Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
17 detections
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The following analytic detects when all virtual machines on an ESXi host are abruptly terminated, which may indicate malicious activity such as a deliberate denial-of-service, ransomware staging, or an attempt to destroy critical workloads.
Detects the execution of common command-line utilities and tools used to enumerate virtual machines, hypervisors, and cloud instance information. Adversaries may perform this reconnaissance to identify virtualization environments, sandbox targets, or cloud infrastructure configurations.
Detects the execution of known desktop hypervisor management CLI tools such as VBoxManage or vmrun to enumerate local virtual machines. Attackers may use these commands during the discovery phase to identify running virtual environments for evasion or subsequent actions.
Detects the execution of sensitive ESXi administrative commands (e.g., esxcli, vim-cmd) that suggest potential hypervisor management or tampering, especially when initiated by non-administrative processes or specific shells.
Detects the creation or registration of virtual machines using VMware ESXi CLI tools, PowerCLI, or Hyper-V PowerShell cmdlets. This behavior is often associated with adversary attempts to create backdoored VMs, isolate environments, or facilitate lateral movement and persistence within virtualized infrastructure.
Detects the execution of sensitive ESXi administrative commands (e.g., esxcli, vim-cmd) that suggest potential hypervisor management or tampering, especially when initiated by non-administrative processes or specific shells.
This rule detects attempts to query Docker version and virtual machine information via the Docker API. It specifically looks for HTTP requests to port 2375 (commonly used for Docker API) with a URI containing "/version". This activity could indicate reconnaissance by an attacker trying to gather information about the Docker environment.
This rule detects attempts to enumerate the VMware vSphere virtual machine inventory via the API. It specifically looks for HTTP POST requests to the '/sdk/vimService' URI with 'RetrieveProperties' in the client body, indicating a query for system properties, which can include VM inventory details. The detection is focused on network traffic to port 443 (HTTPS) within the home network.
This rule detects network traffic (specifically HTTP responses) that contains strings indicative of malware attempting to detect the presence of a hypervisor. It looks for the string "GetSystemFirmwareTable" and "VBOX" (case-insensitive) within the file data of the HTTP response. This combination suggests a malware payload checking if it's running in a virtualized environment, specifically VirtualBox, which is a common anti-analysis technique.
This rule detects HTTP requests to the AWS EC2 service (ec2.amazonaws.com) that specifically attempt to enumerate Amazon Machine Images (AMIs) using the 'DescribeImages' API call. This activity could indicate an attacker performing reconnaissance to understand the available virtual machine images within an AWS environment.
Detects the execution of known desktop hypervisor management CLI tools such as VBoxManage or vmrun to enumerate local virtual machines. Attackers may use these commands during the discovery phase to identify running virtual environments for evasion or subsequent actions.
The analytic detects AMOS Stealer VM check activity on macOS. It identifies the execution of the "osascript" command along with specific commandline strings that include "set", "system_profiler", and either "VMware" or "QEMU". This activity is indicative of AMOS stealer attempting to determine if it is running within a virtual machine environment. If confirmed malicious, this behavior suggests the host is infected by the AMOS stealer, which could lead to arbitrary code execution, privilege escalation, information theft, or persistence, posing a significant security risk.
This analytic identifies non-browser processes reaching out to public IP lookup or geolocation services. These services are commonly used by legitimate tools, but their usage outside of browsers may indicate network reconnaissance, virtual machine detection, or staging by malware. This activity is observed in post-exploitation frameworks, stealer malware, and advanced threat actor campaigns. The detection relies on Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) telemetry and excludes known browser processes to reduce noise.
This detection identifies the use of ESXCLI commands to discover virtual machines on an ESXi host. While used by administrators, this activity may also indicate adversary reconnaissance aimed at identifying high value targets, mapping the virtual environment, or preparing for data theft or destructive operations.
'This detection identifies high-severity alerts across various Microsoft security products, including Microsoft Defender XDR and Microsoft Entra ID, and correlates them with instances of Google Cloud VM creation. It focuses on instances where VMs were created within a short timeframe of high-severity alerts, potentially indicating suspicious activity.'
This query helps reviewing malicious email detections by detection methods
Detects the execution of the 'esxcli' command with the 'vm' flag to retrieve information about installed virtual machines on an ESXi hypervisor. This activity can be part of discovery phase by adversaries targeting ESXi environments.
