Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,918 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,238
1,064
466
410
326
Contributors
725
665
535
485
271
Categories
1,085
870
807
765
577
Platforms
1,844
1,022
856
814
658
Products / Services
988
596
477
456
383
MITRE Techniques
18,116
15,636
12,583
8,393
6,223
4,918
CVEs
37
17
17
15
12
IDS Classtypes
196
73
47
29
16
IDS Protocols
301
27
24
22
6
Detects the creation of the 'shai-hulud-workflow.yml' file, which is associated with the Shai Hulud worm. This worm targets the NPM supply chain and is designed to exfiltrate GitHub secrets. The rule specifically looks for the creation of this file within the '.github/workflows/' directory.
Detects a qlogin.exe command attempting to authenticate as the internal `_+_PublicSharingUser_` using a GUID as the password. This could be an indicator of an attacker exploiting CVE-2025-57788 to gain initial access using leaked credentials.
This rule detects failed attempts to elevate privileges (PIM activation) in Azure Active Directory from devices that are not designated as Privileged Access Workstations (PAW) or Secure Access Workstations (SAW). It specifically looks for messages indicating 'Add member to role completed (PIM activation)' in the sign-in logs, combined with conditions that identify non-compliant devices, unapproved IP addresses, unapproved countries, or unapproved device information. The rule is designed to flag suspicious privilege elevation attempts that originate from unauthorized or untrusted environments, which could indicate a compromised account or an attempt to bypass security controls.
This rule identifies when an admission controller is executed in Azure Kubernetes. Admission controllers intercept and potentially modify requests to the Kubernetes API server. Adversaries can leverage admission webhooks (MutatingAdmissionWebhook or ValidatingAdmissionWebhook) for persistence, such as injecting malicious containers into pods or intercepting API requests to steal credentials and sensitive information.
This rule detects sign-in attempts to Azure Active Directory from devices that are marked as non-compliant. Non-compliant devices typically lack required security configurations, updates, or policies, and their use for authentication can indicate a potential security risk, such as a compromised device or an attempt to bypass security controls.
Identifies user login with multifactor authentication failures, which might be an indication an attacker has the password for the account but can't pass the MFA challenge.
This rule detects the use of PowerShell cmdlets from the 'Microsoft.PowerShell.LocalAccounts' module, which are used to manipulate local user accounts. This includes actions such as disabling, enabling, getting information about, setting properties of, creating, renaming, and removing local users. Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain access to victim systems, modify credentials, or change permission groups.
These rules detect indicators associated with a campaign where attackers compromised developer accounts and inserted malicious code into over 35 Google Chrome extensions. The first rule identifies suspicious network connections to known malicious IP addresses and command-and-control (C2) domains. The second rule identifies the presence of known malicious Chrome extension names or their corresponding extension IDs, which could indicate the presence of a hijacked extension.
Detects suspicious administrative activities on F5 BIG-IP devices, such as failed logins or configuration changes. This is based on recommendations from F5 in response to a security incident disclosed in October 2025 where a threat actor gained access to BIG-IP development environments. F5 advised customers to enhance monitoring for admin logins, failed authentications, and privilege and configuration changes.
Detects GitHub activity associated with the 'Shai-Hulud' NPM supply chain attack. The attack involves malicious NPM packages that use stolen GitHub tokens to create a new branch, inject a malicious workflow file to exfiltrate secrets, and make private repositories public.
Detects suspicious child processes created by CrushFTP, which could indicate the exploitation of a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability like CVE-2025-54309. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell, cmd, bitsadmin, certutil, mshta, cscript, or wscript processes spawned by CrushFTP, often with command-line arguments indicative of malicious activity (e.g., IEX, encoded commands for PowerShell, or common system commands for cmd).
This rule monitors and alerts when a user is added to the 'Global Administrator' or 'Device Administrator' roles within Azure Active Directory. These roles grant highly elevated privileges, making this activity critical for detecting potential persistence, privilege escalation, or initial access attempts by adversaries. The detection logic specifically looks for 'Add member to role' operations within the RoleManagement category, targeting the unique identifiers for these two sensitive administrative roles.
Detects when a configuration change is made to an application's AppID URI in Azure Active Directory (now Microsoft Entra ID). This change can be indicative of an adversary attempting to modify an application's identity to facilitate malicious activities such as phishing, unauthorized access, or maintaining persistence.
Detects when a user successfully resets their own password within Azure Active Directory. This rule specifically looks for 'UserManagement' category events with a 'Success' status, initiated by a 'UPN' (User Principal Name) and targeting a 'UPN' with an 'ActivityType' containing 'Password reset'.
Identifies when an account in a privileged role has not signed in for a specified number of days, indicating a potentially stale or unused privileged account. Such accounts can be a security risk if compromised, as they might not be actively monitored.
This rule detects sign-in attempts to Azure AD where the authentication requirement was single-factor, the sign-in was successful (ResultType: 0), the network location details were empty (indicating an unknown or unclassified location), and the device ID was also empty (indicating an unknown or unregistered device). This combination suggests a sign-in from an unknown device and potentially an untrusted location, which could be indicative of an adversary attempting to gain initial access or maintain persistence.
Detects failed attempts to sign in to disabled accounts within Azure Active Directory. This could indicate an attacker attempting to use compromised credentials for an account that has been deactivated, or an attempt to bypass security controls by targeting dormant accounts.
This rule detects unusual authentication interruptions in Azure Active Directory sign-in logs. Specifically, it looks for three types of ResultType and ResultDescription combinations: '50097 - Device authentication is required', '50155 - DeviceAuthenticationFailed', and '50158 - ExternalSecurityChallenge - External security challenge was not satisfied'. These events indicate that an authentication attempt was interrupted or failed due to device-related issues or an unmet external security challenge, which could be indicative of an adversary attempting to bypass authentication mechanisms or encountering unexpected security controls.
This rule detects successful user authentications from your Azure AD tenant to other Azure AD tenants. This activity can indicate an attacker attempting to maintain access or escalate privileges by leveraging existing user accounts to access resources in external tenants, or it could be a legitimate business-to-business (B2B) collaboration that needs to be approved.
Detects the command line executed when TeamViewer starts a session initiated by a remote host. An investigator can verify connection details by viewing the "incoming_connections.txt" log file in the TeamViewer folder.
Detects suspicious processes attempting to log on with explicit credentials (Event ID 4648). This rule specifically targets common command-line utilities like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, wmic.exe, net.exe, and reg.exe when they are used to explicitly log on, while filtering out localhost connections and service accounts (users ending with '$') to reduce false positives. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to escalate privileges or move laterally using compromised credentials.
Page 156 of 235