Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This query visualises total inbound emails with Malware detections summarizing the data by the top email sender P2 domain (SenderFromDomain)
This query visualises total inbound emails with Malware detections summarizing the data by the top recipient email address (RecipientEmailAddress)
This query visualises total emails with Phish detections over time summarizing the data daily by Delivery Location.
This query visualises total emails with Phish detections summarizing the data by various Phish detection technologies/controls
Intent:
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
- Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
- Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
Definition of Insider Threat:
"The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
The following query surface network activity associated with exploitation of CVE-2022-22965.
' Identifies measureable increase in successful sign-ins from user accounts.
Spike is determined based on Time series anomaly which will look at historical baseline values.
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-successful-unusual-sign-ins'
Spike is determined based on Time series anomaly which will look at historical baseline values.
Ref : https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-user-accounts#monitoring-for-successful-unusual-sign-ins'
'The alert shows users that join a Zoom meeting from a time zone other than the one the meeting was created in.
You can also whitelist known good time zones in the tz_whitelist value using the tz database name format https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tz_database_time_zones'
You can also whitelist known good time zones in the tz_whitelist value using the tz database name format https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tz_database_time_zones'
'This query uses the Azure Defender Security Nested Recommendations data to find machines vulnerable to OMIGOD CVE-2021-38647.
OMI is the Linux equivalent of Windows WMI and helps users manage configurations across remote and local environments. The query aims to find machines that have this OMI vulnerability (CVE-2021-38647).
Security Nested Recommendations data is sent to Microsoft Sentinel using the continuous export feature of Azure Defender(refrence link below).
Reference: https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/security-center/continuous-export?tabs=azure-portal'
OMI is the Linux equivalent of Windows WMI and helps users manage configurations across remote and local environments. The query aims to find machines that have this OMI vulnerability (CVE-2021-38647).
Security Nested Recommendations data is sent to Microsoft Sentinel using the continuous export feature of Azure Defender(refrence link below).
Reference: https://www.wiz.io/blog/omigod-critical-vulnerabilities-in-omi-azure
Reference: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/security-center/continuous-export?tabs=azure-portal'
LemonDuck is an actively updated and robust malware primarily known for its botnet and cryptocurrency mining objectives. First discovered in 2019, LemonDuck has since adopted more sophisticated behavior and escalated its operations in 2021. Today, beyond using resources for its traditional bot and mining activities, LemonDuck steals credentials, removes security controls, spreads via emails, moves laterally, and ultimately drops more tools for human-operated activity.
ZLoader was delivered in a campaign in summer 2021 via malvertising. This campaign was tweeted about by @MsftSecIntel on twitter.
Qakbot operators have been abusing the Craigslist messaging system to send malicious emails. These emails contain non-clickable links to malicious domains impersonating Craigslist, which the user is instructed to manually type into the address bar to access.
Original Sigma Rule: https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/apt/apt_unidentified_nov_18.yml.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
Questions via Twitter: @janvonkirchheim.
These queries was originally published in the threat analytics report, Attacks on gov't, think tanks, NGOs.
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
As described further in Analysis of cyberattack on U.S. think tanks, non-profits, public sector by unidentified attackers, there was a very large spear-phishing campaign launched in November 2019.
The attackers would gain access to a target by having the user click on a link to a compromised website and download a .zip archive.
Once established on a target's device, the attackers used a malicious DLL named cyzfc.dat to execute additional payloads. They would call a function in the malicious DLL via the legitimate Windows process, rundll32.exe, to connect directly to their command-and-control (C2) servers.
The following queries detect activity associated with the malicious DLL, cyzfc.dat., used in this campaign.
Reference - https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/rundll32
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Solorigate supply chain attack. Please note that these attacks are currently known as the Nobelium campaign.
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query locates malicious Nobelium-associated DLLs that have been created in the system or locally.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Microsoft detects the 2020 SolarWinds supply chain attack implant and its other components as part of a campaign by the Nobelium activity group. Nobelium is the threat actor behind the attack against SolarWinds, which was previously referred to as Solorigate.
Nobelium silently added malicious code to legitimate software updates for Orion, which is IT monitoring software provided by SolarWinds. In this way, malicious dynamic link libraries (DLLs) were distributed to SolarWinds customers.
The following query locates malicious Nobelium-associated DLLs that have been created in the system or locally.
More Nobelium-related queries can be found listed under the See also section of this document.
References:
https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2020/12/13/customer-guidance-on-recent-nation-state-cyber-attacks/
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2020/12/18/analyzing-solorigate-the-compromised-dll-file-that-started-a-sophisticated-cyberattack-and-how-microsoft-defender-helps-protect/
Identify prior activity from this campaign using IOCs shared by Microsoft's Threat Intelligence Center, or MSTIC.
Read more: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/
Read more: https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2020/10/28/cyberattacks-phosphorus-t20-munich-security-conference/
This query was originally published in the threat analytics report, Exploitation of CVE-2019-0708 (BlueKeep).
CVE-2019-0708, also known as BlueKeep, is a critical remote code execution vulnerability involving RDP. Soon after its disclosure, the NSA issued a rare advisory about this vulnerability, out of concern that it could be used to quickly spread malware. Attackers have since used this vulnerability to install cryptocurrency miners on targets.
Microsoft has issued updates for this vulnerability, as well as guidance for protecting operating systems that we no longer support. Microsoft Defender ATP also contains behavioral detections for defending against this threat.
The following query locates devices where the known coin miner payload was dropped.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0708
https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/News-Stories/Article-View/Article/1865726/nsa-cybersecurity-advisory-patch-remote-desktop-services-on-legacy-versions-of/
https://www.wired.com/story/bluekeep-hacking-cryptocurrency-mining/
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0708
https://support.microsoft.com/help/4500705/customer-guidance-for-cve-2019-0708
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/11/07/the-new-cve-2019-0708-rdp-exploit-attacks-explained/
CVE-2019-0708, also known as BlueKeep, is a critical remote code execution vulnerability involving RDP. Soon after its disclosure, the NSA issued a rare advisory about this vulnerability, out of concern that it could be used to quickly spread malware. Attackers have since used this vulnerability to install cryptocurrency miners on targets.
Microsoft has issued updates for this vulnerability, as well as guidance for protecting operating systems that we no longer support. Microsoft Defender ATP also contains behavioral detections for defending against this threat.
The following query locates devices where the known coin miner payload was dropped.
References:
https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-0708
https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/News-Stories/Article-View/Article/1865726/nsa-cybersecurity-advisory-patch-remote-desktop-services-on-legacy-versions-of/
https://www.wired.com/story/bluekeep-hacking-cryptocurrency-mining/
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2019-0708
https://support.microsoft.com/help/4500705/customer-guidance-for-cve-2019-0708
https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2019/11/07/the-new-cve-2019-0708-rdp-exploit-attacks-explained/
Use this query to locate emails and malicious downloads related to the IcedId activity that can lead to ransomware
This query visualises the daily amount of admin false positive submission by submission type.
This query helps reviewing mail that is likely a reply but there is no history of the people chatting and the domain is new
This query helps reviewing count of total ZAP events
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