Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects Hannibal Stealer-related process injection patterns involving the use of legitimate Windows binaries (sppextcomobj.exe, slui.exe) spawned by rundll32.exe, or specific child-process relationships, correlated with directory paths associated with CefSharp.BrowsersSubprocess or SCef.WindowsAdapter, which are indicative of malware staging.
Detects instances where WScript.exe queries or modifies multiple sensitive Windows Registry keys. This behavior is often associated with script-based malware attempting to modify file associations, persistence mechanisms, or security policies as part of an infection or post-exploitation process.
This rule monitors for processes named 'setup.exe' executing from user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Downloads, Temp) that load unsigned or non-Microsoft DLLs from the same suspicious directories. This pattern is commonly associated with DLL side-loading or malicious installation attempts where a process attempts to load illegitimate code from local user space.
Detects the modification of the 'LoadMacroProviderOnBoot' registry value in Microsoft Outlook. Enabling this setting can cause Outlook to load macros upon startup, which is a technique often leveraged for persistence or malicious code execution.
Detects instances where explorer.exe loads a DLL file from within C:\ProgramData. This behavior is often associated with adversary activity attempting to hide malicious modules in directories that may have permissive write access or are excluded from routine scans, including techniques used by Covenant frameworks or C2 agents.
Detects potentially malicious process execution behaviors, including the use of 'runas.exe' with saved credentials, the execution of 'runas.exe' by unauthorized users, and unauthorized cross-process access to sensitive Windows system processes such as lsass.exe, winlogon.exe, or services.exe, which are common indicators of credential access or privilege escalation attempts.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows services using sc.exe where the binary path (binpath) points to suspicious or user-writable directories such as User profiles, AppData, Temp, or Public folders, which are often used by adversaries for persistence or privilege escalation.
Detects the creation or modification of Windows Registry Run keys by processes that are not part of the standard Microsoft Windows installation, suggesting potential unauthorized persistence mechanisms.
This rule detects cross-process operations (such as memory access or thread injection) initiated by processes that are not signed by known, trusted vendors, or that do not reside in protected system directories. This behavior is a common indicator of process injection techniques used to evade security controls.
Detects potential WMI persistence mechanisms by monitoring the execution of 'mofcomp.exe' by non-Microsoft signed binaries, the creation of MOF files in suspicious user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, etc.), and the suspicious execution of 'scrcons.exe', which is the WMI permanent event consumer process.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving container runtimes (e.g., Docker) that indicates potential container escape attempts or unauthorized host interaction. It flags scenarios where container processes spawn administrative shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) with SYSTEM privileges, instances of privileged container creation, or direct access to physical drives from container management tools, which are common indicators of host filesystem manipulation.
Detects the execution of known privilege escalation tools (JuicyPotato, RoguePotato, PrintSpoofer) or command-line arguments indicative of token impersonation attempts (e.g., usage of SeImpersonatePrivilege) to escalate privileges on Windows systems.
Detects potential WMI persistence mechanisms by monitoring the execution of 'mofcomp.exe' by non-Microsoft signed binaries, the creation of MOF files in suspicious user-writable directories (Temp, AppData, etc.), and the suspicious execution of 'scrcons.exe', which is the WMI permanent event consumer process.
Detects when a signed process loads a DLL from a non-standard, user-writable directory (e.g., Temp, Downloads, Public folders). This is a common indicator of DLL hijacking or side-loading, where a legitimate signed application is leveraged to load a malicious library from a compromised location.
Detects the execution of an injector process associated with MYRA RAT, specifically monitoring for ptrace-based process injection techniques. The rule identifies processes attempting to attach to other processes using system calls like PTRACE_ATTACH, PTRACE_PEEKDATA, PTRACE_POKEDATA, or process_vm_writev. It also flags the specific behavior of spawning a 'sleep 600' decoy process as an injection target.
Detects instances where common Windows system processes (dllhost.exe, mmc.exe, svchost.exe) spawn known living-off-the-land binaries (LotLBin) or command-line interpreters. This behavior is often indicative of process injection or malicious activity where an adversary leverages trusted system processes to execute commands or malicious scripts.
This rule detects suspicious activity involving container runtimes (e.g., Docker) that indicates potential container escape attempts or unauthorized host interaction. It flags scenarios where container processes spawn administrative shells (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) with SYSTEM privileges, instances of privileged container creation, or direct access to physical drives from container management tools, which are common indicators of host filesystem manipulation.
Detects a sequence of events where an actor deletes a Google Cloud Storage bucket and then immediately recreates it, a pattern consistent with bucket hijacking intended to manipulate resource access or bypass security controls on data streams.
Detects the use of the sc.exe utility to create a new service on a remote system by specifying a path using a UNC share. This behavior is indicative of lateral movement, where an attacker attempts to execute code on a remote host by installing a service via SMB/Admin Shares.
Detects network connection activity originating from a host to the hardcoded IP 62.102.148.212 on port 37393, which is identified as a command and control (C2) endpoint for Remcos RAT. This communication is often associated with process hollowing where the malware hides within legitimate browser processes.
Detects the OXLOADER malware dropping a malicious copy of dui70.dll renamed as a random .ocx file into the user's temporary directory. The rule identifies subsequent loading of this dropped file via LoadLibraryA, which is indicative of module stomping techniques where malicious code in an added .xtext section is executed within the context of a legitimate system component.
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