Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where the Outlook process (OUTLOOK.EXE) initiates a network connection over SMB (port 445) to an external, non-private IP address. This behavior is highly suspicious as Microsoft Outlook should typically not be performing direct SMB connections to external systems, and this is often indicative of an adversary attempting to leverage malicious documents or templates to perform credential harvesting via NTLM relay or SMB authentication captures.
Detects a multi-stage attack chain beginning with the execution of suspicious processes (mstsc.exe, mshta.exe) from email clients or download directories, followed by WinRAR or unrar.exe writing files containing path traversal sequences, and concluding with the execution of a child process from a suspicious directory. This behavior aligns with exploitation attempts targeting vulnerabilities like CVE-2025-8088.
Detects Microsoft Office applications spawning suspicious child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, rundll32.exe) or initiating network connections to WebDAV paths, which may indicate exploitation of ActiveX OLE auto-execution vulnerabilities.
Detects successful ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credential) token acquisitions targeting Microsoft Graph (00000003-0000-0000-c000-000000000000) where Conditional Access was not applied and only single-factor authentication was satisfied. This pattern indicates abuse of hidden CA policy scope exclusions introduced by CVE-2025-0309, enabling token issuance without MFA or device compliance enforcement.
Detects the presence of the Montana Empire phishing kit within ZIP archives. The rule identifies specific PHP backend components (mentalite.php, panel_track.php, verify_api.php) often used for credential harvesting, along with unique branding strings and artifacts suggesting AI-assisted development of the phishing kit.
Detects outbound HTTP requests to a known phishing infrastructure panel associated with the Montana Empire malware campaign, specifically targeting the /mentalite.php endpoint on pttvm.com.
This rule monitors outbound HTTP responses to detect the presence of the Montana Empire phishing panel by analyzing specific branding artifacts, such as strings like 'ENTER THE EMPIRE', '256-bit Encrypted', and 'Brute-force Protected' located within the HTTP response body associated with the URI '/mentalite.php'.
This rule monitors email gateway and EDR telemetry for indicators associated with the CastleLoader malware and the EvilTokens phishing campaign. It flags specific keywords in email subjects, filenames, sender domains, and URLs, as well as suspicious binary execution patterns and child processes spawning from common office applications or web browsers.
This rule detects successful self-service password reset (SSPR) operations performed by users from IP addresses geolocated to a country that does not match their typical sign-in activity over the past 30 days. This behavior may indicate account takeover where an adversary has compromised credentials and is resetting the password to maintain access or gain further persistence.
Detects high-frequency SMB (Logon Type 3) authentication events targeting Domain Controllers, specifically involving suspicious or generic accounts such as 'ANONYMOUS LOGON', 'Guest', empty usernames, or machine accounts. This behavior is indicative of network reconnaissance, session enumeration, or brute-force attempts targeting the domain.
This rule detects network connections to phishing pages hosted on the workers.dev domain that are attempting to interact with EvilTokens device code API endpoints. These pages are known to implement developer hotkey prevention (F12 blocked, context menu disabled) to hinder in-browser analysis, indicating malicious intent.
This rule detects the execution of known remote access tools (such as AnyDesk, TeamViewer, or RustDesk) that are spawned as child processes from common web browsers. It correlates process creation events with subsequent network connections by these tools to public IP addresses over specific ports commonly used by remote access software, within a 30-minute timeframe of the process start.
This rule detects successful configuration modifications to diagnostic settings or storage services where the destination resource is identified as being outside of the organization's trusted subscriptions or expected storage naming conventions. This activity may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate logs or data to an attacker-controlled storage account.
This rule detects potential phishing attempts by identifying emails with subject lines and attachment names related to Income Tax or official tax filings. The detection logic correlates indicators such as specific tax-related subject phrases, common tax utility attachments, suspicious URLs (govtop.one), and sender spoofing (impersonating 'Government of India' without a valid .gov.in domain).
User Added to an Administrator's Azure AD Role
Search Common EventCodes (EventID’s) for Suspicious Behavior
Detects LCRYX ransomware behavior involving the creation of autorun.inf files on removable drives combined with the execution of VBScripts from removable media using wscript.exe, indicative of a worm propagating via USB devices.
This rule detects potential credential harvesting or malware delivery by identifying an email client (e.g., Outlook) launching a PDF reader, which subsequently executes a web browser. This sequence is a common indicator of a user interacting with a malicious link or 'Sign' button inside a PDF attachment opened directly from an email.
This rule detects potentially malicious search queries within Microsoft 365 or Copilot-related URLs intercepted by email gateways, proxies, or SIEM sources. It monitors for suspicious query parameters that may indicate attempts to hide malicious content, such as HTML tags (e.g., <img>), image-related keywords, or excessively long query strings, which could be indicative of phishing attempts or browser-based exploitation techniques.
This rule detects potential Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) exploitation where Bing's 'search by image' functionality is abused to fetch external, non-Microsoft controlled URLs. The query monitors web proxy logs for specific Bing search parameters ('cbir=sbi' and 'imgurl') and filters out requests to trusted domains, effectively identifying attempts to use the search engine as an intermediary for unauthorized external web requests. The rule further correlates these hits with Microsoft Copilot interaction logs to identify if the activity is associated with authenticated Copilot user sessions.
This rule detects two common persistence techniques: the modification of Windows Registry Run keys with paths referencing temporary or application data directories, and the creation of autorun.inf files on removable or non-system drives to facilitate potential code execution upon media insertion.
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