Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects outbound network communication from node.exe to the domain 'stitch-production.org'. This domain is associated with the 'Miasma' (also known as Mini Shai-Hulud) campaign, which uses malicious npm packages with post-install scripts to steal developer credentials, including Git, Docker, SSH, and cloud service configuration files.
This rule detects various techniques used by the Lambsys malware for persistence, watchdog monitoring, and cryptocurrency mining on Linux systems. It monitors for crontab modifications, the execution of hidden watchdog scripts in /var/tmp, the usage of pgrep to monitor the miner, and the detachment of processes via nohup.
This rule detects activities related to the DirtyClone exploit (CVE-2026-43503), including the execution of the exploit binary, the compilation of the exploit from source code using gcc, the use of unshare to prepare network and user namespaces, and suspicious execution of su by non-standard parent processes indicating potential post-exploit root shell acquisition.
Detects anomalous, high-volume npm package publication patterns from a single user account within a 5-minute window. This behavior is indicative of automated worm propagation or supply chain attacks using compromised developer tokens, specifically identified by high-frequency 'publish' events.
Detects the creation of executable or script files within the Windows Startup folder where the parent process is WinRAR.exe. This activity is a common indicator of an adversary leveraging a self-extracting archive or malicious file extraction to achieve persistence by placing a payload in the user's startup directory.
This rule detects potentially malicious command-line arguments used with common Linux utilities. It monitors for: the use of 'unshare' for namespace manipulation often used for privilege escalation or container escapes, the 'ip xfrm' command for configuring IPsec policies, and the loading of kernel modules ('modprobe'/'insmod') with suspicious parameters ('esp4', 'esp6', 'rxrpc') which could indicate the installation of malicious rootkits or kernel-level backdoors.
Detects modifications to Windows Registry keys related to Component Object Model (COM) objects (CLSID or InprocServer32) where the registry value points to suspicious file paths, specifically those within temporary directories like Temp or AppData. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to establish persistence or perform privilege escalation by hijacking COM object execution flow.
Detects the Drun/Chromelevator loader (drun.exe) performing cross-process memory allocation and remote thread creation via direct syscalls (NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) to bypass EDR user-mode API hooking during reflective payload injection. The rule specifically looks for 'drun.exe' initiating these syscalls within a 5-minute window.
Detects the loading of specific vulnerable drivers (Huawei, Topaz Antifraud, Tower of Fantasy, K7 Security) abused by DragonForce ransomware in Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks to terminate security software.
Detects the WinRAR process creating or modifying files within the Windows Startup folder. This activity is a common technique used by attackers to achieve persistence by ensuring that a malicious payload or script is executed automatically upon user logon.
Detects instances where the WinRAR process is used to create or modify files within the Windows startup directory. This behavior is highly suspicious and often indicates an adversary attempting to establish persistence by placing a malicious script or executable in a location that executes automatically upon user login.
Detects the Gamaredon PteroVDoor malware chain, including initial execution of obfuscated VBScript files from Office applications or temporary folders, the spawning of PowerShell with obfuscated arguments, subsequent C2 communication over common ports to dynamic DNS domains, and secondary WMI event subscription persistence.
Detects persistence mechanisms used by the lambsys/procq cryptominer. It identifies two specific behaviors: 1) Correlation of non-root process execution (isp.sh, lambsys, procq) followed within 120 seconds by modifications to cron configuration files (e.g., /etc/cron.d/, /var/spool/cron/crontabs/) containing suspicious command-line patterns or mining pool references. 2) Direct detection of crontab -e invocations using heredoc redirection (<<) to install persistence payloads that match known miner dropper patterns and mining pool endpoints.
Detects execution of PowerShell commands associated with the Gamaredon Group's Ptero malware family. This rule monitors for suspicious PowerShell command lines (including encoded commands and common obfuscation patterns) originating from Office applications or temporary directories, correlated with network connections to known Gamaredon C2 domains or registry modifications to Run keys for persistence.
Detects the multi-stage execution chain associated with the Gamaredon group's PteroEffigy loader. The rule monitors for PowerShell or scriptrunner instances originating from suspicious directories (AppData/Temp) that employ .NET reflection to load DLLs into memory. It then detects the subsequent creation of a scheduled task with a random alphanumeric name and the eventual execution of regsvr32 or rundll32 by that task to load the malicious DLL. Additionally, the rule identifies potential command-and-control activity by detecting specific Kazuar malware HTTP User-Agent strings.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with the Gamaredon Group (also known as Shuckworm/ACTINIUM) involving the Ptero-family of malware. The rule identifies suspicious combinations of encoded PowerShell commands (using -EncodedCommand, IEX, or FromBase64String), registry modification to Windows Run/RunOnce keys referencing suspicious interpreters (wscript, mshta, powershell, rundll32) within user profile paths, and command-line indicators of C2 activity such as DownloadString/WebClient or specific .ru/.online domain patterns.
Detects the attacker leveraging a stolen token to create or modify inbox rules (e.g., moving emails to RSS Subscriptions or Archive) to hide their activities. This rule specifically looks for actions like 'New-InboxRule' or 'Set-InboxRule' with parameters indicating email manipulation such as 'MoveToFolder', 'DeleteMessage', or 'MarkAsRead'.
Detects a user who interacted with a code-of-conduct lure subsequently authenticating through an anonymous proxy or anonymisation service. This rule correlates URL click events or sign-in events with subjects related to 'code of conduct' or 'policy acknowledgement' and then checks if the subsequent authentication occurred via an anonymous proxy.
Detects instances where common Windows processes (svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or notepad.exe) spawn suspicious child processes (such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or wscript.exe). The rule identifies potential process hollowing or living-off-the-land techniques by correlating parent-child relationships with suspicious command-line parameters (encoding, hidden execution, or in-memory execution) or anomalous file paths (running from user-writable directories).
Detects the transition to the BackgroundFix stage, where a VBScript or JScript file dropped in %AppData% establishes persistence via the registry Run key and executes silently via WScript.
Detects persistence mechanisms associated with ModeloRAT, specifically monitoring for suspicious Registry Run key entries, scheduled tasks, and startup folder items that execute 'pythonw.exe' or 'WPy64-31401' based binaries.
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