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This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Solorigate supply chain attack. Please note that these attacks are currently known as the Nobelium campaign.
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query locates malicious Nobelium-associated DLLs that have been loaded into memory on affected systems.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query locates malicious Nobelium-associated DLLs that have been loaded into memory on affected systems.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
These queries was originally published in the threat analytics report, Attacks on gov't, think tanks, NGOs.
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
Detects specific command line argument being passed to a binary as seen being used by the malware Small Sieve.
Suspicious GUP Usage
Sigma
Detects execution of the Notepad++ updater in a suspicious directory, which is often used in DLL side-loading attacks
Detects the use of the PhoneDeepLink parameter to potentially sideload a DLL file that does not exist. This non-existent DLL file is named "ShellChromeAPI.dll".
Adversaries can drop their own renamed DLL and execute it via DeviceEnroller.exe using this parameter
Adversaries can drop their own renamed DLL and execute it via DeviceEnroller.exe using this parameter
Detects potential sideloading of "mpclient.dll" by Windows Defender processes ("MpCmdRun" and "NisSrv") from their non-default directory.
Detects execution of VMware Xfer utility (VMwareXferlogs.exe) from the non-default directory which may be an attempt to sideload arbitrary DLL
Tasks Folder Evasion
Sigma
The Tasks folder in system32 and syswow64 are globally writable paths.
Adversaries can take advantage of this and load or influence any script hosts or ANY .NET Application
in Tasks to load and execute a custom assembly into cscript, wscript, regsvr32, mshta, eventvwr
Adversaries can take advantage of this and load or influence any script hosts or ANY .NET Application
in Tasks to load and execute a custom assembly into cscript, wscript, regsvr32, mshta, eventvwr
Detects potentially suspicious child processes of KeyScrambler.exe
This rule detects a DHCP server in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) was loaded
This rule detects a DHCP server error in which a specified Callout DLL (in registry) could not be loaded
Detects Code Integrity (CI) engine blocking processes from loading unsigned DLLs residing in suspicious locations
Detects a DNS server error in which a specified plugin DLL (in registry) could not be loaded
Detects specific command line argument being passed to a binary as seen being used by the malware Small Sieve.
Detects the execution of an executable that is typically used by PlugX for DLL side loading starting from an uncommon location
Hunts known SVR-specific DLL names.
Detects renamed vmnat.exe or portable version that can be used for DLL side-loading
Detects the use of the PhoneDeepLink parameter to potentially sideload a DLL file that does not exist. This non-existent DLL file is named "ShellChromeAPI.dll".
Adversaries can drop their own renamed DLL and execute it via DeviceEnroller.exe using this parameter
Adversaries can drop their own renamed DLL and execute it via DeviceEnroller.exe using this parameter
Detects potential sideloading of "mpclient.dll" by Windows Defender processes ("MpCmdRun" and "NisSrv") from their non-default directory.
Detects execution of VMware Xfer utility (VMwareXferlogs.exe) from the non-default directory which may be an attempt to sideload arbitrary DLL
Detects potentially suspicious child processes of KeyScrambler.exe
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