Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors network and email gateway logs to detect activity related to the Bluekit Phishing-as-a-Service (PhaaS) platform. It identifies traffic to known Bluekit command-and-control or phishing domains, detects the presence of rrweb scripts often associated with session recording on phishing pages, alerts on brand-impersonation phishing pages using specific keyword combinations, and flags the presence of FortiBleed campaign lures.
This rule detects successful network logons (LogonType 3) using NTLM (NTLMv1 or NTLMv2) where the authentication results in an elevated token and the logon originates from a different workstation than the target computer. This combination of factors can indicate lateral movement attempts, especially when an adversary has obtained NTLM hashes (e.g., via Pass-the-Hash or NTLM relay attacks) and is attempting to authenticate to other systems on the network. The rule excludes machine accounts and anonymous logons, as well as loopback authentications, to reduce noise.
Detects a potential logging sink hijack in Google Cloud Platform (GCP) by identifying the deletion of a logging sink's destination bucket followed by the creation of a new bucket with the same name in a different project. This technique could allow an attacker to redirect logs to an attacker-controlled bucket, impairing defenses and potentially exfiltrating sensitive log data.
This rule detects highly suspicious email attachments that mimic voicemail notifications, specifically targeting Scotiabank users. It identifies emails with attachments named like 'v-mail_*.mp3.eml' or ending with '.mp3.eml' where the attachment's MIME type is 'application/html'. The rule also looks for specific subject line keywords related to Scotiabank, Interac, e-Transfer, unauthorized activity, or a specific monetary value ('3,000'), and checks for an approximate file size of 6000-9000 bytes, consistent with known phishing lures.
Detects an inbound policy-themed PDF attachment whose extracted URLs lead to a sign-in, authentication, review, or acknowledgement workflow outside the organisation. This rule specifically looks for PDF attachments in emails where the subject contains terms like 'code of conduct', 'policy', 'compliance', or 'handbook', and the extracted URLs within the PDF contain keywords such as 'login', 'signin', 'auth', 'review', or 'acknowledge'.
This rule detects email-based phishing attempts that utilize a two-hop open-redirect mechanism by abusing legitimate SaaS platforms (holabrief.com and loopedin.io). It flags emails containing specific redirect links, often used to bypass traditional security filters by redirecting users through trusted domains before reaching a malicious destination.
This rule monitors inbound emails that exhibit signs of phishing, specifically looking for failures in email authentication protocols (DKIM, DMARC), the use of specific invoice-themed subject lines, and the inclusion of redirection links pointing to known third-party collaboration platforms (HolaBrief, LoopedIn). It also identifies cases where the sender's envelope domain differs from the header's 'From' domain, which is a common indicator of email spoofing used in identity-based attacks.
Detects modification of Azure management groups to bypass governance policies
Detects inbound phishing emails that fail both DKIM and DMARC checks, contain invoice-themed subject lines, and include links pointing to known open-redirect infrastructure (holabrief.com or loopedin.io). This pattern is consistent with credential harvesting campaigns using multi-hop SaaS redirects.
Detects HTTP requests to the SaaS platforms 'holabrief.com' or 'loopedin.io' that contain common URL redirection parameters, characteristic of an open-redirect abuse tactic used in phishing campaigns. These platforms are leveraged as intermediate hops to obfuscate the final destination of phishing links. The rule identifies the initial request and suggests correlation with subsequent traffic to unknown destinations to confirm a two-hop redirection chain.
Detects phishing emails that spoof specific healthcare domains (nhs.uk, mayoclinic.org, clevelandclinic.org) using invoice or payment-related subjects, characterized by DMARC/DKIM/SPF authentication failures. The detection correlates these emails with a subsequent user network request to known open-redirect or intermediary SaaS platforms (holabrief.com, loopedin.io) within a 10-minute window, indicating a likely credential harvesting or malware delivery sequence.
Detects potential Remote Code Execution (RCE) in an AutoGen Studio environment by correlating an unexpected outbound network connection from the AutoGen process to an external endpoint, followed by the immediate spawning of a command interpreter (shell) child process containing common command-line interface indicators (e.g., whoami, curl, wget, encoded PowerShell).
Detects a potential OS command injection attack targeting AutoGen Studio. The rule correlates a suspicious WebSocket connection to the Model Context Protocol (MCP) endpoint on localhost:8081, specifically containing the 'server_params' parameter, with a subsequent shell process spawning from an AutoGen Studio, Python, or Uvicorn parent process. The shell command line includes common injection characters (e.g., ;, |, &&, ||) and OS enumeration commands (e.g., whoami, id, net user).
Detects credential harvesting portals from evil twin Wi-Fi access points
Detects activity associated with the SNOWLIGHT malware, specifically the dropping of a malicious executable named 'wusvc.exe' or 'WindowsUpdate' into user-writable directories (Downloads or AppData), followed by the creation of an automatically starting Windows service that executes the dropped file. This rule correlates process creation/service registration events with SCM event 7045 entries.
Detects Node.js processes associated with NodeBB making outbound network connections to suspicious paths (/users/, /activities/, /inbox, /.well-known/webfinger). This activity may indicate exploitation of the NodeBB ActivityPub plugin (attributedTo UID spoofing), where an attacker forces the application to fetch attacker-controlled URIs.
Detects evidence of the NodeBB ActivityPub UID spoofing proof-of-concept (PoC) script (poc.js). The rule identifies the execution of node processes using specific command-line arguments (--target-base, --actor-origin, --spoof-uid, --recipient-uid) associated with the exploit, as well as Node.js processes making outbound network connections to ActivityPub path components (/inbox, /activitypub) over non-standard network ports. This activity is indicative of vulnerability testing or exploitation attempts.
Detects a sequence of reconnaissance commands (whoami, tasklist, systeminfo, netstat) executed by the command prompt and piped to a text file. This specific TTP was used in the Notepad++ supply chain attack to gather system information for exfiltration. The detection is scoped to specific AppData directories to reduce false positives.
This rule detects logon events from Windows Admin Center (WAC) virtual accounts where the associated user principal name (UPN) belongs to an external or unknown tenant. This activity is a key indicator of compromise for CVE-2026-20965, where an attacker uses a forged token from an external tenant to gain unauthorized access.
Detects anomalous child process execution from PHP worker processes (php-fpm, php-cgi, php.exe) that may indicate exploitation of a PHP 8.5.7 stream bucket Use-After-Free (UAF) vulnerability. Attackers can leverage crafted SOAP requests to achieve remote code execution, resulting in the PHP worker spawning command shells (e.g., sh, bash, cmd.exe) or other interpreters (e.g., python, curl) to execute malicious payloads.
Detects automated programmatic token refreshes (BAV2ROPC) originating from Railway IP space. This rule specifically looks for sign-in logs in Azure Active Directory where the UserAgent contains 'BAV2ROPC' and the IPAddress falls within known Railway PaaS IP ranges.
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