebsites.net, pages.dev, or web.app) that has not been previously observed in the organization's network traffic history over the last 37 days. This pattern is commonly used by adversaries to redirect traffic to staging infrastructure hosting malicious payloads or C2 content while leveraging reputable cloud services to bypass filters.
Identifies inbound emails leveraging the HR-themed "Code of Conduct" or "Employee Policy" subjects often used to trigger the AiTM campaign.
Detects phishing emails associated with the TONResolver RAT campaign that impersonate Booking.com partner support. The emails use Japanese-language lures concerning guest complaints, include 'invite.ics' calendar attachments, and contain URLs pointing to suspicious top-level domains (.cfd, .bond, .sbs, .shop) or specific 'photo-' URL patterns. The rule differentiates between malicious impersonation and legitimate booking.com domain traffic.
Detects incoming email messages containing PDF attachments from 'gasparinutrition.com' that either have suspicious filenames indicating legal or contractual documents or contain external links redirecting to non-domain URLs. These indicators are consistent with credential harvesting or phishing campaigns.
Detects deployment of phishing landing pages on attacker infrastructure
This rule detects network connections to a list of domains identified as associated with phishing activities associated with Crimson Kingsnake. Monitoring these connections can help identify compromised systems or users attempting to access malicious sites.
This rule detects network connections or URL click events to a list of domains known to be associated with phishing or malware distribution. The rule specifically looks for connections to these domains that also contain certain path segments like '/wlc/', '/load/', or '/success/', which are often indicative of malicious activity or payload delivery. It also broadly checks for any URL click events containing these suspicious domains.
This rule detects network connections from internal hosts to identified C2 or phishing infrastructure associated with the threat actor group UNC1151 (also known as Ghostwriter). It monitors both host-based network events (via DeviceNetworkEvents) and centralized network security logs (via CommonSecurityLog) for traffic targeting a curated list of known malicious IP addresses.
Detects network connections to Bunny CDN infrastructure that contain common URL path indicators associated with phishing, a technique observed in activity attributed to UNC1151 (Ghostwriter).
This rule detects network connections from internal hosts to identified C2 or phishing infrastructure associated with the threat actor group UNC1151 (also known as Ghostwriter). It monitors both host-based network events (via DeviceNetworkEvents) and centralized network security logs (via CommonSecurityLog) for traffic targeting a curated list of known malicious IP addresses.
Identifies emails with low text content but containing image attachments (.png/.jpg) associated with QR code "Quishing" attacks, a rising Q1 trend. The rule specifically looks for image attachments with filenames containing keywords like 'scan', 'qr', 'barcode', 'auth', or 'mfa', and joins this with email events that have no URLs, indicating the QR code is the primary call to action.
Detects application consent by a user shortly after the same account clicked a code-of-conduct or compliance-themed message. This behavior can indicate a multi-stage phishing campaign where a user is lured into clicking a malicious link (e.g., a fake policy document) and subsequently grants OAuth permissions to a malicious application.
This rule detects attempts to grant consent to OAuth applications, which could indicate an illicit consent grant attack. It specifically looks for successful operations related to consenting to applications, adding app role assignments to service principals, adding delegated permission grants, or adding OAuth2PermissionGrants within audit logs. The rule extracts details such as the target application, the user who consented, their initiating IP address, and the permissions granted.
This rule detects potentially unauthorized or suspicious Google Forms collaboration invitations delivered via email. It filters for emails that pass full sender authentication (SPF, DKIM, and DMARC) and originate from Google infrastructure, while containing a specific Google Forms editor invite URL pattern. The rule excludes internal organizational communications from the Google domain and identifies specific return-path domains commonly associated with automated Google Forms sharing notifications to highlight external or unexpected collaboration requests.
Detects HTTP connections to paste sites (glot.io, rentry.co) used by ClawHavoc campaigns as redirect intermediaries. These sites serve as payload staging areas allowing attackers to update malicious content without modifying published AI skills.
Detects incoming emails originating from Google infrastructure (Gmail or Google Forms) where the sender's display name closely matches the recipient's local username part. This heuristic is commonly used to identify targeted spearphishing campaigns where attackers impersonate internal users or trusted entities via abuse of legitimate Google services.
This rule detects potentially malicious email messages masquerading as Google Forms collaboration invitations. It identifies emails originating from Google-related domains that contain URLs for Google Forms with invite parameters. The detection logic filters for messages passing SPF, DKIM, and DMARC authentication checks to highlight legitimate-looking emails that may be part of a social engineering campaign, and flags instances where the sender's display name matches the recipient's name as a high-risk indicator of impersonation.
This rule detects suspicious WebSocket upgrade attempts targeted at Microsoft authentication endpoints, typically used by 'Bluekit' or similar Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platforms to establish a persistent connection or tunnel for credential harvesting via adversary-in-the-middle attacks. It flags traffic from non-private IP addresses that exhibit specific patterns associated with proxy usage or automated tooling (e.g., Python/curl) combined with WebSocket upgrade headers.
This rule detects suspicious WebSocket upgrade attempts targeted at Microsoft authentication endpoints, typically used by 'Bluekit' or similar Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platforms to establish a persistent connection or tunnel for credential harvesting via adversary-in-the-middle attacks. It flags traffic from non-private IP addresses that exhibit specific patterns associated with proxy usage or automated tooling (e.g., Python/curl) combined with WebSocket upgrade headers.
This rule detects EvilTokens device code OAuth phishing by identifying rapid, repeated POST requests to the /common/oauth2/token endpoint with a device_code grant and authorization_pending responses, followed by a successful token issuance and sign-in without an MFA claim. This pattern is consistent with EvilTokens session harvesting.
This rule detects suspicious execution patterns involving 'wscript.exe' or 'cscript.exe' that utilize common COM objects or VBScript, while excluding executions from standard Windows and Program Files directories. It specifically looks for multiple unique command line executions within a two-hour window from the same device and account, indicating potential malicious script activity.
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