Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects node.exe spawning powershell.exe as a child process, consistent with malicious npm postinstall lifecycle hooks used by the PostCSS typosquatting campaign (postcss-minify-selector-parser / postcss-minify-selector). The attack chain decrypts an AES-256-GCM blob at runtime and executes a PowerShell downloader stage.
Tycoon2FA PHaaS User Agent Detection
Cortex XDR
Detects user agents associated with Tycoon2FA phishing-as-a-service (PHaaS) campaigns, specifically targeting credential relay (axios/1.13.x) and device code phishing (node/undici) variants. The rule identifies sign-in attempts from unmanaged and non-compliant devices using these specific user agents during a device code flow authentication.
This rule detects the creation or modification of executable files (.com, .exe, .scr, .pif, .bat, .cmd) in common user directories (Documents, Downloads, Desktop) where the initiating process is a legitimate application like explorer.exe, winrar.exe, or 7z.exe. This pattern is often used in phishing attacks where malicious executables are disguised as benign documents.
This rule detects AI-generated phishing campaigns characterized by a high degree of attachment polymorphism. It identifies instances where a single campaign (based on sender domain or subject schema) delivers HTML attachments with a unique SHA256 hash to each recipient, indicating an attempt to evade traditional signature-based detection.
Detects network traffic fetching device codes from the Kali365 backend, specifically targeting the '/api/device/start' or '/api/device/status/' endpoints. This activity is associated with the EvilTokens device code phishing kit.
Detects phishing emails utilizing Kali365's hardcoded subject line templates impersonating file sharing services like SharePoint and DocuSign. The rule specifically looks for emails with subjects starting with "SharePoint - Document Shared:" or "DocuSign - Signature Required:" where the sender's domain is not microsoft.com or docusign.com, indicating a potential spoofing attempt.
This rule detects suspicious activity on high blast radius accounts, specifically correlating failed authentication attempts, password resets, and successful logons outside business hours.
The rule prioritizes detection based on a password reset event to produce an informational severity alert, then looks for preceding failed authentications and subsequent out-of-hours logons to indicate a potential compromise by raising severity accordingly.
You will need to utilise the AlertSeverityOverride configuration, pointed at the AlertSeverity field, in your Sentinel rule metaconfig to use this detection effectively.
Hard requirement: Need UEBA enabled in your tenant to populate the BlastRadius field in your IdentityInfo table.
Change each stage to suit your log source for the behaviour mapped to this stage.
Add in other stages if needed to add more dynamic severity (e.g., Account has high blast radius AND is a GA AND was logged in to from outside of expected geolocation > Critical severity)
The rule prioritizes detection based on a password reset event to produce an informational severity alert, then looks for preceding failed authentications and subsequent out-of-hours logons to indicate a potential compromise by raising severity accordingly.
You will need to utilise the AlertSeverityOverride configuration, pointed at the AlertSeverity field, in your Sentinel rule metaconfig to use this detection effectively.
Hard requirement: Need UEBA enabled in your tenant to populate the BlastRadius field in your IdentityInfo table.
Change each stage to suit your log source for the behaviour mapped to this stage.
Add in other stages if needed to add more dynamic severity (e.g., Account has high blast radius AND is a GA AND was logged in to from outside of expected geolocation > Critical severity)
Detects the installation of known malicious PyPI packages ('frint', 'skytext', 'slogsec', 'logcrypt.cryptography') associated with the ChocoPoC supply chain campaign. The rule monitors process execution commands related to 'pip' package installation and tracks the appearance of malicious compiled extension files ('gradient.pyd', 'gradient.so') on the filesystem.
This rule detects potential business email compromise (BEC) activity where a compromised mailbox is used to send internal phishing emails or fraudulent invoices to financial departments. It identifies emails sent internally with subjects containing keywords like 'Invoice', 'Payment', 'Wire Transfer', or 'Updated Account', and correlates them with email sending events from cloud applications.
Detects developers cloning a repository (mimicking a coding interview test) and immediately executing an anomalous binary or script hidden within the project structure. This behavior is indicative of the Void Dokkaebi threat actor's tactics.
Detects user execution of malicious files downloaded via email link clicks
Detects the abuse of SAP RFC function modules SXPG_CALL_SYSTEM and SXPG_COMMAND_INSERT to execute arbitrary OS commands. This activity, observed in the Operation Escaneo campaign, indicates potential unauthorized system command execution via SAP application components, often leveraging specific ZREDTEAM modules or scripts.
Detects anomalous activities associated with the Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) vulnerability. The rule identifies suspicious machine account password changes, NTLM authentication from potentially untrusted subnets or unconfigured workstations, and privilege escalation indicators occurring on domain controllers.
Detects malicious Python or JavaScript package archives (such as those used in dependency confusion attacks) that contain obfuscated code execution logic (base64 encoded commands) within package installation hooks (setup.py), or those embedding suspicious binary executables (PE/ELF headers) within the package structure.
Detects HTTP response bodies containing specific strings associated with the 'Montana Empire' phishing kit. This rule monitors for indicators that a web server is serving a phishing credential harvesting page.
Detects the Montana Empire Android malware, either through a direct SHA256 hash match or through structural characteristics of the APK file (such as the presence of 'post.apk') combined with specific embedded strings commonly found in the attacker's fraudulent mobile landing pages used for social proof.
Detects unauthorized access attempts to ServiceNow Scripted REST APIs, specifically targeting misconfigured endpoints that do not require authentication. This rule monitors for requests made by the 'guest' user, known malicious IP addresses, or requests missing authorization headers directed at potentially vulnerable APIs like 'related_list_edit'.
Detects the 'BadBlocker' Adblock for YouTube browser extension communicating with its command-and-control infrastructure to fetch and execute arbitrary scriptlets in the MAIN JavaScript world. By injecting directly into the page context, the extension gains unauthorized access to the DOM, user browsing sessions, and sensitive form data.
Detects SSH network connections initiated by common administrative service accounts 'vmanage-admin' or 'troot' using the ssh or sshd process. This pattern may indicate unauthorized use of these service accounts or anomalous remote access behavior.
This rule monitors network logs (proxy, web gateway, and DNS) to detect connections to a curated list of known malicious domains associated with phishing, credential harvesting, and malware delivery infrastructure.
This rule detects potentially malicious web content by identifying the use of randomized or specific combinations of CSS filters (saturate, hue-rotate, brightness, contrast) within HTML responses. These techniques are often used by attackers to obfuscate malicious content, such as phishing pages, from automated scanners and security filters. The rule also incorporates a check for unusually large JavaScript bundle sizes, which may indicate the presence of injected malicious scripts.
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