Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects known command-and-control (C2) domains associated with the Sauron Loader malware family, specifically by inspecting TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) fields. It also monitors for patterns of repeated connections to domains prefixed with 'api.' over established TLS sessions, which may indicate beaconing behavior characteristic of C2 activity.
Detects Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) traffic occurring over non-standard high ports (64350, 64330, 65535, 65111, 61256), which is indicative of SilkParasite C2 activity or potentially malicious lateral movement attempting to bypass standard port monitoring.
Detects anomalous HTTP POST requests to a suspected C2 endpoint ('/beacon/pre-register') on a typosquatted domain ('thecovnresation') characterized by an application/octet-stream content type, which is indicative of encrypted C2 beacon registration activity.
Detects anomalous HTTP POST requests to a suspected C2 endpoint ('/beacon/pre-register') on a typosquatted domain ('thecovnresation') characterized by an application/octet-stream content type, which is indicative of encrypted C2 beacon registration activity.
Detects anomalous HTTP POST requests to a suspected C2 endpoint ('/beacon/pre-register') on a typosquatted domain ('thecovnresation') characterized by an application/octet-stream content type, which is indicative of encrypted C2 beacon registration activity.
Detects potential Command and Control (C2) beaconing activity associated with Xray-core, where the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) field is spoofed to 'dl.google.com' to masquerade malicious traffic as legitimate Google-related traffic.
Detects network communication associated with the SectopRAT/ArechClient2 remote access trojan, specifically identifying its characteristic length-prefixed, AES-encrypted command-and-control handshake on non-standard ports. The rule matches traffic containing a specific length-prefixed packet structure starting with null bytes, typically seen during C2 check-in.
Detects network communication associated with the SectopRAT/ArechClient2 remote access trojan, specifically identifying its characteristic length-prefixed, AES-encrypted command-and-control handshake on non-standard ports. The rule matches traffic containing a specific length-prefixed packet structure starting with null bytes, typically seen during C2 check-in.
Detects network communication associated with the SectopRAT/ArechClient2 remote access trojan, specifically identifying its characteristic length-prefixed, AES-encrypted command-and-control handshake on non-standard ports. The rule matches traffic containing a specific length-prefixed packet structure starting with null bytes, typically seen during C2 check-in.
In DeviceNetworkEvents, we can find both JA4 and JA4S inside AdditionalFields for some TLS connections. This is interesting because we can look at both sides of the same TLS communication. We can compare clients, servers and JA4/JA4S combinations, and look for patterns or connections that behave differently from what we normally see. The following KQL extracts and decodes both fingerprints from the same network event.
Detects network communication associated with the SilkParasite campaign, specifically identifying TLS traffic using fraudulent certificates impersonating the Uzbekistan railway authority (azure.uzrailwaystax.com) and connections to identified malicious infrastructure using specific JA4X TLS fingerprinting.
Detects network communications between internal hosts and known malicious infrastructure associated with SpiceRAT, including TLS-based command channels and HTTP requests for decoy pages.
Detection rules designed to identify communication patterns associated with the CRPx0 ransomware, specifically targeting HTTP-based command-and-control (C2) traffic, including relay server interaction, unique Authorization headers, and connections to known onion-based proxies.
This rule detects network traffic originating from the local network to external destinations that exhibit characteristics associated with the Xray-core tool, specifically the use of a spoofed TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) of 'dl.google.com' paired with a server certificate that does not contain 'Google' in the subject. This technique is used to bypass network filters by masquerading command and control traffic as legitimate Google traffic.
This rule detects potential Xray-core command-and-control (C2) activity where a client initiates a TLS connection using 'dl.google.com' as the Server Name Indication (SNI) but connects to a destination IP address that does not belong to Google's infrastructure. This technique is often used to mask C2 traffic as legitimate traffic to Google services.
Detects network activity associated with the DarkMe RAT, including DNS lookups for its known C2 domain 'thatawful.boutique' and outbound TCP connections to a hardcoded non-standard port (7712) at a known malicious C2 IP address.
Detects HTTP POST requests to the specific '/api/node/register' URI, which is associated with the RatHat RAT command and control (C2) node registration behavior.
Detects Ruby processes executing with arguments explicitly disabling SSL/TLS verification (OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_NONE) while correlating with the presence of suspicious helper scripts ('loader.rb' or 'script.rb') within Ruby gem-related directories. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to perform man-in-the-middle attacks or bypass security controls for outbound C2 communications.
Detects network activity associated with the RUSTYSHADE malware, specifically identifying the 'HCENC1:' prefix used in HTTP requests to encapsulate AES-256-GCM encrypted command and control traffic directed towards GitHub API channels.
Detects outbound TCP traffic originating from the internal network destined for a known malicious IP associated with Meterpreter Java payload retrieval and post-exploitation Command and Control (C2) activity, potentially related to PaperCut vulnerability exploitation.
This rule monitors HTTP POST requests for patterns indicative of armored malware (specifically StealC) beaconing to a Command and Control (C2) server. The rule looks for established connections that use POST requests while avoiding common patterns found in standard web traffic (like JSON, XML, or standard form data) and having a specific request body size threshold. The thresholding mechanism helps reduce noise by only alerting when multiple occurrences are observed within a short time frame, suggesting automated beaconing behavior.
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