Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential device code phishing attempts by correlating URL click events with sign-in logs using the 'deviceCode' authentication protocol. It specifically looks for successful or failed sign-ins (result types 0, 50074, 50076, 500121) that occur after a user clicks on a URL.
Detects phishing links delivered through URL shortening services
Detects a high volume of outbound emails originating from an internal Exchange server to external addresses with spoofed headers, indicating an Open Relay exploit.
Detects inbound emails that are fully authenticated (SPF, DKIM, DMARC pass) and contain keywords related to 'code of conduct', 'employee handbook', 'policy acknowledgement', or 'compliance update' in the subject line, originating from a sender domain that has not been observed by the recipient organization within the last 24 hours. This rule aims to identify potential phishing attempts leveraging social engineering themes from newly registered or previously unseen domains.
This rule detects inbound emails that have failed SPF and/or DKIM authentication checks and presents evidence of post-delivery user interaction. Authentication failures on inbound email are a strong indicator of email spoofing or unauthorized sending infrastructure, commonly associated with phishing campaigns targeting organizational users.
Unlike basic phishing detections that alert on email receipt alone, this rule correlates authentication failures with downstream activity to identify attacks that have progressed beyond the initial delivery phase of the MITRE ATT&CK kill chain. Specifically, the rule looks for three post-delivery indicators tied to the suspicious email:
URL Click Activity — A recipient clicked a link contained within the flagged email, suggesting potential engagement with a malicious payload or credential harvesting site
Malicious Attachment Match — An attachment delivered by the flagged email matched a known malicious SHA-256 hash present in the Threat Intelligence table, indicating a known-bad payload was delivered to the recipient
Endpoint File Creation — A file was created on an endpoint whose SHA-256 hash matches an attachment from the flagged email, suggesting the attachment was saved or executed on a host device
Any email triggering one or more of these conditions is surfaced with full metadata including sender, recipient, subject, SPF/DKIM/DMARC results, and the associated IOC for analyst review.
Unlike basic phishing detections that alert on email receipt alone, this rule correlates authentication failures with downstream activity to identify attacks that have progressed beyond the initial delivery phase of the MITRE ATT&CK kill chain. Specifically, the rule looks for three post-delivery indicators tied to the suspicious email:
URL Click Activity — A recipient clicked a link contained within the flagged email, suggesting potential engagement with a malicious payload or credential harvesting site
Malicious Attachment Match — An attachment delivered by the flagged email matched a known malicious SHA-256 hash present in the Threat Intelligence table, indicating a known-bad payload was delivered to the recipient
Endpoint File Creation — A file was created on an endpoint whose SHA-256 hash matches an attachment from the flagged email, suggesting the attachment was saved or executed on a host device
Any email triggering one or more of these conditions is surfaced with full metadata including sender, recipient, subject, SPF/DKIM/DMARC results, and the associated IOC for analyst review.
SniperDz VAPID Key Activity
Cortex XDR
Detects web requests or command line activity containing the specific VAPID public key associated with the SniperDz push-notification infrastructure. This key is known to be used by the SniperDz PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) ecosystem.
Detects network connections or DNS queries to the specific link-aggregation domain 'fanlnk.to'. This domain is known to be abused by the threat actor SniperDz to mask the destination of malicious social media lures, often leading to phishing or malware delivery.
Detects high-volume POST requests to login forms indicating credential harvesting
Identifies emails where the sender claims to be internal, but the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AuthAs header is not set to 'Internal', indicating a potential Ghost-Sender exploit. This rule focuses on delivered emails to reduce noise and filters out expected external mail gateways and trusted automated senders.
This rule detects suspicious execution patterns involving 'wscript.exe' or 'cscript.exe' that utilize common COM objects or VBScript, while excluding executions from standard Windows and Program Files directories. It specifically looks for multiple unique command line executions within a two-hour window from the same device and account, indicating potential malicious script activity.
Detects high-volume email campaigns that exhibit characteristics of sophisticated phishing, including spoofed sender domains, urgent subject lines, and multiple URLs in the email body, indicative of credential harvesting attempts. The rule specifically looks for emails delivered to 'Deleted' or 'Junk' folders, from non-company domains that resemble company domains, and containing keywords often used in phishing lures.
Detects inbound emails containing Google Forms links with the '/edit?invite=' parameter. This parameter grants editor privileges and is frequently abused in data harvesting campaigns to bypass traditional email gateway URL filtering.
Identifies network traffic targeting the backend API endpoints associated with EvilTokens device code generation and token weaponization. This rule specifically looks for requests to paths like /api/device/start, /api/device/status, /api/device/sessions, and various /api/prt/ endpoints (convert, refresh, exchange, cookie, owa-session, recon, azure) which are indicative of EvilTokens activity.
Detects phishing links with credential harvesting redirects
Detects phishing links with credential harvesting redirects
This detection identifies when an email that contains a URL associated with a known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool was sent and subsequently clicked by the intended recipient or the original sender. The domain is not part of the organization's approved RMM solutions, indicating a potential use of Living-off-the-Land RMM (LOLRMM) techniques often employed in initial access or persistence stages by threat actors.
This activity may reflect attempted remote access, lateral movement, or data collection through unauthorized RMM deployment.
This activity may reflect attempted remote access, lateral movement, or data collection through unauthorized RMM deployment.
Detects incoming emails containing hyperlinks to legitimate Microsoft device code authentication pages combined with keywords or spoofed branding for document sharing services like DocuSign, Adobe Acrobat Sign, or SharePoint. This technique is indicative of Kali365 and similar Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) kits attempting to steal OAuth tokens and bypass MFA.
This rule detects emails containing multiple obfuscated URLs from common URL shortening services (bit.ly, tinyurl, short.link) originating from external senders. It specifically looks for emails with 3 or more such URLs within a one-hour window from the same sender.
This rule detects suspicious device registration operations in a tenant by identifying device names that match known automated device code phishing kit patterns. Specifically, it looks for device names that are in the format of 'DESKTOP-' followed by 6 to 8 hexadecimal characters, which deviates from typical Windows default naming conventions. This pattern is often used by attackers to register devices for persistence or to bypass MFA.
Identifies the creation or execution of the specific JavaScript file named 'Remittance Advice.js' used in the initial access phase of the Evil MSI Background steganography campaign.
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