Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule detects potential AI prompt injection attacks delivered via email. It identifies users clicking external links directed at AI platforms (like OpenAI, Claude, or Perplexity) that contain suspicious URL parameters or instructions designed to manipulate or override the AI's standard behavior. It correlates the web request with a subsequent process execution on the host that includes suspicious keywords in the command line, suggesting an attempt to automate or exploit the AI assistant through local system interaction.
This rule detects potential AI prompt injection attacks delivered via email. It identifies users clicking external links directed at AI platforms (like OpenAI, Claude, or Perplexity) that contain suspicious URL parameters or instructions designed to manipulate or override the AI's standard behavior. It correlates the web request with a subsequent process execution on the host that includes suspicious keywords in the command line, suggesting an attempt to automate or exploit the AI assistant through local system interaction.
This rule detects potential AI prompt injection attacks delivered via email. It identifies users clicking external links directed at AI platforms (like OpenAI, Claude, or Perplexity) that contain suspicious URL parameters or instructions designed to manipulate or override the AI's standard behavior. It correlates the web request with a subsequent process execution on the host that includes suspicious keywords in the command line, suggesting an attempt to automate or exploit the AI assistant through local system interaction.
This rule detects potential AI prompt injection attacks delivered via email. It identifies users clicking external links directed at AI platforms (like OpenAI, Claude, or Perplexity) that contain suspicious URL parameters or instructions designed to manipulate or override the AI's standard behavior. It correlates the web request with a subsequent process execution on the host that includes suspicious keywords in the command line, suggesting an attempt to automate or exploit the AI assistant through local system interaction.
Detects MFA method resets, security info updates, or new authentication device registrations targeting privileged or administrator accounts in Azure AD/Entra ID audit logs. This activity is often indicative of social engineering campaigns, including AI-driven voice or video deepfake impersonation of employees contacting helpdesk support to gain unauthorized account access.
Detects macOS Terminal commands that involve decoding a base64 string and piping the output directly to bash. This behavior is characteristic of 'ClickFix' social engineering campaigns, where users are lured into pasting a malicious command into their terminal, often under the guise of fake 'reCAPTCHA' or 'bot-verification' instructions.
Detects inbound Microsoft Teams calls or chats originating from an external or federated tenant where the caller's display name mimics internal IT support or helpdesk personnel, a technique used in social engineering and vishing campaigns.
Detects a sequence of events where a user's MFA configuration is modified (typically via a help-desk impersonation vishing attack) followed closely by a successful sign-in from a new IP address. This pattern is indicative of attackers hijacking sessions or stealing credentials by coercing victims into resetting MFA settings.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user engagement (voice/video call) involving themes of urgency or helpdesk interaction is closely followed by a high-risk administrative action (e.g., password reset, MFA device enrollment, or financial transfer) by the same user, where the communication session context differs from standard activity, indicative of a deepfake-enabled vishing attack.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user engagement (voice/video call) involving themes of urgency or helpdesk interaction is closely followed by a high-risk administrative action (e.g., password reset, MFA device enrollment, or financial transfer) by the same user, where the communication session context differs from standard activity, indicative of a deepfake-enabled vishing attack.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user engagement (voice/video call) involving themes of urgency or helpdesk interaction is closely followed by a high-risk administrative action (e.g., password reset, MFA device enrollment, or financial transfer) by the same user, where the communication session context differs from standard activity, indicative of a deepfake-enabled vishing attack.
This rule detects potentially malicious messages within Microsoft Teams that use common social engineering keywords related to security configuration changes (e.g., passkey, MFA, SSO). The detection specifically filters for users who have successfully logged in within the last 30 days to identify potential compromised accounts acting as internal senders.
This KQL detects potential social engineering and vishing activity in Microsoft Teams over the last 30 days.
Detects a specific adversary pattern termed 'Phantom Deal' where a user is socially engineered into disabling their VPN (by claiming a link won't open), followed immediately by a rapid succession of accesses to the same tracking or canary link from that user account. The rule correlates sign-in events indicating a shift in VPN or MFA context with subsequent bursts of URL clicks.
Detects a specific adversary pattern termed 'Phantom Deal' where a user is socially engineered into disabling their VPN (by claiming a link won't open), followed immediately by a rapid succession of accesses to the same tracking or canary link from that user account. The rule correlates sign-in events indicating a shift in VPN or MFA context with subsequent bursts of URL clicks.
Detects a specific adversary pattern termed 'Phantom Deal' where a user is socially engineered into disabling their VPN (by claiming a link won't open), followed immediately by a rapid succession of accesses to the same tracking or canary link from that user account. The rule correlates sign-in events indicating a shift in VPN or MFA context with subsequent bursts of URL clicks.
Detects a specific adversary pattern termed 'Phantom Deal' where a user is socially engineered into disabling their VPN (by claiming a link won't open), followed immediately by a rapid succession of accesses to the same tracking or canary link from that user account. The rule correlates sign-in events indicating a shift in VPN or MFA context with subsequent bursts of URL clicks.
Detects a specific adversary pattern termed 'Phantom Deal' where a user is socially engineered into disabling their VPN (by claiming a link won't open), followed immediately by a rapid succession of accesses to the same tracking or canary link from that user account. The rule correlates sign-in events indicating a shift in VPN or MFA context with subsequent bursts of URL clicks.
Detects email from a new hire (within 30 days of hire date) combining personal-crisis pretext language with an explicit request to use a personal or unmanaged device, corroborated by a non-compliant or untrusted device sign-in, consistent with PurpleDelta's device-substitution social-engineering pattern.