Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects modifications to common Windows Registry Run keys (Run, RunOnce, RunServices, RunServicesOnce) that include specific keywords ('ManageEngine', 'SystemOptimizer') and attempt to execute scripting tools (wscript, cscript, powershell, cmd). This pattern is often used by adversaries to establish persistence on a system.
This rule monitors for persistence mechanisms being established on Windows systems. Specifically, it tracks unauthorized modifications to the HKEY_CURRENT_USER Run registry key using 'reg.exe', the creation of scheduled tasks using 'schtasks.exe', and suspicious process spawning patterns where 'MpExtMs.exe' executes 'reg.exe' or 'schtasks.exe' to facilitate persistence.
Detects the Windows RAT from the PostCSS typosquatting campaign establishing persistence by writing a registry Run key value named 'csshost' via chost.exe. The RAT targets HKCU and HKLM CurrentVersion\Run to survive reboots.
This rule detects the suspicious behavior where the process 'MpExtMs.exe' loads the 'EndpointDlp.dll' library into memory without any corresponding file creation or modification events for that DLL. This pattern is indicative of reflective code loading or fileless execution techniques often associated with Backdoor.Mistic (MLTBackdoor), where malicious code is executed directly from memory to evade disk-based security controls.
Detects usage of Sysinternals PsSuspend which can be abused to suspend critical processes
This rule detects successful OAuth logins originating from IP addresses identified as residential proxies. This behavior can indicate an adversary attempting to bypass geo-blocking or other IP-based restrictions, potentially using stolen credentials (Valid Accounts) or after a successful phishing campaign (Spearphishing Link) to gain initial access or maintain persistence.
Detects Electron applications attempting to establish persistence using `setLoginItemSettings` in conjunction with JavaScript code execution (`eval`) or external process execution (`child_process` and `execFile`). This combination is indicative of malicious activity, such as that observed in Clickfix attacks, where an application gains persistence and then executes arbitrary code.
This rule identifies the Potemkin Loader establishing persistence by creating a scheduled task. The scheduled task is configured to execute a Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) payload upon user logon or system startup. Detection is based on `schtasks.exe` command-line arguments that include `/create`, `/tn` (task name), and `/tr` (task run) pointing to an executable within an `AppData` directory.
This rule detects suspicious activities related to OAuth application consent and service principal operations originating from IP addresses identified as proxy infrastructure. Specifically, it looks for actions such as adding service principal credentials, granting OAuth2Permission, consenting to applications, adding delegated permission grants, and adding service principals or applications, when these actions are performed from a proxy IP address. This combination of activities and source IP can indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges within an Azure AD environment.
Detects a driver containing strings associated with the SprySocks malware, specifically related to Windows Filtering Platform (WFP) manipulation and the 'RawWNPF' string. The rule looks for the presence of 'RawWNPF', 'FwpmEngineOpen', 'FwpmFilterAdd', 'FwpmSubLayerAdd', and 'Delivery Optimization' within a file identified as a Windows executable (MZ header).
Detects MYRA RAT install-guard.js preinstall hook forcing re-execution with sudo npm install -g apintergrationpost to gain root privileges
Detects the use of net.exe or net1.exe to add a local user account to the 'Administrators' or 'Remote Desktop Users' groups. This is a common technique used by attackers to gain persistent, elevated access or enable remote access to a compromised machine.
This rule detects crashes in Nginx worker processes, specifically looking for messages indicating a 'signal 11' or 'SIGSEGV' error. This could be indicative of a vulnerability being exploited (e.g., CVE-2026-42945) or other critical software malfunctions.
This rule detects attempts to establish persistence for 'vds.exe' (Virtual Disk Service) by modifying the Image File Execution Options (IFEO) registry key to point its debugger to an executable located within the Windows Fonts directory. This technique is often used by adversaries to maintain access or elevate privileges, as the Fonts directory is typically writable by standard users and can be used to hide malicious executables.
Detects potential process impersonation by monitoring for suspicious named pipe creation followed by system-level process spawning.
Detects the use of the `sysadminctl` utility with the `addUser` or `-addUser` command-line arguments, which can be used to create new user accounts on macOS systems. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistences by creating new accounts.
This rule detects various stages of a cryptojacking campaign, as described by Microsoft, involving initial access via autorun.dll sideloading, silent MSI installations, execution of RuntimeHost.exe from suspicious locations, scheduled task creation for persistence, .NET process hollowing, Windows Defender exclusions, and persistence via Startup folder shortcuts and Registry Run keys. The campaign leverages ScreenConnect for remote access and .NET utilities for process hollowing, ultimately leading to GPU mining cryptojacking.
Detects the Drun/Chromelevator loader (drun.exe) performing cross-process memory allocation and remote thread creation via direct syscalls (NtAllocateVirtualMemory, NtWriteVirtualMemory, NtCreateThreadEx) to bypass EDR user-mode API hooking during reflective payload injection. The rule specifically looks for 'drun.exe' initiating these syscalls.
Detects a successful self-service password reset for a privileged or high-value account when the initiating context does not match an approved helpdesk workflow.
Detects rapid failed local Windows account logon attempts consistent with Pony malware's built-in dictionary brute-force routine. The rule identifies a high volume of type-2 interactive logon failures against multiple local accounts in a short time window, indicative of brute-force activity using LogonUserA.
This rule detects the creation of scheduled tasks or 'at' jobs initiated by VBScript engines (wscript.exe or cscript.exe). This behavior can be indicative of malicious activity, such as persistence mechanisms established by malware or phishing attacks that leverage VBScript to schedule future execution.
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