Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
Detects the Iron Man System kit's known template artifact path, and separately its randomized per-deployment admin-panel path shape combined with a Host header on a disposable TLD. Splitting these and requiring the disposable-TLD host on the generic admin-path rule avoids matching legitimate multi-tenant apps or hardened CMS installs that use similar random-path-plus-/admin/ obfuscation on ordinary domains.
This rule detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards identified phishing or malicious domains that mimic Passkey, Single Sign-On (SSO), or help desk authentication portals. These domains are commonly used by attackers for credential harvesting or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) phishing attacks targeting organizational authentication services.
This rule monitors DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic for connections to domains that appear to be performing typosquatting, specifically targeting users by impersonating SSO and Passkey service providers. These domains mimic legitimate security portals to facilitate credential harvesting.
Detects DNS lookups and TLS SNI requests to known domains associated with Storm-3121 and Storm-3032 phishing campaigns. These campaigns utilize passkey or Single Sign-On (SSO) themed lures to facilitate credential harvesting.
Detection of DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers matching domains associated with Storm-3121 and Storm-3032 phishing campaigns. These campaigns mimic identity, SSO, and passkey registration processes to capture credentials or perform token theft.
This rule detects email-based business fraud (BEC) targeting the organization, specifically looking for executive impersonation paired with financial lure terminology and sender domain mismatches. It utilizes both a blocklist of known fraudulent sender indicators (domains and addresses) and a heuristic approach analyzing discrepancies between the envelope sender domain and the header sender domain combined with executive titles in display names and invoice-related keywords.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards domains identified as part of Storm-3121/Storm-3032 phishing campaigns. These domains are themed around passkey management and single sign-on (SSO) services, likely intended for credential harvesting.
This rule monitors DNS queries and HTTP traffic for indicators related to known phishing infrastructure impersonating passkey and SSO providers. The domains detected are associated with Storm-3121/3032 campaigns designed to facilitate credential or session harvesting.
Detects DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host header traffic directed towards known phishing domains associated with Storm-3121/Storm-3032 infrastructure. These domains often use themes related to passkey setup, SSO, or account security to trick users into providing credentials.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards known malicious domains associated with passkey and SSO phishing campaigns, specifically attributed to Storm-3121 and Storm-3032. These domains are used to deceive users into providing credentials or authentication tokens via fraudulent login portals.
Detects DNS queries for lookalike domains combining a government/brand-impersonation keyword (as its own label, not a substring) with a disposable TLD used across the IronToll campaign. Dropped the standalone 'digital' keyword, which was generic enough to match ordinary e-commerce domains on the same TLDs.
Detects DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host header traffic associated with the IronToll phishing campaign. The rule specifically monitors for government-impersonating domains and lookalike domains utilizing various non-standard top-level domains (TLDs).
Detects DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host header traffic associated with the IronToll phishing campaign. The rule specifically monitors for government-impersonating domains and lookalike domains utilizing various non-standard top-level domains (TLDs).
Detects the Iron Man System kit's known template artifact path, and separately its randomized per-deployment admin-panel path shape combined with a Host header on a disposable TLD. Splitting these and requiring the disposable-TLD host on the generic admin-path rule avoids matching legitimate multi-tenant apps or hardened CMS installs that use similar random-path-plus-/admin/ obfuscation on ordinary domains.
Detects the Iron Man System kit's known template artifact path, and separately its randomized per-deployment admin-panel path shape combined with a Host header on a disposable TLD. Splitting these and requiring the disposable-TLD host on the generic admin-path rule avoids matching legitimate multi-tenant apps or hardened CMS installs that use similar random-path-plus-/admin/ obfuscation on ordinary domains.
Detects active phishing threat-intelligence indicators whose domain name uses one of the disposable TLDs observed across IronToll's 73+ rotating lookalike domains (.cfd, .sbs, .icu, .buzz, etc.). Scoped to the structured ThreatType classification only — dropped the free-text 'Description has phishing' fallback, since KQL's 'has' is a substring/token match with no negation awareness (e.g. a description stating an indicator is 'not related to phishing' would still match), which could pull in indicators unrelated to actual phishing activity.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP requests) directed towards the 'web12api.com' domain, as well as specific HTTP response structures commonly associated with adversary registration or command-and-control communication protocols.
Detects active phishing threat-intelligence indicators whose domain name uses one of the disposable TLDs observed across IronToll's 73+ rotating lookalike domains (.cfd, .sbs, .icu, .buzz, etc.). Scoped to the structured ThreatType classification only — dropped the free-text 'Description has phishing' fallback, since KQL's 'has' is a substring/token match with no negation awareness (e.g. a description stating an indicator is 'not related to phishing' would still match), which could pull in indicators unrelated to actual phishing activity.
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