Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
435 detections
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This rule detects potential data exfiltration to Dropbox cloud storage. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to 'api.dropboxapi.com' with a data size greater than 10000 bytes. This indicates a significant amount of data being uploaded to Dropbox, which could be a sign of unauthorized data transfer.
Detects the creation or modification of Power Automate flows that connect to external services commonly used for data exfiltration or command and control, such as webhooks, Gmail, Dropbox, Google Drive, Slack, RSS feeds, custom connectors, or generic HTTP requests/webhooks. This could indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or exfiltrate data from the Power Platform environment.
Detects suspicious attempts to dump serialized GitHub Actions secrets (JSON) into a text file named 'format-results.txt' for subsequent artifact exfiltration, a technique used by IronWorm. The rule looks for shell commands that use 'echo' to write to 'format-results.txt' and contain references to 'VARIABLE_STORE' or 'secrets', indicating an attempt to exfiltrate sensitive CI/CD environment variables.
Detects the execution of MEGAsync.exe with the /upload argument, a technique used by NightSpire ransomware operators to exfiltrate staged data to MEGA cloud storage.
Detects the use of curl.exe to upload files to sendit.sh, indicative of staging stolen data to a public file-transfer service as observed in Seedworm campaigns.
Detects the export of Microsoft Teams messages, transcripts, recordings, and chat retrieval activities, particularly when performed via the Graph API. This rule identifies suspicious activity by looking for specific operation names in SaaS audit logs from Microsoft Teams and flags user agents commonly associated with automation tools (e.g., python-requests, axios, go-http, curl, wget, powershell, httpx, aiohttp, node) which could indicate post-compromise attackers using stolen tokens to silently export chat history.
This rule detects the creation or modification of Exchange transport rules or inbox rules that forward or redirect emails to external domains. It specifically looks for operations like 'New-TransportRule', 'Set-TransportRule', 'New-InboxRule', 'Set-InboxRule', 'Set-Mailbox', 'UpdateInboxRules', and 'Set-TransportConfig' where the destination is an email address outside of the organization's verified domains. This activity can indicate data exfiltration or an attempt to maintain persistence and collect sensitive information.
No description available.
Detects DNS requests to file.io originating from non-browser processes, indicative of data exfiltration, potentially by tools like CompactGopher. The rule identifies DNS requests for file.io or its subdomains, joins them with process information, and then filters out common web browsers to highlight suspicious activity.
Detects the creation or modification of Power Automate flows that connect to external services commonly used for data exfiltration or command and control, such as webhooks, Gmail, Dropbox, Google Drive, Slack, RSS feeds, custom connectors, or generic HTTP requests/webhooks. This could indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or exfiltrate data from the Power Platform environment.
Detects the execution of S3 Browser or Office installation executables, followed by network traffic from the same host to known cloud storage or file-sharing sites within a short time window. This behavior aligns with Muddled Libra's method of staging and exfiltrating sensitive data, such as PST files, to attacker-controlled cloud buckets.
Detects the specific OpenSSL command line arguments used by TeamPCP (Trivy compromise) to encrypt stolen credentials before exfiltration using a hybrid AES-256-CBC scheme. This rule looks for the 'openssl' executable being run with 'enc -aes-256-cbc' or 'enc -aes-256' and a passphrase specified via a file using '-pass file:'.
This rule detects outbound network connections to URLs associated with common file sharing services (e.g., Dropbox, Mega, Gofile) or temporary email providers (e.g., Temp-Mail). Such connections can indicate data exfiltration attempts, use of unsanctioned services, or communication with command and control infrastructure.
Detects outbound web requests to the Anthropic API containing the specific beta header required to upload files. This can be abused by attackers to exfiltrate sensitive data from the Claude sandbox to an attacker-controlled Anthropic account.
This rule detects artifacts associated with the APT36 CreepDropper malware, specifically focusing on scheduled task names and staging file markers. It looks for specific strings related to scheduled tasks like 'MicrosoftEdgesUpdatesTasksMachineUAs-Task' and 'MicrosoftEdgesUpdatesTasksMachineUAs-1234-87hy', as well as a staging file named 'ds.png' and other related strings such as 'msedge.exe', 'Task10', and 'System.Reflection.Assembly'. The rule requires at least four of these strings to be present, along with the MZ header, indicating a Windows executable.
This rule detects outbound network connections to a predefined list of suspicious cloud storage and file-sharing services. These services are often used by adversaries for exfiltration of collected data, providing a covert channel due to their common use and potential for SSL/TLS encryption. The rule specifically looks for `RemoteUrl` containing any of the domains listed in `suspiciousexfildomains`.
Detects the use of Rclone to exfiltrate data to a Wasabi cloud storage bucket. This technique was observed being used by the Iranian APT group Seedworm.
This rule detects various indicators associated with a developer-targeting campaign, including Node.js fetching remote JavaScript from untrusted PaaS domains, dynamic loader behavior in next.config.js, repeated beaconing to C2 paths, detached child Node interpreters, directory enumeration and exfiltration behavior, and suspicious access to sensitive files on developer machines.
Detects network connections to known Command and Control (C2) infrastructure associated with the APT37 Ruby Jumper campaign. This includes the C2 IP address for the FOOTWINE backdoor and the Zoho WorkDrive Client ID used by the RESTLEAF implant for exfiltration.
Detects non-browser processes making outbound connections to specific Google Sheets API endpoints used by the GRIDTIDE backdoor for command and control. This activity is indicative of the malware using legitimate cloud services to disguise its C2 traffic.
Detects access to file sharing and exfiltration services reported in the Unit 42 Muddled Libra operational playbook, including S3 Browser and multiple upload services.
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