Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
4,916 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
2,236
1,064
466
410
326
Contributors
725
665
535
485
271
Categories
1,085
870
805
765
576
Platforms
1,843
1,022
856
814
656
Products / Services
988
596
477
456
383
MITRE Techniques
18,123
15,639
12,581
8,394
6,215
4,916
CVEs
37
17
17
15
12
IDS Classtypes
196
73
47
29
16
IDS Protocols
301
27
24
22
6
Detects administrative login to the FortiWeb console from an address without prior
history. Console access permits policy change and signature control, so compromise
of the WAF administrator is equivalent to removing the WAF for every application
behind it.
Onboarding: FORTIWEB is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 115).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='FORTIWEB' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip
history. Console access permits policy change and signature control, so compromise
of the WAF administrator is equivalent to removing the WAF for every application
behind it.
Onboarding: FORTIWEB is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 115).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='FORTIWEB' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip
Detects inbound mail carrying an attachment from a sending server not previously
seen. Most legitimate correspondence arrives from infrastructure with history;
first-contact plus attachment is the shape of a targeted delivery attempt.
Pair with the recipient list: a single first-seen sender reaching many recipients at
once is a campaign rather than a one-off.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_RECEIVED' and file != ''
| groupby remoteip, sender, file, recipient
seen. Most legitimate correspondence arrives from infrastructure with history;
first-contact plus attachment is the shape of a targeted delivery attempt.
Pair with the recipient list: a single first-seen sender reaching many recipients at
once is a campaign rather than a one-off.
Onboarding: MS-EXCHANGE is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 142).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=email-gateway where sourcename='MS-EXCHANGE'
and action='EMAIL_RECEIVED' and file != ''
| groupby remoteip, sender, file, recipient
Detects hosts with the trojanized version 3.0.123 of the Rank Math PRO WordPress plugin distributed in October 2026. It correlates software inventory, file events, command-line process events, and network connections to identify affected packages, installation activity, and C2 communications.
Detects successful non-interactive sign-ins by Entra ID service principals from an IP address and location never seen in the prior 14 days, helping to identify potentially compromised application credentials used from unfamiliar locations.
Detects HTTP requests to the PeopleSoft PSEMHUB servlet using alternate
encodings such as the percent-encoded path %50SEMHUB. ShinyHunters/UNC6240 mass-exploit
Oracle PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273 against internet-facing systems and encode the path to
defeat literal WAF signatures for /PSEMHUB/ (T1190, T1027).
encodings such as the percent-encoded path %50SEMHUB. ShinyHunters/UNC6240 mass-exploit
Oracle PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273 against internet-facing systems and encode the path to
defeat literal WAF signatures for /PSEMHUB/ (T1190, T1027).
Detects a file creation event for any executable inside the "tmphtml" staging
directory beneath the AOMEI Backupper installation path, where the creating process
is Backupper.exe. The application stages popup resources here before relocating them
to html\; a genuine promotional bundle contains no executables, so an .exe written
to this path indicates a tampered bundle.
directory beneath the AOMEI Backupper installation path, where the creating process
is Backupper.exe. The application stages popup resources here before relocating them
to html\; a genuine promotional bundle contains no executables, so an .exe written
to this path indicates a tampered bundle.
Detects a file creation event for any executable inside the "tmphtml" staging
directory beneath the AOMEI Backupper installation path, where the creating process
is Backupper.exe. The application stages popup resources here before relocating them
to html\; a genuine promotional bundle contains no executables, so an .exe written
to this path indicates a tampered bundle.
directory beneath the AOMEI Backupper installation path, where the creating process
is Backupper.exe. The application stages popup resources here before relocating them
to html\; a genuine promotional bundle contains no executables, so an .exe written
to this path indicates a tampered bundle.
Detects HTTP requests to the WordPress REST batch endpoint (/wp-json/batch/v1 or /?rest_route=/batch/v1) carrying user agents associated with public wp2shell proof-of-concept tooling. This targets the pre-auth route confusion and SQL injection primitive in WordPress Core (CVE-2026-63030, CVE-2026-60137) that leads to full remote code execution.
Users who received a delivered phishing email and then signed in from an IP not seen for them in the prior 30 days within 24 hours. Hunting query, not an alert.
Detects service principal sign-ins involving known compromised application IDs associated with the ConnectWise cloud backup and management supply-chain attack.
Detects suspicious DNS queries to external service interaction domains often used for out-of-band interactions after successful RCE
Detects external inbound FortiGate Fabric Management Protocol (FGFM) traffic on TCP port 541 followed by a FortiGateCloud administrative configuration download, backup, or running-config event on the same FortiGate device within a one-hour window, potentially indicating unauthorized configuration access or device compromise.
Sweeps email telemetry for exact matches against known Kimsuky (APT-C-55) infrastructure email addresses. Matches are exact and case-insensitive. MatchType separates inbound mail from the actor and outbound mail to the actor.
Detects administrative login to the ePO console. An ePO administrator can change
protection policy, create exclusions and push software to every managed endpoint —
which makes this account one of the highest-value targets in any estate running it.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-EPO is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 857).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='TRELLIX-EPO' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
protection policy, create exclusions and push software to every managed endpoint —
which makes this account one of the highest-value targets in any estate running it.
Onboarding: TRELLIX-EPO is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 857).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='TRELLIX-EPO' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
Detects a threat identified in Zimbra mail flow. Because Zimbra is both the mail
server and the webmail client, a threat here reaches the user directly without
passing any separate gateway — in many Zimbra deployments there is no other mail
security layer at all.
Onboarding: ZIMBRA is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 123).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='ZIMBRA' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, threat, srcip, dstip
server and the webmail client, a threat here reaches the user directly without
passing any separate gateway — in many Zimbra deployments there is no other mail
security layer at all.
Onboarding: ZIMBRA is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 123).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='ZIMBRA' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, threat, srcip, dstip
Detects authentication to the Barracuda load balancer management interface. Appliance
management accounts are often shared, rarely rotated and seldom covered by the
identity controls applied elsewhere, which makes them a durable route back in.
Onboarding: BARRACUDA-LOADBALANCER is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 859).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='BARRACUDA-LOADBALANCER' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
management accounts are often shared, rarely rotated and seldom covered by the
identity controls applied elsewhere, which makes them a durable route back in.
Onboarding: BARRACUDA-LOADBALANCER is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 859).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='BARRACUDA-LOADBALANCER' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
Detects MFT authentication from a source address without prior history. Transfer
platforms are reached by a small, stable set of partners and internal systems, so
the population of legitimate source addresses is unusually predictable — which makes
a new one unusually meaningful.
Onboarding: GOANYWHERE-MFT is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 850).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='GOANYWHERE-MFT' and action='LOGIN'
| duration 24h
| groupby srcip, user, authproto
platforms are reached by a small, stable set of partners and internal systems, so
the population of legitimate source addresses is unusually predictable — which makes
a new one unusually meaningful.
Onboarding: GOANYWHERE-MFT is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 850).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='GOANYWHERE-MFT' and action='LOGIN'
| duration 24h
| groupby srcip, user, authproto
Detects a threat identified by Deep Discovery Email Inspector. DDEI detonates
attachments and inspects URLs in a sandbox, so its verdicts carry behavioural
evidence rather than signature matches — which makes them a strong input for
detections that most estates never ingest.
Onboarding: TREND-MICRO-DDEI is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 265).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TREND-MICRO-DDEI' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, threat, threattype, srcip
attachments and inspects URLs in a sandbox, so its verdicts carry behavioural
evidence rather than signature matches — which makes them a strong input for
detections that most estates never ingest.
Onboarding: TREND-MICRO-DDEI is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 265).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='TREND-MICRO-DDEI' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| groupby sender, recipient, threat, threattype, srcip
Detects an invitation into a GitHub organisation. Membership confers access to
private source and, depending on role, the ability to alter it. An unexpected
invitation is a supply chain risk: the attacker does not need to breach anything if
somebody adds them to the organisation.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='GITHUB' and action='MEMBER_INVITED'
| groupby target, role, organisationid, accesstype
private source and, depending on role, the ability to alter it. An unexpected
invitation is a supply chain risk: the attacker does not need to breach anything if
somebody adds them to the organisation.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='GITHUB' and action='MEMBER_INVITED'
| groupby target, role, organisationid, accesstype
Detects an account joining the workspace. Slack Connect and guest access let outside
identities into an internal communication space, and an unexpected join is how an
attacker gains a listening position without touching the network perimeter at all.
Check the account type: a guest or external identity joining a channel carrying
operational or security discussion is worth immediate confirmation with the inviter.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='SLACK' and action='USER_JOINED_WORKSPACE'
| groupby user, targetuser, accounttype, workspace
identities into an internal communication space, and an unexpected join is how an
attacker gains a listening position without touching the network perimeter at all.
Check the account type: a guest or external identity joining a channel carrying
operational or security discussion is worth immediate confirmation with the inviter.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='SLACK' and action='USER_JOINED_WORKSPACE'
| groupby user, targetuser, accounttype, workspace
Detects threats identified by Mimecast where the same sender appears repeatedly.
A single blocked message is routine; the same origin returning again and again is a
campaign specifically targeting this organisation, and the repetition is the signal
worth acting on rather than the individual block.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| duration 24h
| groupby sender, srcip
| select sender, srcip, distinct_count(recipient)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
A single blocked message is routine; the same origin returning again and again is a
campaign specifically targeting this organisation, and the repetition is the signal
worth acting on rather than the individual block.
Onboarding: MIMECAST is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 161).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/mimecast-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='MIMECAST' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
| duration 24h
| groupby sender, srcip
| select sender, srcip, distinct_count(recipient)
| having distinct_count_col1 > 5
Page 6 of 235