Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
14 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
7
6
1
Contributors
5
3
3
1
1
Categories
9
7
3
2
2
Platforms
7
5
1
1
Products / Services
5
4
2
1
1
MITRE Techniques
18,114
15,633
12,576
8,388
6,215
IDS Classtypes
3
2
1
IDS Protocols
5
1
This rule detects network communication to known malicious IP addresses or sessions utilizing TLS certificates that impersonate the Uzbekistan railway authority (azure.uzrailwaystax). This behavior is characteristic of the SpiceRAT/NodeEdgeRAT malware families, which use these specific certificates to establish Command and Control (C2) channels.
Detects network traffic associated with the SilkParasite threat actor, specifically identifying the use of typosquatted domain names in TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) fields and a suspicious TLS CA certificate subject.
This rule detects outbound TLS connections from the internal network to external destinations where the server certificate is self-signed. It identifies connections where both the certificate issuer and subject common names (CN) are present, which is often indicative of opportunistic encryption used by C2 infrastructure or malicious payloads. The rule includes a threshold to reduce noise by limiting alerts for the same source over a specific window.
STAC4749 Golang Implant TLS Certificate with Hardcoded CA Issuer (loop-CA/connectify-CA/james-bond-CA)
Detects the creation of files ending with '.sig', '.asc', or '.cer'. These extensions are commonly associated with digital signatures, PGP/GPG keys, and certificates, which could indicate activities like code signing, certificate generation/import, or PGP/GPG key manipulation by an adversary.
Detects access to code signing certificate vendors for capability development
Correlates browsers encountering a certificate error (invalid issuer) for a major cloud provider due to DNS redirection.
Detects wildcard TLS certificates on cheap TLDs commonly used for attack infrastructure
Detects self-signed TLS certificates on suspicious domains commonly used for C2
This rule detects HTTP requests to domains associated with free SSL certificate issuance (Let's Encrypt or ZeroSSL) where the URI contains 'acme'. This could indicate an attacker attempting to obtain a free SSL certificate for a domain they control, potentially for use in phishing or other malicious activities. The rule uses a threshold to prevent excessive alerts from legitimate certificate renewals.
Detects the creation of files ending with '.sig', '.asc', or '.cer'. These extensions are commonly associated with digital signatures, PGP/GPG keys, and certificates, which could indicate activities like code signing, certificate generation/import, or PGP/GPG key manipulation by an adversary.
This rule detects the use of self-signed TLS certificates on newly registered domains, specifically those ending in .xyz, .top, .club, .online, or .site. It looks for certificates where both the issuer and subject Common Name (CN) fields are present, and the subject CN matches a pattern indicative of a newly registered domain (5 to 20 alphanumeric characters followed by one of the specified TLDs). This pattern is often associated with malicious infrastructure setup.
Detects the creation of files ending with '.sig', '.asc', or '.cer'. These extensions are commonly associated with digital signatures, PGP/GPG keys, and certificates, which could indicate activities like code signing, certificate generation/import, or PGP/GPG key manipulation by an adversary.
The following analytic detects the use of certutil.exe to add a certificate to the Root certificate store using the "-addstore" flag. In this case, the certificate is loaded from a temporary file path (e.g., %TEMP%) or other uncommon locations (e.g. C:\Users\Public\), which is highly suspicious and uncommon in legitimate administrative activity. This behavior may indicate an adversary is installing a malicious root certificate to intercept HTTPS traffic, impersonate trusted entities, or bypass security controls. The use of flags such as -f (force) and -Enterprise, combined with loading .tmp files from user-writable locations, is consistent with post-exploitation activity seen in credential theft and adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) attacks. This should be investigated immediately, especially if correlated with unauthorized privilege use or prior certificate modifications. You should monitor when new certificates are added to the root store because this store is what your system uses to decide which websites, apps, and software can be trusted. If an attacker manages to add their own certificate there, they can silently intercept encrypted traffic, impersonate trusted websites, or make malicious programs look safe. This means they could steal sensitive data, bypass security tools, and keep access to your system even after other malware is removed.
