Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for suspicious activity associated with npm or Node.js processes. This includes potential credential misuse during npm publish or login, unauthorized build-time execution via node-gyp, and the use of unconventional preinstall/postinstall hooks that spawn external binaries or scripts, which are often indicative of software supply chain attacks.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying users who, within a short timeframe (90 seconds) of their first recorded network logon (EventID 4624, Logon Type 3), perform suspicious follow-up activities such as explicit credentials usage (4648), network share access (5140), or remote service installation (7045).
This rule detects the execution of RMM (Remote Monitoring and Management) installers (Atera or SimpleHelp) via msiexec.exe or setup.exe when launched from directories commonly used for downloads (Temp/Downloads) and originating from web browsers or Microsoft Office applications. This behavior is indicative of a potential drive-by download or phishing attack aimed at installing unauthorized remote access software.
Detects instances where the Node.js runtime (node.exe) spawns a command shell or scripting interpreter (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or wscript.exe). The detection specifically looks for these processes being initiated from directories commonly associated with Node.js package management (npm) or local module installations, which may indicate malicious activity such as software supply chain attacks or execution of obfuscated scripts.
This rule detects successful authentication attempts directed at network devices from sources not explicitly marked as authorized management systems. It identifies users or systems that are not recognized service accounts authenticating against network infrastructure and flags activity that involves multiple unique destination targets as high risk.
This rule identifies potential mass phishing campaigns by monitoring O365 email activity for high-volume outbound mail from newly registered or observed domains. It specifically flags senders that have no prior historical activity in the last 90 days, have a domain age of less than 30 days, and exhibit a low variation in email subjects across a large volume of recipients, which is characteristic of automated bulk phishing.
This rule detects potential lateral movement by identifying users who, within a short timeframe (90 seconds) of their first recorded network logon (EventID 4624, Logon Type 3), perform suspicious follow-up activities such as explicit credentials usage (4648), network share access (5140), or remote service installation (7045).
Detects Payouts King ransomware operator TTPs involving Microsoft Teams social engineering followed by Windows Quick Assist (msra.exe) abuse. The rule monitors for three primary indicators: Teams spawning Quick Assist, Quick Assist being launched with remote session-initiation flags, and Quick Assist spawning suspicious child processes (cmd, powershell, etc.) or network utilities (curl, certutil, bitsadmin) characteristic of post-exploitation payload delivery.
Detects Microsoft 365 OAuth access tokens issued via device_code grant — the mechanism abused by the EvilTokens phishing kit — followed within 1 hour by mailbox forwarding rule creation for the same account, indicating persistent BEC access post-compromise.
Detects suspicious repository content updates, such as modifications to package files, workflow configurations, or README files, and activities involving automated user IDs like 'dependabot' or 'github-actions' that may indicate compromised CI/CD credentials or unauthorized repository defacement.
Detects suspicious 'npm publish' or 'npm login' commands executed as child processes of 'node' or 'npm'. This pattern indicates programmatic execution from within package install hooks (such as preinstall or postinstall scripts) instead of manual developer interaction, a behavior characteristic of malicious npm supply chain attacks (e.g., IronWorm) aiming to trojanize packages using stolen tokens.
Detects in-memory execution of the MYRA RAT originating from a node.exe process. The rule monitors for suspicious process creation patterns associated with fileless techniques, including execution from memory file descriptors (memfd), /proc/self/fd, or empty process image paths, as well as unauthorized process interaction with systemd-userdbd, indicative of node.js supply chain compromises.
Detects anomalous behaviors associated with malicious npm package self-upgrades, where node.exe modifies its own source files within node_modules or spawns npm pack commands to replace existing dependencies with malicious versions.
Detects HTTP requests where the URI or request body contains indicators of internal network references (e.g., localhost, 127.0.0.1, or RFC 1918 private IP address ranges). This pattern is consistent with Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attempts, where an attacker tries to force a vulnerable web application to perform unauthorized requests to internal resources.
Detects the creation of executable files (.exe or .dll) on a removable drive followed by the execution of a process from that same drive within a 30-second window. This behavior is indicative of an adversary using removable media to stage and execute malicious payloads.
Detects node.exe executing 'test.js' as a child process of NPM lifecycle scripts (postinstall/preinstall). This behavior is characteristic of malicious NPM packages like 'ts-bn-lint' and 'log-taker' used in the Polymarket Trap campaign to execute an embedded infostealer payload.
Detects outbound network connections from node.exe or npm related processes to domains associated with the Polymarket Trap supply chain attack. This detection highlights the malicious behavior of compromised npm packages that initiate C2 communication at import time, bypassing standard postinstall security scripts.
Detects reconnaissance activity originating from npm or Node.js processes, specifically targeting system information (OS, network, user context, and hardware identifiers). This activity is associated with supply chain compromise attempts where malicious npm postinstall scripts or inline Node.js execution are used to enumerate the host environment.
Detects the creation of an MSI (Microsoft Installer) file on a device where the file's origin referrer URL indicates it was downloaded from a ZIP archive that was originally an email attachment. This could indicate a user opening a malicious ZIP file from an email, leading to the execution of an installer.
This rule detects network connections or URL click events to a list of domains known to be associated with phishing or malware distribution. The rule specifically looks for connections to these domains that also contain certain path segments like '/wlc/', '/load/', or '/success/', which are often indicative of malicious activity or payload delivery. It also broadly checks for any URL click events containing these suspicious domains.
This rule detects network connections to specific deep link patterns associated with messaging applications like Telegram, WhatsApp, and Signal. Such deep links can be used in phishing attempts or to initiate actions on a user's device through these applications.
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