Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects cases in which an ISO files is opend within an archiver like 7Zip or Winrar, which is a sign of phishing as threat actors put small ISO files in archives as email attachments to bypass certain filters and protective measures (mark of web)
Identify prior activity from this campaign using IOCs shared by Microsoft's Threat Intelligence Center, or MSTIC.
Read more: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/
Read more: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/
Detects suspicious child processes of the Veeam service process. This could indicate potential RCE or SQL Injection.
Detects a suspicious program execution in Outlook temp folder
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Confluence and WebLogic abuse.
2019 has seen several seemingly related campaigns targeting Atlassian Confluence Server and Oracle WebLogic Server. Although these campaigns use different implants and delivery methods, they consistently use the same infrastructure, and exploit the same vulnerabilities.
The campaigns have specifically targeted:
1. CVE-2019-3396 - Software update
2. CVE-2019-2725 - Software update
The following query detects activity broadly associated with these campaigns.
2019 has seen several seemingly related campaigns targeting Atlassian Confluence Server and Oracle WebLogic Server. Although these campaigns use different implants and delivery methods, they consistently use the same infrastructure, and exploit the same vulnerabilities.
The campaigns have specifically targeted:
1. CVE-2019-3396 - Software update
2. CVE-2019-2725 - Software update
The following query detects activity broadly associated with these campaigns.
Detects shell spawned from Java host process, which could be a sign of exploitation (e.g. log4j exploitation)
Detects suspicious processes spawned from a Java host process which could indicate a sign of exploitation (e.g. log4j)
The .SettingContent-ms file type was introduced in Windows 10 and allows a user to create "shortcuts" to various Windows 10 setting pages. These files are simply XML and contain paths to various Windows 10 settings binaries.
Detects the execution of an AnyDesk binary with a version prior to 8.0.8.
Prior to version 8.0.8, the Anydesk application used a signing certificate that got compromised by threat actors.
Use this rule to detect instances of older versions of Anydesk using the compromised certificate
This is recommended in order to avoid attackers leveraging the certificate and signing their binaries to bypass detections.
Prior to version 8.0.8, the Anydesk application used a signing certificate that got compromised by threat actors.
Use this rule to detect instances of older versions of Anydesk using the compromised certificate
This is recommended in order to avoid attackers leveraging the certificate and signing their binaries to bypass detections.
Detects suspicious child processes of the SQLServer process. This could indicate potential RCE or SQL Injection.
Detects the creation of a office macro file from a a suspicious process
Detects the creation of recent element file that points to an .ISO, .IMG, .VHD or .VHDX file as often used in phishing attacks.
This can be a false positive on server systems but on workstations users should rarely mount .iso or .img files.
This can be a false positive on server systems but on workstations users should rarely mount .iso or .img files.
Detects the creation of a ISO file in the Outlook temp folder or in the Appdata temp folder. Typical of Qakbot TTP from end-July 2022.
Detects the creation of a new office macro files on the systems via an application (browser, mail client).
Action "PnpDeviceConnected" reports the connection of any plug and play device.
Read more online on event 6416: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-6416.
Query #1: look for rare one-time devices connected to a specific machine.
Read more online on event 6416: https://docs.microsoft.com/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-6416.
Query #1: look for rare one-time devices connected to a specific machine.
Detects suspicious activity in which the MSExchangeMailboxReplication process writes .asp and .apsx files to disk, which could be a sign of ProxyShell exploitation
This query visualises the total amount of admin false positive submissions by the state of the submission.
In this detection, we track emails with personalized subjects.
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
First query digs in print spooler drivers folder for any file creations,
MANY OF THE FILES THAT SHOULD COME UP HERE MAY BE LEGIT. Unsigned files
or ones that don't have any relations to printers that you are using are
suspicious.
Second query that can be used for finding client machines that
could be operating print servers or file servers is also included here.
As additional mitigation for the exploit you might want to block the
incoming traffic to the SMB or EPMAP Ports (445) if you need to keep the
spooler service running to print from clients.
MANY OF THE FILES THAT SHOULD COME UP HERE MAY BE LEGIT. Unsigned files
or ones that don't have any relations to printers that you are using are
suspicious.
Second query that can be used for finding client machines that
could be operating print servers or file servers is also included here.
As additional mitigation for the exploit you might want to block the
incoming traffic to the SMB or EPMAP Ports (445) if you need to keep the
spooler service running to print from clients.
'Example query for SigninLogs showing how to break out packed fields. In this case extending conditional access Policies '
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