Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects sign-ins from additional IP ranges associated with Kali365 infrastructure and proxies, which could indicate token replay attacks or other unauthorized access attempts.
This rule detects suspicious remote thread creation events (Sysmon Event ID 8) where a process initiates a thread in high-value system processes like lsass.exe, svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or winlogon.exe. It specifically filters out activity originating from common Windows system directories, highlighting potential process injection attempts by unauthorized binaries.
Detects instances where the SSH daemon (sshd) or its related components, such as PAM libraries, create or write to files located in /tmp/ or hidden files in /var/ directories, which may indicate unauthorized configuration changes, credential manipulation, or staging of malicious files.
Detects the creation or modification of files within /etc/systemd/system/ or /etc/init.d/ by non-standard management processes. Attackers often use these paths to establish persistence by creating or altering service unit files to execute malicious code automatically upon system boot or service restart. The rule specifically excludes common system management tools.
This rule detects instances where a process loads a DLL from suspicious, commonly user-writable directories (such as Temp, AppData, ProgramData, or Public). It filters for DLLs that lack standard file metadata (FileVersion/Description) or contain an OriginalFileName mismatch, which is often indicative of side-loading or malicious library injection. The rule further correlates this event with a network connection initiated by the same process to highlight potential C2 activity associated with the suspicious DLL load.
Detects the execution of GSocket (gs-netcat), a network tool often used for establishing persistent backdoors, interactive shells, or SOCKS proxies. The rule identifies execution with common flags for daemonization, interactive shell access, or SOCKS proxying, as well as instances where the process masquerades as common system binaries (e.g., smbd, sshd) or is initiated from system persistence directories like systemd or init.d.
Detects instances where the sshd process or PAM-related processes create or write to files within temporary directories (/tmp/ or /var/). This behavior is often associated with the staging of malicious scripts, backdoors, or tools during an attack involving credential abuse or unauthorized access via SSH.
Detects the use of a masquerading binary named 'uptime' for persistence or malicious activity on Linux systems. This rule monitors for unauthorized 'uptime' process activity such as network connections, spawning of shell/interpreter processes, creation of systemd service unit files, and manipulation via systemctl, as well as execution from non-standard directories.
Detects the NUKESPED backdoor component 'zlrenu8.exe' interacting with the 'SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows' registry key. This activity is consistent with malware performing environment profiling or establishing persistence by targeting registry keys used for automatic startup.
Detects suspicious service-based persistence activity associated with JFMBackdoor, specifically when fltMC.exe (a known host process) initiates child processes sc.exe or services.exe to create or start a service, using file paths located in C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Network and specific registry key modification patterns.
Detects the execution of Red Lamassu's JFMBackdoor payload by monitoring for fltMC.exe being launched from temporary directories. The rule identifies a sideloading technique where fltMC.exe loads a malicious FLTLIB.dll, which then injects the flt.bin shellcode stub into memory, avoiding writing the malicious PE file to disk.
Detects the co-occurrence of JFMBackdoor DLL sideloading via fltMC.exe and an additional PlugX DLL sideloading event originating from a temporary directory on the same host. This pattern is indicative of the Red Lamassu actor group deploying shared tooling for lateral movement and persistence.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows services using sc.exe or PowerShell New-Service where the binary path points to suspicious user-writable directories such as Temp or AppData, a technique observed in the Red Lamassu JFMBackdoor infection chain.
Detects potential persistence via the creation of suspicious systemd service files. The rule monitors for new service files created by non-package manager processes, correlates these with subsequent 'systemctl enable' or 'start' operations, and identifies the execution of binaries from non-standard directories (e.g., /tmp, /dev/shm) by the systemd process.
Detects a suspicious sequence where DllHost.exe writes an executable or script to a common public directory (such as C:\Users\Public\, C:\Windows\Temp\, or C:\ProgramData\), followed by the execution of that file within 30 minutes by a system process (svchost.exe or services.exe), often indicative of a scheduled task or service-based persistence mechanism.
Detects anomalous registry activity associated with the JFMBackdoor, specifically when the legitimate Windows utility fltMC.exe is used for registry modification or enumeration. This rule looks for high-frequency registry operations performed by fltMC.exe, particularly targeting common persistence locations or other registry paths, indicating potential malicious use following DLL side-loading.
Detects the creation or modification of files within the 'C:\ProgramData\Windows Multimedia' directory, a path associated with JFMBackdoor's screen capture output. The rule specifically monitors for this activity when initiated by 'fltMC.exe', which is known to be used by this malware for DLL side-loading.
Detects network connection attempts or successes from critical Windows processes (System, svchost.exe, lsass.exe) targeting the localhost interface (127.0.0.1 or ::1) on non-standard ports (above 1024, excluding SMB ports 445/139). This behavior is often indicative of local process injection, credential dumping activity, or unauthorized inter-process communication used by malware to bypass network security controls.
Detects anomalous registry activity by wscript.exe, specifically targeting keys associated with file association, COM object registration, or run-time startup locations. A high count of registry open operations by a scripting engine often indicates persistence installation or reconnaissance of system configuration.
Detects execution of schtasks.exe initiated by common scripting languages (wscript, cscript, powershell, pwsh) or execution involving files within the ProgramData directory, which are frequent indicators of malicious activity related to persistence or automated task manipulation.
Detects the execution of 'sudo npm install -g apintergrationpost', a known command pattern utilized by the MYRA RAT. This pattern leverages sudo for elevated privilege installation via a malicious npm package hook, facilitating potential privilege escalation.
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