Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects high-volume DNS resolution of domains ending in the .shop TLD from internal hosts, which may indicate interaction with a cluster of infrastructure used by the DoppelCart fake-shop campaign.
Detects high-volume, potentially malicious activity where a client requests a large number of distinct hostnames ending in .shop from a single destination IP address within a short time frame, which may indicate infrastructure used for phishing or fraudulent e-commerce storefronts similar to DoppelCart-style activity.
Detects high-volume, potentially malicious activity where a client requests a large number of distinct hostnames ending in .shop from a single destination IP address within a short time frame, which may indicate infrastructure used for phishing or fraudulent e-commerce storefronts similar to DoppelCart-style activity.
This rule monitors DNS queries and network connection events for interactions with a list of domains associated with the Kali365 infrastructure. It flags activity by identifying both direct matches and subdomains associated with 'ssengineers.com' and 'clientengagenow.de', often used in phishing or C2 communications.
This rule monitors DNS queries and network connection events for interactions with a list of domains associated with the Kali365 infrastructure. It flags activity by identifying both direct matches and subdomains associated with 'ssengineers.com' and 'clientengagenow.de', often used in phishing or C2 communications.
Detects network connections, DNS resolutions, or TLS SNI values matching known TWINLOOT command-and-control infrastructure, including the attacker-registered domains sharepointx.th2ch.com and lpi-web.com and the failover IP 193.24.211.221. TWINLOOT is a modular Python implant that hides its C2 inside trusted Microsoft cloud services (Graph API, SharePoint Online, Teams TURN relay) while also relying on dedicated attacker-controlled infrastructure for direct TLS/WebSocket tunneling and failover.
Detects HTTP traffic directed to known abused web hosting platforms and SaaS site builders frequently used by the BengalSEO campaign to host search engine optimization (SEO) poisoning lures. These lures typically mimic service activation or support pages to trick users into downloading malicious content.
Detects network activity (DNS queries, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) directed towards domains ending in the .vu Top-Level Domain (TLD). This is associated with NovaCookies phishing infrastructure which utilizes these TLDs for malicious redirection or staging.
Detects HTTP traffic communicating with known domains (grove-12.com and trekmesh15.com) associated with the Codex ClickFix/AMOS campaign, specifically looking for indicators of payload staging or beaconing activity through specific URI patterns.
This rule detects user interaction with potentially malicious URLs from known Dynamic DNS (DDNS) providers or URLs containing suspicious keywords frequently associated with phishing lures (e.g., login, auth, verify, mfa). It filters out known legitimate Microsoft domains to reduce noise.
Detects DNS resolution, network connections, or email-embedded URLs matching known JWR phishing framework hosting domains and IP addresses, including banking/government/logistics brand-impersonation lookalikes and smishing-delivered typosquats.
Detects TLS sessions to Sapphire Sleet/UNC1069 Hostwinds C2 infrastructure presenting the exact self-signed certificate issuer string linked to the Mastra/axios campaigns.
This rule detects HTTP requests directed towards known malvertising domains that serve trojanized MSI installers. The rule identifies specific suspicious hostnames and a common URL pattern used for payload delivery.
Correlates DNS/network requests to newly observed domains matching JWR's brand-plus-suffix generation pattern across .top/.cfd/.info/.cc TLDs, requiring multiple distinct hostnames sharing the same brand token within a short window to flag likely batch-registered phishing infrastructure.
Detects HTTP requests for fingerprinted JavaScript/CSS assets shared across UNC6671's cloned SSO and cryptocurrency vault-drainer phishing panels.
Detects DNS queries to the broader set of UNC6671/Blackfile/Pink/Falcon passkey- and SSO-themed lookalike phishing domains used across the campaign's rebrand clusters.
Detects DNS queries to Google Ads click-tracking infrastructure followed within 60 seconds by resolution of a newly registered, previously unseen domain, consistent with the Storm-2755 AiTM redirect chain.
Detects HTTP outbound traffic to domains using the .sbs TLD that follow a specific 'file' followed by dictionary words naming convention, associated with the ClickFix campaign. The rule specifically identifies staging requests matching a /curl/<hex-id> URI pattern used to deliver secondary payloads.
Detects DNS query bursts from a single source to a predefined set of domains mimicking passkey or single-sign-on (SSO) login portals. These domains are known to be part of the infrastructure used by the UNC6671 threat actor for credential harvesting activities.
UNC6671 AiTM passkey/SSO lookalike domain DNS query
Detects DNS queries to mangorbit.com and its subdomains, C2 infrastructure associated with the Open VSX Evil Twin extensions campaign
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