Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects network connections or DNS queries to known typosquatted and malicious domains associated with the SilverFox campaign. These domains impersonate legitimate software (e.g., SteelSeries GG, Bcut, DeepSeek) to lure users into downloading malware via SEO poisoning and deceptive downloads.
Detects outbound web requests where the referer header indicates the traffic originated from 'accounts.google.com' and the target URI contains 'gusercontent.com', excluding the legitimate 'googleusercontent.com' domain. This behavior is indicative of potential typosquatting or malicious redirection to a lookalike domain, often used in credential theft or phishing campaigns.
Detects network activity associated with the 'ClickFix' campaign, specifically targeting DNS queries, TLS SNI, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious infrastructure domains (cdnsuicaches.com, mnl.ac) and exfiltration endpoints (23.227.198.199).
This rule detects interaction with specific infrastructure identified as deceptive dating applications. It monitors network communication, sign-in attempts, email interactions, and endpoint execution associated with known malicious domains (e.g., archat.us, heyhru.com, sitin.ai), specific IP addresses (38.129.138.244), and unique package identifiers (com.cavalier.nalo, com.qiga.vio). The detection logic spans across DeviceNetworkEvents, EntraIdSignInEvents, EmailUrlInfo, EmailEvents, DeviceEvents, and DeviceProcessEvents to identify exposure to these Indicators of Compromise (IOCs) across both network and endpoint layers.
This rule monitors network, file, and process telemetry for matches against a predefined list of malicious IP addresses, domain names, and file hashes. It flags suspicious network connections to known C2 infrastructure and the presence or execution of known malicious files based on SHA256 and SHA1 indicators.
This rule monitors for network traffic related to known fake GitHub pages and malicious loader sites impersonating LastPass Authenticator. It detects attempts to access specific malicious domains and organization pages on GitHub, as well as the delivery of malicious pages containing spoofed trust badges and branding, commonly used in phishing campaigns.
Detects DNS queries and TLS SNI traffic directed towards known phishing domains associated with credential harvesting campaigns (specifically those attributed to Storm-3121/Storm-3032). These domains are used to lure users into providing credentials under the guise of SSO or passkey setup.
This rule detects DNS queries for suspicious domains that mimic MFA or passkey registration portals. Such domains are often used in phishing campaigns to lure users into registering their credentials or security tokens on adversary-controlled infrastructure.
Detects network communication associated with the Casbaneiro (Metamorfo) banking trojan, specifically identifying DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure.
Detects network communication associated with the Casbaneiro (Metamorfo) banking trojan, specifically identifying DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, HTTP Host headers, and direct IP connections to known malicious C2 infrastructure.
Detects DNS queries, TLS SNI headers, and HTTP host headers associated with identified C2 infrastructure for NetSupport Manager malware, specifically domains themed around 'GTA6'. These indicators are used by attackers for command and control communication.
Detects network DNS queries to known SpiceRAT-associated hostnames that resolve to specific C2 IP addresses. The rule identifies suspicious network activity by aggregating resolution counts and monitoring for connections to multiple dispersed IPs, which is consistent with command-and-control behavior.
Detects TLS connections where the certificate subject is 'azure.uzrailwaystax.com' and the issuer is 'TLC DV TLS CA', indicating potential impersonation of the Uzbekistan railway authority infrastructure, likely associated with SilkParasite activity.
Detects HTTP traffic proxying Microsoft authentication paths (OAuth 2.0 authorization or CDN assets) via non-Microsoft domains. This behavior is indicative of an Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing attack using typosquatted infrastructure to intercept user sessions.
Detection of suspicious DNS queries associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing infrastructure. The rules monitor for suspicious subdomains and TLD patterns targeting Microsoft login services, as well as behavioral sequences involving initial Google Ads traffic redirection followed by rapid lookups of suspected malicious or newly registered domains and external geolocation services.
Detects network traffic (DNS, TLS SNI, and HTTP Host headers) attempting to communicate with infrastructure associated with the EvilTokens Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. This activity is indicative of credential harvesting or adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
IOC hunt for the HEAVYGRAM/CRUDEEXCLUDE campaign: matches known SHA256 file hashes (first-stage malware, implant, RAR/ZIP artefacts) via DeviceFileEvents and DeviceProcessEvents, plus known-malicious domains/staging infrastructure by parsed hostname across network connections, process command lines, and file origin URLs.
Detects activity associated with the 'MovieReaper' threat campaign by identifying known malicious file hashes, command and control (C2) IP addresses, and communication with identified malicious domains. This rule monitors process execution, file operations, and network connections within the campaign's active timeframe.
Detects DNS lookups and subsequent HTTP requests to known domains associated with the Exvicy pop-under/loader malware. These domains are identified as malicious lures often used to initiate payload downloads.
CloudSEK researchers uncovered BigBear 2.0, a global Microsoft 365 phishing-as-a-service operation targeting hundreds of organizations across 40+ countries. The investigation exposed the attacker’s admin panel, affiliate network, phishing infrastructure, and thousands of stolen credentials and session cookies, revealing how modern AiTM attacks can hijack authenticated sessions even after MFA.
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