Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
11 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
3
3
2
1
1
Contributors
4
2
2
1
1
Categories
4
3
3
3
2
Platforms
4
4
2
2
1
Products / Services
3
3
2
2
2
MITRE Techniques
18,123
15,639
12,581
8,394
6,215
IDS Classtypes
2
1
IDS Protocols
2
1
Detects the use of reg.exe to query the MachineGuid value from the Windows Registry (HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography). This behavior is often associated with adversary reconnaissance, specifically host fingerprinting, to uniquely identify compromised machines.
Detects network activity associated with Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) phishing kits that perform client-side fingerprinting and geolocation tracking. The rules identify the initial fingerprinting request, the subsequent setting of a geolocation cookie by the proxy, and the query to a third-party geolocation service, using state tracking to correlate the chain of events.
Detects components of the LucidPawn malware family using DLL side-loading (e.g., index.exe loading DismCore.dll) or renaming DISM binaries within WindowsApps folders. The detection identifies these processes subsequently querying system locale or language registry keys, indicating a geo-targeting execution gate used to determine if the environment matches the intended target profile (specifically zh-TW).
KQL Query from file: The Hunt for QR Phisher
The analytic detects a PowerShell script that enumerates camera devices on the targeted host. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for commands querying Win32_PnPEntity for camera-related information. This activity is significant as it is commonly observed in DCRat malware, which collects camera data to send to its command-and-control server. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to gather sensitive visual information from the host, potentially leading to privacy breaches or further exploitation.
Detects browser-based WebRTC STUN traffic initiated from phishing landing pages used by the Bluekit PhaaS platform. The rule identifies suspicious STUN requests originating from browsers that exhibit a WebRTC IP mismatch when compared to the active HTTPS session IP, a technique used by attackers to de-anonymize security researchers and bypass automated analysis sandboxes.
This rule detects an SNMP Hardware MIB Enumeration Walk. It triggers when a TCP connection to port 161 (SNMP) on the home network contains the byte sequence "30 82" at a depth of 2 bytes. A threshold is set to trigger an alert if 20 such events occur within 30 seconds from the same source IP address. This activity is classified as a network scan, specifically reconnaissance, as it involves querying SNMP for hardware information.
This rule detects attempts to enumerate hardware asset inventory information via web requests. It triggers when HTTP requests contain both 'asset' and 'inventory' in the URI, indicating a potential reconnaissance activity to gather information about an organization's hardware assets. A threshold of 10 such requests within 60 seconds from the same source IP is set to reduce false positives.
Detects a sequence of macOS system profiling and software update commands associated with the UNC1069 'ClickFix' social engineering ruse, often followed by a payload download via curl piped to a shell.
KQL Query from file: The Hunt for QR Phisher
The analytic detects a PowerShell script that enumerates camera devices on the targeted host. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging, specifically looking for commands querying Win32_PnPEntity for camera-related information. This activity is significant as it is commonly observed in DCRat malware, which collects camera data to send to its command-and-control server. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an attempt to gather sensitive visual information from the host, potentially leading to privacy breaches or further exploitation.
