Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
746 detections
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Detects attempts to stop or reconfigure critical Windows security services (such as WinDefend, WscSvc, Sense, and WdNisSvc) using the Service Control Manager (sc.exe) or by modifying service registry keys via reg.exe. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to disable EDR/AV solutions to evade detection.
Detects attempts to tamper with Microsoft Windows Defender configuration, specifically by modifying exclusion paths via PowerShell cmdlets (Add-MpPreference, Set-MpPreference), direct registry modifications, or forced Group Policy updates. It also monitors for the disabling of Tamper Protection via registry and the creation of scheduled tasks designed to apply Defender exclusions.
This rule detects the termination of critical security software processes (e.g., antivirus agents) by a process that has recently acquired SeDebugPrivilege. This behavior is indicative of a malicious actor attempting to disable endpoint security controls to evade detection.
Detects modifications to Windows Defender registry keys responsible for exclusions. Specifically monitors when paths or processes associated with potentially suspicious locations (like C:\Drivers) or common system binaries (VSSVC.exe, ctfmon.exe, C:\Windows\System32) are added to the Defender exclusion list. This is a common technique used by attackers to hide malicious files or activity from antivirus scanning.
This rule detects instances where LockAppHost.exe or a variation of it (likely used as a proxy) initiates processes or command-line arguments that interact with Windows services, scheduled tasks, or Windows Defender configurations. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to disable security features, suppress Windows updates, or manipulate system services to evade detection.
Surfaces entities generating an unusually high volume of low-fidelity alerts that can mask a true-positive escalation event — the alert-fatigue and untuned-tooling gap CISA identified as a root cause of Organization A's failed detection.
Detects the use of the sc.exe utility to disable critical system, security, and database services, a technique commonly associated with Everest ransomware to prevent service restart during encryption activities.
This rule detects the termination of critical security software processes (e.g., antivirus agents) by a process that has recently acquired SeDebugPrivilege. This behavior is indicative of a malicious actor attempting to disable endpoint security controls to evade detection.
Detects attempts to modify, disable, or exclude paths and processes from Microsoft Defender Antivirus using legitimate administrative utilities such as PowerShell, cmd, sc, and netsh. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to evade security monitoring.
This rule detects successful attempts by non-approved users or service accounts to delete, patch, or update Kubernetes PrometheusRule or AlertmanagerConfig resources. These resources control critical cluster monitoring and alerting; unauthorized changes could be used to disable security monitoring, modify alert notification channels to hide malicious activity, or tamper with detection capabilities.
Detects the loading of potential Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) drivers, specifically those known to be utilized for bypassing endpoint security controls. This rule triggers on specific driver filenames or drivers loaded from non-standard, user-writable directories (e.g., %TEMP%, Public), which are common tactics for dropping and executing malicious kernel-mode code.
Detects instances where the Google Chrome browser is executed with flags that disable the sandbox security feature, such as --no-sandbox and --allow-no-sandbox-job. This configuration is often used by adversaries to facilitate credential dumping from the browser by bypassing sandbox restrictions that typically prevent unauthorized process memory access.
Detects System-process (PID 4) registry writes or deletions targeting Windows Defender tamper-protection values or Run/RunOnce persistence keys, indicating use of the BTR.sys kernel registry-write primitive to disable protections or establish persistence.
Detects suspicious registry modifications that disable the shutdown button on a user's logon screen. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry data model, specifically monitoring changes to registry paths associated with shutdown policies. This activity is significant because it is a tactic used by malware, particularly ransomware like KillDisk, to hinder system usability and prevent the removal of malicious changes. If confirmed malicious, this could impede system recovery efforts, making it difficult to restart the machine and remove other harmful modifications.
Detects the disabling of critical encryption enforcement settings on an ESXi host, such as secure boot or executable verification requirements, which may indicate an attempt to weaken hypervisor integrity or allow unauthorized code execution.
Detects behavioral indicators associated with the ChocoShell malware, a fileless PowerShell-based infostealer. The rule monitors for malicious command-line activity including AMSI bypass, credential theft from Token Broker and WLAN profiles, disabling of Microsoft Defender signatures, and communication with local API endpoints typical of the CornFlake controller.
The following analytic detects the EDRSilencer-specific Windows Filtering Platform filter name "Custom Outbound Filter" when it is configured with a block action.
EDRSilencer creates WFP filters to block outbound traffic from EDR and security agent processes, impairing endpoint telemetry without requiring the tool binary to keep its original process name.
EventCode 5447 identifies creation of the runtime filter with ChangeType %%16384, while EventCode 5441 can show the same persistent filter when the Base Filtering Engine starts.
EDRSilencer creates WFP filters to block outbound traffic from EDR and security agent processes, impairing endpoint telemetry without requiring the tool binary to keep its original process name.
EventCode 5447 identifies creation of the runtime filter with ChangeType %%16384, while EventCode 5441 can show the same persistent filter when the Base Filtering Engine starts.
This rule detects in-memory patching of critical Windows security functions, specifically AmsiScanBuffer (used by AMSI) and EtwEventWrite (used by ETW). It monitors for suspicious API calls such as VirtualProtect, WriteProcessMemory, NtProtectVirtualMemory, or NtWriteVirtualMemory targeting these specific DLLs (amsi.dll and ntdll.dll), which is a common technique used by malware and offensive security tools to blind endpoint security and logging mechanisms.
This rule detects in-memory patching of critical Windows security functions, specifically AmsiScanBuffer (used by AMSI) and EtwEventWrite (used by ETW). It monitors for suspicious API calls such as VirtualProtect, WriteProcessMemory, NtProtectVirtualMemory, or NtWriteVirtualMemory targeting these specific DLLs (amsi.dll and ntdll.dll), which is a common technique used by malware and offensive security tools to blind endpoint security and logging mechanisms.
Correlates a Sysmon DriverLoad event matching known BTR.sys hashes with a subsequent System-process (PID 4) deletion of specific Defender binaries or WdFilter/WinDefend registry keys within a 10-second window — the definitive Defender self-destruction signature of the kernel primitive.
Detects Chrome/Chromium processes launched with the --remote-debugging-port flag (optionally combined with --remote-allow-origins or --headless), enabling Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) session hijacking as used by AmnesiaStealer's streaming module to remotely control an authenticated browser session. Excludes known automation frameworks (Puppeteer, Playwright, Selenium).
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