Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
98 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
45
19
10
8
6
Contributors
23
20
10
8
6
Categories
79
44
11
11
8
Platforms
46
36
15
10
10
Products / Services
30
28
20
10
6
MITRE Techniques
18,110
15,627
12,575
8,387
6,212
CVEs
2
IDS Classtypes
4
1
IDS Protocols
5
The following analytic identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe for IAM users in AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect multiple failed access attempts from the same source IP and user identity. This activity is significant as it may indicate that an access key has been compromised and is being misused for unauthorized discovery actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gather information about the AWS environment, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation.
The analytic detects multiple failed attempts to assume an AWS IAM role, indicating a potential brute force attack. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `MalformedPolicyDocumentException` errors with a status of `failure` and filters out legitimate AWS services. This activity is significant as repeated failures to assume roles can indicate an adversary attempting to guess role names, which is a precursor to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and services.
The following analytic detects multiple failed attempts to assume an AWS IAM role, indicating a potential brute force attack. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to identify `MalformedPolicyDocumentException` errors with a status of `failure` and filters out legitimate AWS services. This activity is significant as repeated failures to assume roles can indicate an adversary attempting to guess role names, which is a precursor to unauthorized access. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access to AWS resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and services.
The analytic identifies excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe for IAM users in AWS. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs to detect multiple failed access attempts from the same source IP and user identity. This activity is significant as it may indicate that an access key has been compromised and is being misused for unauthorized discovery actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gather information about the AWS environment, potentially leading to further exploitation or privilege escalation.
This rule detects calls to the undocumented 'Estimate Access' API in Microsoft Graph. This API is used by tools like GraphRunner for reconnaissance purposes, specifically to determine what actions a user can perform. While not inherently malicious, its use can indicate an adversary attempting to enumerate permissions or discover accessible resources within an Azure environment. The rule filters for successful POST requests to the specific beta endpoint and excludes certain Microsoft IP ranges to reduce false positives.
The authorization policy of Entra ID (User Settings) contains information about who can create applications, invite guest users and more. It's not something that is generally modified or reviewed except by administrators so it's worth knowing who may be requesting this endpoint.
This rule detects when a single user generates an excessive number of 'Permission Denied' events within a one-hour timeframe in Google Cloud Platform (GCP). Specifically, it looks for more than 5 'BLOCK' actions with a severity of 'ERROR' and a status code of '7' (which typically indicates 'Permission Denied' in GCP API errors) from a single user. Additionally, it requires these events to span across more than one target application and more than one product event type, which helps to reduce false positives by indicating broader activity rather than a single, isolated error.
This rule detects an excessive number of 'AccessDenied' events within a one-hour timeframe originating from a single AWS IAM user. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to discover cloud infrastructure and resources by making numerous API calls that they do not have permissions for. The rule specifically looks for more than 5 'AccessDenied' events, involving more than one target application and more than one product event type, from the same user within an hour.
This rule detects an excessive number of successful AWS API calls related to discovery activities (e.g., Describe*, List*, Get*) originating from a single IAM user within a 5-minute timeframe. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to map out the cloud environment after gaining initial access.
This rule detects when an EC2 instance makes a high number of API calls within a 5-minute window. The rule specifically looks for API calls originating from an assumed role associated with an EC2 instance, identified by a user ID matching the pattern `/i-.*$/`. A high number is defined as more than 7 distinct product event types within the specified timeframe. This behavior can indicate reconnaissance or other malicious activity from a compromised instance.
Detects excessive PermissionDenied events within an hour timeframe from a user
Detects excessive AccessDenied events within an hour timeframe from an IAM User
Detect when an EC2 instance makes high number of API calls.
Detects excessive successful events within a 5 minute timeframe from an IAM User.
Page 5 of 5