Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
140 detections
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Detects outbound connections to the known Rust supply-chain C2 infrastructure, plus a lower-confidence rule for the broader Hostwinds range on port 9089.
Detects the botking RAT's C2 beacon: HTTPS POST with the 'i am botking' registration marker and form-urlencoded action=check polling, plus associated TLS/DNS indicators.
This rule detects outbound TLS connections from the local network to an external destination where the server provides a self-signed certificate. Self-signed certificates are often used by malware for command-and-control (C2) communication or by data exfiltration tools to establish encrypted channels while avoiding the need for legitimate, verifiable PKI infrastructure.
KQL Query
Detects a network connection to Google's passkey enclave or caBLE hybrid-transport domain (*.ua5v.com) that should be correlated with EDR process telemetry to confirm the source process is non-browser, unsigned, or otherwise anomalous rather than the legitimate Chrome browser.
Detects short-lived execution of the compiled AppleScript loader from /tmp/p.app, correlated with its rapid creation-then-deletion pattern, the observable proxy for XCSSET's dual-key-encrypted loader architecture.
Detects short-lived execution of the compiled AppleScript loader from /tmp/p.app, correlated with its rapid creation-then-deletion pattern, the observable proxy for XCSSET's dual-key-encrypted loader architecture.
This rule detects UDP traffic patterns characteristic of the msaRAT C2 handshake. It specifically identifies initial WebRTC DataChannel connection frames containing the 0xFE marker combined with ChaCha-Poly1305 encryption indicators within the expected packet size range.
Detects established TLS connections to known malicious infrastructure associated with PureRAT and DlrtyGames RAT. The rules identify suspicious patterns such as connections without a Server Name Indication (SNI) and specific JA3 hashes indicative of malware beacons.
This rule detects network traffic patterns associated with BlueNoroff ClickFix C2 communications. It specifically identifies GET requests to endpoints containing an 'ft?id=' parameter followed by a base64-encoded string, which indicates the delivery of encrypted tasking parameters to an infected system.
Detects established TLS traffic over WebSockets where the certificate subject field lacks a common name (CN), often indicative of non-standard, self-signed, or improperly generated TLS certificates used by command-and-control (C2) agents to bypass standard certificate validation or hide within encrypted channels.
This rule detects outbound TLS 1.2 traffic communicating over TCP port 99, which is a non-standard port for TLS/HTTPS traffic. This behavior is indicative of potential command-and-control (C2) communication where an adversary is attempting to hide traffic using encryption on an unconventional port.
Detects established TLS connections to external networks where the server certificate subject contains a Common Name (CN) but lacks Organization (O) or Organizational Unit (OU) fields. This pattern is characteristic of basic, potentially malicious self-signed certificates used by command-and-control (C2) frameworks to mask communication.
Detects outbound HTTP POST requests to a /gallery URI endpoint, which is associated with Cavern Manticore C2 beacons. The detection logic inspects the HTTP request body for a specific Base64-encoded pattern following XOR 0x48 encoding, indicating potential command-and-control communication.
This rule identifies potential Command and Control (C2) beaconing activity by detecting recurring, consistent HTTP(S) requests from internal hosts to unknown or newly seen external destinations, characterized by stable time intervals and low variance in response sizes. The detection logic filters out common User-Agents, indicating non-browser or automated traffic often associated with malware communication.
Detects network traffic consistent with the Metasploit Meterpreter reverse HTTPS payload, specifically looking for the default 'CN=metasploit' certificate subject name used by the framework in SSL/TLS handshakes, or connections targeting default Meterpreter ports like 4444.
Detects command and control (C2) activity attributed to threat actor UAC-0226 by monitoring for direct network connections to known hardcoded C2 IP addresses from suspicious process paths or PowerShell, and by identifying beaconing patterns (regular HTTPS intervals) originating from non-browser processes in sensitive locations like ProgramData or AppData/Local/Temp.
Detects outbound WebSocket connections from endpoints to known infrastructure associated with the Turla group's STOCKSTAY malware. The rule monitors DeviceNetworkEvents for successful connections or attempts to specific domains (glitch.me, onrender.com, theworkpc.com) or connections containing WebSocket-related headers in the metadata, which indicate C2 activity.
Detects the SNOWLIGHT dropper (disguised as the Windows Update Service 'wusvc.exe') attempting to establish an outbound network connection to a known malicious C2 infrastructure (38.60.253.35) on port 8084. The rule also accounts for the use of non-standard port communication and monitors for suspicious process masquerading outside of protected system directories.
Malvertising loader delivering CastleStealer via malicious Google Ads
This rule monitors network traffic for activity related to the Tox decentralized protocol. It identifies specific domains (tox.chat) or known hex-encoded identifiers associated with Payouts King ransomware leak sites and ransom notes embedded in network requests or payloads.
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