Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
401 detections
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Detects anomalous post-exploitation behaviors such as mass file modifications, lateral movement (SMB/RDP), or persistence mechanisms (scheduled tasks/services) following ScreenConnect client session activity. This behavior is indicative of potential exploitation of ScreenConnect to deploy ransomware or move laterally within the network.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager' via registry keys or command-line utilities. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or service manipulation for malicious purposes.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager' via registry keys or command-line utilities. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or service manipulation for malicious purposes.
Detects the creation of Windows services using sc.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe that reference specific DLL files (winfsp-x64.dll or DukeQt.dll). This behavior is often associated with persistence mechanisms or DLL hijacking/side-loading techniques where a malicious service is configured to load a specific library.
Detects the creation of Windows services using sc.exe, powershell.exe, or cmd.exe that reference specific DLL files (winfsp-x64.dll or DukeQt.dll). This behavior is often associated with persistence mechanisms or DLL hijacking/side-loading techniques where a malicious service is configured to load a specific library.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager' via registry keys or command-line utilities. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or service manipulation for malicious purposes.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager' via registry keys or command-line utilities. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or service manipulation for malicious purposes.
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
Detects the execution of known potentially malicious tools cplsupport.exe and wtass.exe with install parameters, or the creation of a Windows service associated with these filenames using sc.exe. This activity is indicative of service-based persistence or malicious software installation.
Detects the creation or modification of a Windows service named 'ProcAuditManager' via registry keys or command-line utilities. This pattern is indicative of potential persistence mechanisms or service manipulation for malicious purposes.
Remote Service Creation via SVCCTL RPC
Cortex XDR
Detects remote service manipulation, including service creation, starting, and deletion, using the SVCCTL RPC interface. This activity is a common method for lateral movement and remote code execution by tools like PsExec, smbexec, and CrackMapExec.
Detects suspicious service installation patterns involving WmiPrvSE, common in lateral movement techniques.
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of activities indicative of potential lateral movement and credential access. It identifies the execution of PsExec (PSEXESVC.exe) in conjunction with volume shadow copy manipulation (vssadmin, wmic, or diskshadow to create or delete shadow copies) within a 30-minute window. It further correlates this activity with potential lateral movement commands (e.g., net.exe, query.exe, nslookup.exe) to assess the severity of the incident.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of activities indicative of potential lateral movement and credential access. It identifies the execution of PsExec (PSEXESVC.exe) in conjunction with volume shadow copy manipulation (vssadmin, wmic, or diskshadow to create or delete shadow copies) within a 30-minute window. It further correlates this activity with potential lateral movement commands (e.g., net.exe, query.exe, nslookup.exe) to assess the severity of the incident.
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
Detects the creation of Windows services immediately following a network logon event (Logon Type 3) using NTLM or Kerberos. The rule monitors for service names or file paths characteristic of PsExec-style remote execution tools, specifically focusing on suspicious paths (e.g., Temp, UNC paths) or file extensions (e.g., .bat, .ps1, .tmp) used by attackers to execute payloads laterally.
Detects attempts to modify or disable the Windows Update service (wuauserv) using command-line utilities (sc.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe) in a context involving 'LockAppHost.exe'. This pattern is often associated with unauthorized attempts to tamper with security update mechanisms to prevent system patching.
Detects attempts to modify or disable the Windows Update service (wuauserv) using command-line utilities (sc.exe, cmd.exe, powershell.exe) in a context involving 'LockAppHost.exe'. This pattern is often associated with unauthorized attempts to tamper with security update mechanisms to prevent system patching.
Detects suspicious service installation patterns involving WmiPrvSE, common in lateral movement techniques.
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