Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspicious exploitation activity against NetScaler ADC/Gateway appliances, including requests to CGI, VPN, or authentication endpoints with command execution, webshell, or encoded payload behavior associated with CVE-2026-88771.
Detects repeated crashes of GitLab Ruby, Puma, Sidekiq, or bundle processes on Linux within a short time window. The detection looks for crash markers such as segfault, SIGSEGV, SIGABRT, or onigmo in the command line, which typically indicate exploitation attempts against Onigmo regex engine vulnerabilities.
Detects a potential social engineering or phishing attack pattern where a recipient first receives a high volume of inbound emails (mail flood) within a short window, followed quickly by an external Microsoft Teams chat message from an IT-themed sender attempting to impersonate internal support.
Detects when a web browser (such as Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Brave, or Opera) spawns common command interpreters, scripting engines, or Living off the Land Binaries (LOLBins) like cmd, powershell, mshta, rundll32, or certutil. This behavior is often indicative of a drive-by compromise or browser exploitation attempt.
Detects the creation of application-specific passwords followed by their initial use from unknown or new IP addresses using legacy authentication clients, which may indicate account compromise or persistence establishment.
Detects a potential app-only tenant-takeover sequence associated with Storm-3119 (YAM Store), where a single service principal performs an administrative password reset, a license assignment, and a privileged role grant within a one-hour window.
Detects incoming xAI invitation emails from noreply@x.ai containing URLs that do not belong to the x.ai domain, which may indicate a phishing attempt or link injection.
Detects non-interactive service principal sign-ins originating from an IP address and location never seen for that specific principal over a prior 30-day baseline period, approximating potential misuse of stolen cloud credentials exposed via environment variables.
Correlates a device code flow sign-in event with bulk file downloads from SharePoint or OneDrive by the same user account within a 1-hour window. This behavior can indicate potential account compromise or misuse where an adversary uses device code phishing to authenticate and subsequently exfiltrate sensitive files.
Detects Azure AD service principal sign-ins utilizing suspicious scripting-related user agents such as curl, python-requests, Wget, or Postman, which may indicate automated scripting, custom tooling, or potential abuse of cloud service accounts.
Behavioral hunt for accounts whose non-interactive sign-ins over 30 days are dominated (>=95%) by a single IP using a scripted client (python/aiohttp/httpx/urllib) with no browser. Scripted now requires BOTH no browser AND a scripted user agent, and Microsoft ASN egress is excluded.
Detects a burst of denied requests at the load balancer. The appliance sits in front
of the application and sees attempts the application never receives, which makes it
an early warning layer that most estates collect and never query.
Onboarding: BARRACUDA-LOADBALANCER is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 859).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webserver where sourcename='BARRACUDA-LOADBALANCER'
and action='REQUEST_DENIED'
| duration 15m
| groupby srcip, useragent
| select srcip, useragent, distinct_count(url)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 20
of the application and sees attempts the application never receives, which makes it
an early warning layer that most estates collect and never query.
Onboarding: BARRACUDA-LOADBALANCER is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 859).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=webserver where sourcename='BARRACUDA-LOADBALANCER'
and action='REQUEST_DENIED'
| duration 15m
| groupby srcip, useragent
| select srcip, useragent, distinct_count(url)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 20
Detects web servers (httpd, apache2, nginx, php-fpm) or Request Tracker (RT) Perl worker processes spawning suspicious child processes such as shells, downloaders, netcat, or Python interpreters, indicative of post-exploitation or web application compromise.
Detects VPN connection events where the client hostname contains the string 'kali', which may indicate the use of a penetration testing operating system or a suspicious device connecting to the corporate network via Palo Alto Networks GlobalProtect.
Detects network, file, process, and email interactions associated with known IOCs related to Power BI phishing and rogue ScreenConnect campaigns over a 30-day lookback period.
Detects CVE-2026-76504 Cisco SD-WAN vManage authentication bypass attempts: POST logins using internal viptela-reserved-* accounts via the percent-encoded /%6a_security_check path. Summarized per host and account.
Correlates a CVE-2026-76504 encoded /%6a_security_check login POST with a follow-on /dataservice/admin/user request from the same client to the same vManage within 10 minutes. Summarized and sorted by follow-on count.
Finds BeyondTrust Remote Support (Bomgar) appliances at version 26.2.3 or earlier that have a public IP address, indicating a potentially internet-facing vulnerable appliance (CVE-2026-102764). Index and field names are placeholders to adapt.
Detects execution of Node.js and NPM related commands involving potential supply chain indicators, script execution, or download utilities (such as curl, wget, powershell, or eval) within command lines.
Detects a single application or service principal performing a password reset, a license assignment, and a privileged role grant within a one-hour window. This sequence matches Storm-3119 admin-panel abuse of a compromised tenant client secret through an app-only flow in Microsoft 365 or Entra ID.
Detects an attack identified by the FortiWeb web application firewall. WAF telemetry
is widely collected and almost never turned into detection content — it is usually
left as a vendor dashboard, so repeated targeting of one application by one source
goes unexamined.
Onboarding: FORTIWEB is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 115).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='FORTIWEB' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, dstip, threat
| select srcip, dstip, threat, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
is widely collected and almost never turned into detection content — it is usually
left as a vendor dashboard, so repeated targeting of one application by one source
goes unexamined.
Onboarding: FORTIWEB is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 115).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='FORTIWEB' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| duration 1h
| groupby srcip, dstip, threat
| select srcip, dstip, threat, count(*) as cnt
| having cnt > 10
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