Detections

Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.

44 detections

Detects attempts to disable security event logging by adding the `MiniNt` registry key.
This key is used to disable the Windows Event Log service, which collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications.
Adversaries may want to disable this service to prevent logging of security events that could be used to detect their activities.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
006
Detect filter driver unloading activity via fltmc.exe
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
006
Detects attempts to disable Windows EventLog autologger sessions via registry modification.
The AutoLogger event tracing session records events that occur early in the operating system boot process.
Applications and device drivers can use the AutoLogger session to capture traces before the user logs in.
Adversaries may disable these sessions to evade detection and prevent security monitoring of early boot activities and system events.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
005
Detects suspicious access to the "svchost" process such as that used by Invoke-Phantom to kill the thread of the Windows event logging service.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
004
Threat actors can use an older version of the auditpol binary available inside the NT resource kit to change audit policy configuration to impair detection capability.
This can be carried out by selectively disabling/removing certain audit policies as well as restoring a custom policy owned by the threat actor.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
004
Detects the use of SharpEvtHook, a tool that tampers with the Windows event logs
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
004
Threat actors can use auditpol binary to change audit policy configuration to impair detection capability.
This can be carried out by selectively disabling/removing certain audit policies as well as restoring a custom policy owned by the threat actor.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
003
Detects potential suspicious behaviour using secedit.exe. Such as exporting or modifying the security policy
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
003
Detects tampering with the "ChannelAccess" registry key in order to change access to Windows event channel.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
003
Detects tampering with autologger trace sessions which is a technique used by attackers to disable logging.
The AutoLogger event tracing session records events up that occur early in the operating system boot process.
Applications and device drivers can use the AutoLogger session to capture traces before the user logs in, and also used by security solutions as telemetry source.
Adversaries may disable these sessions to evade detection and prevent security monitoring of early boot activities and system events.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
003
Detects tampering with EventLog service "file" key. In order to change the default location of an Evtx file. This technique is used to tamper with log collection and alerting
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
003
Detects the addition of a new module to an IIS server.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
002
Detects the removal of a previously installed IIS module.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
002
Detects the load of EvtMuteHook.dll, a key component of SharpEvtHook, a tool that tampers with the Windows event logs
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
002
Detects possible Sysmon filter driver unloaded via fltmc.exe
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
002
Detects the addition of a key 'MiniNt' to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stop writing events.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
002
Detects changes to of the IIS server configuration in order to disable/remove the ETW logging/processing option.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
001
Detects changes to of the IIS server configuration in order to disable HTTP logging for successful requests.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
001
Detects scenarios where system auditing (i.e.: Windows event log auditing) is disabled.
This may be used in a scenario where an entity would want to bypass local logging to evade detection when Windows event logging is enabled and reviewed.
Also, it is recommended to turn off "Local Group Policy Object Processing" via GPO, which will make sure that Active Directory GPOs take precedence over local/edited computer policies via something such as "gpedit.msc".
Please note, that disabling "Local Group Policy Object Processing" may cause an issue in scenarios of one off specific GPO modifications - however, it is recommended to perform these modifications in Active Directory anyways.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
001
Disables HTTP logging on a Windows IIS web server as seen by Threat Group 3390 (Bronze Union)
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
001
Detects the addition of the 'MiniNt' key to the registry. Upon a reboot, Windows Event Log service will stop writing events.
Windows Event Log is a service that collects and stores event logs from the operating system and applications. It is an important component of Windows security and auditing.
Adversary may want to disable this service to disable logging of security events which could be used to detect their activities.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
6 months ago
001
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