Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects DLL sideloading of system DLLs that are not present on the system by default (at least not in system directories).
Usually this technique is used to achieve UAC bypass or privilege escalation.
Usually this technique is used to achieve UAC bypass or privilege escalation.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "DbgModel.dll"
Detects potential DLL sideloading using comctl32.dll to obtain system privileges
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "ShellDispatch.dll"
Detects loading and execution of an unsigned thor scanner binary.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "mfdetours.dll". While using "mftrace.exe" it can be abused to attach to an arbitrary process and force load any DLL named "mfdetours.dll" from the current directory of execution.
Detects DLL sideloading of unsigned "mfdetours.dll". Executing "mftrace.exe" can be abused to attach to an arbitrary process and force load any DLL named "mfdetours.dll" from the current directory of execution.
Detects loading of "RjvPlatform.dll" by the "SystemResetPlatform.exe" binary which can be abused as a method of DLL side loading since the "$SysReset" directory isn't created by default.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "SmadHook.dll", a DLL used by SmadAV antivirus
Detects when an attacker create a similar folder structure to windows system folders such as (Windows, Program Files...)
but with a space in order to trick DLL load search order and perform a "DLL Search Order Hijacking" attack
but with a space in order to trick DLL load search order and perform a "DLL Search Order Hijacking" attack
Detects the creation of a file named "WerFault.exe" or "wer.dll" in an uncommon folder, which could be a sign of WerFault DLL hijacking.
These queries was originally published in the threat analytics report, Attacks on gov't, think tanks, NGOs.
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Solorigate supply chain attack. Please note that these attacks are currently known as the Nobelium campaign.
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query locates malicious Nobelium-associated DLLs that have been created in the system or locally.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query locates malicious Nobelium-associated DLLs that have been created in the system or locally.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Look for the creation of suspicious DLL files spawned in the \spool\ folder along with DLLs that were recently loaded afterwards from \Old.
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, WinRAR CVE-2018-20250 exploit
WinRAR is a third-party file compressing application. Versions 5.61 and earlier contained a flaw that could be exploited by an attacker to read and write to an arbitrary path on the target's system. This could be used to run arbitrary code, overwrite system files, or access sensitive information. This vulnerability was designated CVE-2018-20250, and it is associated an outdated version of the legacy ACE compression library, 'unacev2.dll'.
The following query detects possible CVE-2020-20250 exploitation by looking for files with the .ace extension.
Reference - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20250
WinRAR is a third-party file compressing application. Versions 5.61 and earlier contained a flaw that could be exploited by an attacker to read and write to an arbitrary path on the target's system. This could be used to run arbitrary code, overwrite system files, or access sensitive information. This vulnerability was designated CVE-2018-20250, and it is associated an outdated version of the legacy ACE compression library, 'unacev2.dll'.
The following query detects possible CVE-2020-20250 exploitation by looking for files with the .ace extension.
Reference - https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-20250
'This query uses Sysmon Image Load (Event ID 7) and Process Create (Event ID 1) data to look for COM Event System being used to load a newly seen DLL.'
apt sofacy
KQL
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_sofacy.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
This query is using the locations where malicious DLL images are often loaded from by regsvr32.dll and rundll32.exe.
Blog:
https://threathunt.blog/dll-image-loads-from-suspicious-locations-by-regsvr32-exe-rundll32-exe/
Blog:
https://threathunt.blog/dll-image-loads-from-suspicious-locations-by-regsvr32-exe-rundll32-exe/
'This query identifies modifications to COM registry keys to point to executable files in C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\'
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Solorigate supply chain attack. Please note that these attacks are currently known as the Nobelium campaign.
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query retrieves an inventory of SolarWinds Orion software use in your organization, organized by product name and ordered by how many devices the software is installed on.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query retrieves an inventory of SolarWinds Orion software use in your organization, organized by product name and ordered by how many devices the software is installed on.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
This rule detects potential DLL sideloading by identifying the loading of specific system DLLs from non-standard, non-system locations. Adversaries often use DLL sideloading to execute malicious code by placing a malicious DLL in a directory where a legitimate application will load it instead of the intended system DLL. The rule includes a comprehensive list of DLLs commonly abused in sideloading attacks and filters out legitimate loads from known system directories to reduce false positives.
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